MYERS VS. HASKINS (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review: A district court's decision to deny a motion to modify physical custody without an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 338, 419 P.3d 157, 160 (2018). Abuse occurs only when "no reasonable judge could reach a similar conclusion under the same circumstances." In re Guardianship of Rubin, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 27, 491 P.3d 1, 6 (2021). Deference is not owed to legal error or to conclusory findings that may mask legal error. Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 450, 352 P.3d 1139, 1142 (2015). Doctrinal framework: Under Rooney v. Rooney, 109 Nev. 540, 542-43, 853 P.2d 123, 124-25 (1993), a movant seeking custody modification is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only on a showing of "adequate cause," which requires a prima facie case for modification. The substantive modification test requires (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) that the child's best interest is served by modification. Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 1, 501 P.3d 980, 983 (2022) (quoting Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 150, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007)). Holding on the source-of-evidence question: In assessing whether the movant has demonstrated a prima facie case, the district court must generally consider only the properly alleged facts in the movant's verified pleadings, affidavits, or declarations, and must accept those specific allegations as true. The court relied on section 410 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (the model on which Rooney was patterned), and on persuasive authority including Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Volz v. Peterson, 667 N.W.2d 637, 641 (N.D. 2003); Betzer v. Betzer, 749 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); and Boland v. Murtha, 800 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). The court analogized to NRCP 41(b) prima facie practice under Bareli v. Bareli, 113 Nev. 873, 879-80, 944 P.2d 246, 249-50 (1997), and Fernandez v. Admirand, 108 Nev. 963, 968, 843 P.2d 354, 358 (1992), and to Arcella v. Arcella, 133 Nev. 868, 872, 407 P.3d 341, 346 (2017) (a Rooney decision may not be made on "contradictory sworn pleadings [and] arguments of counsel," quoting Mizrachi v. Mizrachi, 132 Nev. 666, 678, 385 P.3d 982, 990 (Ct. App. 2016)). The district court may not weigh evidence or assess credibility before an evidentiary hearing. Exception announced: A district court may consider a nonmovant's evidentiary submission when it "conclusively establishes" the falsity of the movant's allegations. Mock v. Mock, 673 N.W.2d 635, 637-38 (N.D. 2004). This exception serves Rooney's twin purposes of discouraging temporary-custody contests and preventing repeated or insubstantial modification motions. Rooney, 109 Nev. at 543 n.4, 853 P.2d at 125 n.4. Limitations on cognizable allegations: District courts need not consider allegations that are irrelevant, cumulative, impeaching, or merely permit inferences sufficient to establish grounds for modification. Rooney, 109 Nev. at 543, 853 P.2d at 125. Courts also need not credit general, vague, broad, or conclusory allegations. See DCR 13(5); Pridgeon v. Superior Court, 655 P.2d 1, 5 (Ariz. 1982); Madgett v. Madgett, 360 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Schumacker v. Schumacker, 796 N.W.2d 636, 640 (N.D. 2011); In re Marriage of MacLaren, 440 P.3d 1055, 1067 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). Allegations must be supported by verified pleadings, declarations, or affidavits. NRS 15.010; NRS 53.045; EDCR 5.102; DCR 13(6). The substantial-change prong is limited to facts post-dating the last custody determination, Ellis, 123 Nev. at 151, 161 P.3d at 243, although prior-order facts may be considered for best-interest analysis, Nance v. Ferraro, 134 Nev. 152, 161-63, 418 P.3d 679, 686-88 (Ct. App. 2018). Application: Lisa's declarations alleged specific facts implicating multiple statutory best-interest factors, NRS 125C.0035(4)(a), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k); NRS 125C.0035(5); NRS 125C.0035(1)(b) (incorporating NRS 33.018(1)); including alleged domestic violence by household members, deprivation and substantial interference with parenting time (Martin v. Martin, 120 Nev. 342, 346, 90 P.3d 981, 983 (2004), abrogated on other grounds by Ellis), and a slide in academic performance (Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244). The district court instead weighed Caleb's CPS report, unauthenticated medical and dental records (see NRS 52.325(2)), and contested email correspondence against Lisa's allegations. The court of appeals held that an unsubstantiated CPS finding does not "conclusively establish" falsity because it requires credibility and thoroughness assessments suited to a hearing; CPS reports are not automatically admissible (In re Parental Rights as to J.D.N., 128 Nev. 462, 469-70, 283 P.3d 842, 847-48 (2012)) and serve a different statutory purpose (NRS 432B.180; NRS 432B.330; NRS 432B.340). Because Lisa's properly supported allegations stated a prima facie case, denial without an evidentiary hearing was an abuse of discretion. Findings requirement: Extending Davis v. Ewalefo to the Rooney threshold, the court held that when a district court denies a modification motion without an evidentiary hearing, it must make specific findings and provide an adequate explanation - because such denial has the same practical effect as a denial on the merits. The court contrasted NRCP 52(a)(3). The order under review supplied only a conclusory recitation mirroring Rooney's elements, which is insufficient. Form of the hearing on remand: The form, timing, scope, and discovery aspects of the evidentiary hearing remain within the district court's broad discretion. Arcella, 133 Nev. at 872, 407 P.3d at 346; Primm v. Lopes, 109 Nev. 502, 504, 853 P.2d 103, 104 (1993); see also NRCP 16.215; NRCP 16.21(b). The court noted that postjudgment discovery generally is disfavored absent good cause or an ordered evidentiary hearing because the Rooney inquiry focuses on the movant's verified submissions.

In plain language

This case is about when a Nevada family court must hold a full hearing before deciding whether to change which parent has primary physical custody of a child. Caleb Haskins and Lisa Myers divorced in 2012 and have one child, S.H. (now 12). Caleb has primary physical custody and lives in Oregon; Lisa lives in Nevada and has the child during school breaks. In 2020, Lisa did not return S.H. to Caleb after summer break, saying the child had a panic attack at the airport and refused to fly. Caleb asked the court to enforce the custody order; Lisa filed a countermotion asking the court to give her primary physical custody, alleging that Caleb and his current wife were neglecting and verbally abusing the child, denying her parenting time, making the child sleep on a foam mattress in a non-bedroom in an overcrowded house, failing to address dental problems, and assigning the child excessive caregiving duties for other children in the home. The district court ordered Caleb to return the child and allowed both sides 90 days to gather information. After receiving documents and statements from both parents, the district court denied Lisa's motion to change custody without holding an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where witnesses testify and the judge weighs evidence). The judge said it was a "close call" but concluded Lisa had not shown enough to justify a hearing, in part because Caleb had submitted an Oregon Child Protective Services report that did not substantiate similar claims. The Court of Appeals reversed. Drawing on a 1993 Nevada Supreme Court decision, Rooney v. Rooney, the court explained that a parent seeking to modify custody is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if she presents a "prima facie case" - meaning, on the face of her allegations, enough specific facts that, if true, would justify changing custody. The big question the court answered for the first time is: what materials may a judge look at when deciding whether the moving parent has cleared that initial bar? The court's answer has two parts. As a general rule, the judge should look only at the moving parent's properly sworn statements - verified pleadings, affidavits, or declarations - and accept those specific factual allegations as true. The judge should not weigh the other parent's competing evidence or judge anyone's credibility at this stage; that is what the evidentiary hearing itself is for. The narrow exception: if the non-moving parent's evidence "conclusively establishes" that the moving parent's allegations are false, the judge may consider it. Applying that framework, the court held that the district judge made a mistake by weighing Caleb's CPS report and other documents against Lisa's sworn allegations. A CPS report that did not substantiate similar claims does not "conclusively" prove Lisa's allegations are false - evaluating such a report requires credibility findings that belong at a hearing. And even setting the CPS report aside, Lisa's specific allegations (about domestic violence in the home, neglected dental care, deprived parenting time, falling math grades, and the child's living conditions and wishes) tied to Nevada's best-interest factors were enough to require a hearing. The court also held that when a judge denies a custody-modification motion without a hearing, the order must include specific findings and an adequate explanation, not just a conclusory recitation of the legal standard - both to allow appellate review and to help the parents (often self-represented) understand why their motion failed. The case goes back to the district court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing, though the court emphasized that the form and scope of that hearing remain within the trial judge's broad discretion.