NOBLE VS. NOBLE (CHILD SUPPORT)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The appeal challenged a district court order that, as a sanction for the custodial mother's persistent denial of court-ordered visitation, suspended alimony and child support and relieved the father of maintaining the mother as an insured or beneficiary until she submitted an acceptable visitation-compliance plan. The court affirmed as to alimony and insurance but remanded as to child support. Recognizing the courts' inherent power to enforce and defend their decrees by contempt, the court sustained suspension of alimony and the insurance obligations. Lamb v. Lamb, 83 Nev. 425, 433 P.2d 265 (1967); McCormick v. District Court, 67 Nev. 318, 218 P.2d 939 (1950); see Levell v. Levell, 190 P.2d 527 (Ore. 1948) (recognizing power to suspend alimony while the mother illegally deprives the father of visitation). It rejected the mother's inadequate-notice argument, holding the father's motion (seeking relief from support, insurance, and 'any other financial contribution in whatever form') and the court's earlier open-court warning gave adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. As to child support, the court identified a head-on confrontation between the inherent contempt power (Lamb; In re Chartz, 29 Nev. 110, 85 P. 352 (1907)) and the paramount principle that the best interest and welfare of a minor child controls. Atkins v. Atkins, 50 Nev. 333, 259 P. 288 (1927); Peavey v. Peavey, 85 Nev. 571, 460 P.2d 110 (1969). Although a court may modify or vacate a child support order (NRS 125.140(2)), it must do so for cause, and here there were no findings on the effect of total suspension on the child's present comfort and future well-being. While findings may be implied where the record is clear (State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. Olsen, 76 Nev. 176, 351 P.2d 186 (1960)), they will not be implied where the record is unclear or devoid of evidence on the point. Richfield Oil Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 85 Nev. 185, 452 P.2d 462 (1969). The court therefore could not review whether the contempt power or the child-welfare principle should prevail, and remanded for adequate findings. Cf. Fenkell v. Fenkell, 86 Nev. 397, 469 P.2d 701 (1970). Denial of a continuance was within the trial court's discretion, and the mother's noncompliance justified denying her attorney's fees on appeal.

In plain language

When Marguerite and Leighton Noble divorced in 1966, Marguerite received custody of their son Scott, alimony, and child support, and Leighton was ordered to keep certain insurance and to have reasonable visitation. Although Leighton paid on time, Marguerite repeatedly blocked or frustrated his visits with Scott. The trial court warned her, in open court, that if she kept denying visitation it might use sanctions, including relieving Leighton of support payments, and it set specific visitation times. The situation did not improve. In 1969, Leighton moved to be relieved of all child support, insurance premiums, and 'any other financial contribution.' After a hearing, the trial court suspended both child support and alimony and relieved Leighton of maintaining Marguerite under the insurance policies, until Marguerite submitted an acceptable plan for complying with the visitation orders. Marguerite appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed most of the order but sent one piece back. It held the trial court acted within its inherent power to enforce its own decrees when it suspended alimony and the insurance obligations as a sanction for Marguerite's contumacious denial of visitation, and that she had received adequate notice (Leighton's motion sought relief from any financial contribution 'in whatever form') and an opportunity to be heard. But the suspension of child support raised a conflict between the court's power to punish contempt and the paramount principle that a child's best interest and welfare come first. Because the trial court made no findings about how a total suspension of child support would affect the child's present comfort and future well-being, and the record would not let the court imply such findings, the case was remanded for the trial court to make those findings on the child support suspension. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying Marguerite a continuance and denied her attorney's fees on appeal.