NEYMAN VS. NEYMAN

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

**Alimony modification jurisdiction (Siragusa).** The court reviewed questions of law, including interpretation of caselaw, de novo (Martin v. Martin), but treated whether a party is in arrears as a question of fact reviewed for clear error (Wilford v. Wilford; cf. Taylor v. Vilecheck). Under Siragusa v. Siragusa, a district court retains jurisdiction to modify the alimony portion of a divorce decree regardless of whether all payments were made, so long as the original alimony period has not elapsed; and a court also maintains jurisdiction where the period expired while the obligor was in arrears. Here, the alimony period ran through April 30, 2022 (seven years from a May 1, 2015 start), and Natasha filed on June 30, 2022. The court rejected her contention that text messages modified the start date, because the decree required modification by "written agreement signed by both parties." Because the period had expired, jurisdiction existed only if Michael was in arrears when she filed — and the district court's finding that he was not in arrears was not clearly erroneous, given Natasha's own concessions that the final payment was made in June 2022. To the extent she argued a July 2022 payment evidenced arrears, that argument was waived under Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown. In a footnote, the court distinguished Siragusa and Schryver v. Schryver, noting that no Nevada authority permits modification through the end of the final payment month unless that end date falls within the decreed alimony period. **Reservation-of-jurisdiction provision.** Divorce decrees incorporating settlement agreements are interpreted under contract principles and reviewed de novo (Martin v. Martin), and unambiguous language is enforced as written (Nev. State Educ. Ass'n v. Clark Cnty. Educ. Ass'n). The court acknowledged that, under Kilgore v. Kilgore, the reservation-of-jurisdiction provision gave the district court discretion to determine whether compensatory alimony was "necessary to enforce or effectuate" the decree's terms. However, Natasha argued below only that the existence of arrears conferred jurisdiction, not that compensatory alimony was necessary to enforce the decree. The court held that the mere existence of arrears does not establish that compensatory alimony is necessary, and declined to consider the unraised theory (Old Aztec Mine). **Child support.** Child support determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion and upheld if supported by substantial evidence (Miller v. Miller), but the court must follow statutory guidelines (NRS 125B.080(2); NRS 125B.145(2)(b)). NAC 425.140 sets the base obligation, presumed to meet the child's basic needs, rebuttable under NAC 425.100(2); deviation requires calculating the base obligation and making findings under the eight factors of NAC 425.150(1) (Matkulak v. Davis). Natasha did not quantify the children's special needs or contend below that the $4,035 base obligation was insufficient, and did not file a pretrial memorandum raising the point. She therefore forfeited the claim that an upward adjustment was required, and the district court was not required to make NAC 425.150(1) findings. Her adult-child-support claim (regarding support beyond majority) was not clearly raised below — including under NRS 125B.110 — and was likewise forfeited. **Rehabilitative alimony reimbursement (the reversal).** Alimony determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion (Eivazi v. Eivazi), but no deference is owed to legal error (Davis v. Ewalefo). Under NRCP 7(b)(1), a request for a court order must be made by motion stating the grounds with particularity and the relief sought. Michael alleged overpayment in his opposition but did not seek reimbursement or specify an amount until his pretrial memorandum — filed after counsel's withdrawal, after discovery closed, and two weeks before the hearing. The court held that considering this request violated Natasha's due process rights for lack of adequate notice and opportunity to respond (citing Miller v. Miller, No. 87625-COA (Nev. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2024) (Order of Affirmance); cf. Spears v. Spears). The court further held that NRCP 54(c), while permitting relief different from that requested, does not authorize relief on issues not properly raised (Yount v. Criswell Radovan, LLC), and that Michael's unjust-enrichment and equitable theories were forfeited (Old Aztec Mine). The court reversed the $8,500 award. **Attorney fees under the decree's fee-shifting provision.** Natasha sought fees below only under NRS 125.150, NRS 18.010(2), and EDCR 7.60(b), not under the decree's fee-shifting provision, so that theory was forfeited on appeal (Old Aztec Mine; Dermody v. City of Reno). As to fees on appeal, neither party cogently argued they were "required to go to court to enforce" the decree (Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest.), and neither prevailed on a "dispute ... relating to the terms of" the decree; thus neither was entitled to appellate fees. **Motion to continue.** Reviewed for abuse of discretion (Bongiovi v. Sullivan; see Matter of J.B.); a party may move for a continuance for good cause (EDCR 7.30; EDCR 7.01). The record did not show the denial was a penalty for failing to file a pretrial memorandum or a finding that discovery was irrelevant. The matter had been pending roughly nine months, Natasha did not articulate what additional discovery was needed, conceded she had received over a thousand pages of discovery, and stated she would proceed. No abuse of discretion. **Evidentiary rulings.** Reviewed for abuse of discretion (FGA, Inc. v. Giglio), which occurs if a decision is arbitrary, capricious, or exceeds the bounds of law or reason (Skender v. Brunsonbuilt Constr. & Dev. Co.). The district court properly struck documents filed directly after discovery closed and instructed Natasha to bring them to the hearing for authentication and objection (Sanders v. Sears-Page), and the court could not view the electronic documents at the hearing; requiring physical copies was not arbitrary or capricious. **Post-judgment interest** on the $6,500 in unpaid attorney fees was not sought below and was forfeited (Old Aztec Mine). **Reassignment on remand** was not warranted (Roe v. Roe).

In plain language

Natasha and Michael Neyman married in 2002, had two children, separated in 2006, and divorced in 2015 through an agreed-upon (stipulated) divorce decree. The decree gave Natasha primary physical custody and required Michael to pay child support, the children's extracurricular costs, and two kinds of spousal support (alimony): $3,000 per month in general family support and $2,000 per month in "rehabilitative" alimony to help pay for Natasha's education. To get the rehabilitative alimony, Natasha had to give Michael proof she was enrolled in school. These payments were to run for seven years, starting May 1, 2015, meaning the final payment was due April 20, 2022. Natasha stopped going to school at the end of 2020 because she and the children had health problems, and by January 2021 she was no longer enrolled. She did not give Michael proof of enrollment, but Michael kept paying her $2,000 per month for 15 more months — a total of $30,000. On June 30, 2022 — about two months after the alimony period ended — Natasha filed a motion asking the court to increase child support and family support because Michael's income had gone up sharply, and to recover money she said Michael still owed her. Michael agreed his child support should go up, but said his alimony obligation had ended in May 2022 and that he was not behind on any payments. The district court ruled that it had no power (jurisdiction) to change the alimony because the alimony period had already expired when Natasha filed her motion, and there was no evidence Michael was behind. It raised Michael's monthly child support to $4,035. It also found that Natasha had failed her duty to give proof of school enrollment for 15 months, but that Michael knew or should have known she was no longer in school. Splitting the difference, the court ordered Natasha to repay Michael $15,000 — half of what he had paid during that period — then subtracted $6,500 in attorney fees Michael still owed her, leaving Natasha owing Michael $8,500. The court found neither side was a "prevailing party," so each paid their own fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court on most points but reversed the order requiring Natasha to repay the rehabilitative alimony. The court explained that under Nevada law, once an alimony period ends, a court can only modify alimony if the paying spouse was behind ("in arrears") when the motion was filed. Here, the alimony period had ended on April 30, 2022, and Natasha herself had admitted Michael had made all his payments before she filed. The text messages she pointed to as a supposed agreement to push the start date back did not count, because the decree said it could only be changed by a written agreement signed by both parties. The most important reversal concerned the order that Natasha repay $8,500. The court found that Michael never properly asked for that money back. He mentioned in passing that he had overpaid, but he did not formally request reimbursement, and did not say how much, until his pretrial memorandum — filed after Natasha's lawyer had quit, after the discovery period closed, and just two weeks before the hearing. The court concluded this violated Natasha's right to fair notice and a chance to respond (due process). It therefore reversed the repayment order and directed that Natasha receive the full $6,500 in unpaid attorney fees with no reduction. The court also upheld the child support ruling (finding Natasha had not properly argued below that the base amount was too low for the children's needs), upheld the denial of her request to postpone the hearing, and upheld the court's refusal to accept her digital documents, which she needed to bring in physical form so they could be authenticated and so Michael could object.