NORMAN VS. STAMPER (FAMILY)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of a NRCP 60(b)(3) motion for abuse of discretion, citing Vargas v. J Morales Inc., 138 Nev. 384, 387, 510 P.3d 777, 780 (2022) ("The district court has wide discretion to grant or deny a motion to set aside a judgment under NRCP 60(b), and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion."). The court set out the governing framework. Under NRCP 60(b)(3), a district court may relieve a party from a final judgment based on "fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party." Under NRCP 60(c)(1), a Rule 60(b) motion "must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than 6 months after the date of the proceeding or the date of service of written notice of entry of the judgment or order, whichever date is later." Applying this framework, the court addressed Norman's contention that Stamper committed fraud upon the court by failing to timely update and file her FDF. The court held this was not a basis for relief under NRCP 60(b)(3), citing NC-DSH, Inc. v. Garner, 125 Nev. 647, 654, 218 P.3d 853, 858 (2009), which noted that fraud upon the court "cannot mean any conduct of a party or lawyer of which the court disapproves," and defined it as "that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, subvert the integrity of the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases." On the merits of the misrepresentation claim, the court found the record — including Norman's own sworn testimony — established that he knew by August 26 that Stamper was making or expected to make at least $75,000 a year, and had the exact income figure by August 28, the day before the settlement conference. Because he agreed to $550 per month in child support and to include the children on his own health insurance despite this knowledge, and never inquired about Stamper's potential health coverage, these arguments provided no basis for relief. The court declined to consider Norman's argument that he was misled and forced into the settlement due to abandonment by his counsel, because he did not raise it before the district court prior to trial or during the settlement conference, and his NRCP 60(b)(3) motion did not argue that his lack of representation caused him to misunderstand the agreement. The court applied the waiver rule of Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived and will not be considered on appeal."). As to Norman's remaining arguments — noncompliance with NAC 425.110(1), that Stamper's income was unsupported by the record, that the district court ignored his child-abuse allegations, and that temporary interlocutory orders violated his due process rights — the district court had concluded that the first three did not demonstrate fraud warranting NRCP 60(b)(3) relief and should have been raised on appeal from the decree, and that the temporary orders expired when the decree was entered. Because Norman failed to address on appeal the bases on which the district court rejected these arguments, the court treated the challenges as waived under Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011). The court also noted in a footnote that although Norman challenged the denial of a stay related to a QDRO he argued Stamper had wrongfully executed and sent to CalPERS, no relief was warranted because there was no QDRO in effect at that time. Concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion, the court affirmed.

In plain language

Norman and Stamper married in 2014 and have three minor children. Stamper filed for divorce in 2023 and asked for primary physical custody of the children. Norman filed a counterclaim also seeking primary physical custody. Both parties initially had lawyers, but Norman's counsel withdrew, and Norman began representing himself (pro se, meaning without a lawyer). The couple negotiated a settlement outside of court. Stamper sent Norman a "global settlement offer" under which the parties would share joint physical and legal custody, Norman would pay $550 per month in child support, they would split the children's medical costs, the children would stay on Norman's health insurance, and Stamper would receive 35 percent of Norman's CalPERS retirement funds instead of alimony. The parties added a term about Stamper returning a set of diamond earrings, then signed the agreement and told the court they had settled. Before the settlement conference, Stamper mailed Norman an updated financial disclosure form (a document, called an FDF, that lists a person's income and finances) on August 23, 2023, but did not file a copy with the court. That form showed Stamper had been hired at a law firm and expected to make about $75,000 a year. Norman testified he received it on August 26. On August 28, Stamper emailed Norman a draft of the divorce decree that included both parties' income figures updated to reflect her new job. On August 29, the court held a settlement conference. Both parties confirmed they had settled and testified that they had enough time to consider the terms, understood they were giving up their right to a trial, believed the terms were fair, and believed the agreement was in the children's best interest. The court signed the decree, which listed gross monthly incomes of $7,374 for Stamper and $10,509.36 for Norman. Norman did not appeal the divorce decree. About six months later, on March 4, 2024, Norman filed a motion under NRCP 60(b)(3) — a rule that lets a court relieve a party from a judgment that resulted from fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the opposing party. He argued Stamper had not timely filed her updated financial disclosure, that this information was material to his decision to settle, and that there was therefore no genuine "meeting of the minds" on child support, alimony, or the children's health insurance. He also argued the decree did not comply with an administrative rule requiring child support stipulations to list the guideline amount, and that opposing counsel's conduct violated his due process rights. The district court denied the motion. It found the motion was untimely because Norman knew about the alleged fraud before the settlement and the entry of the decree and did not seek relief quickly or file an appeal. The court also found that, even if timely, the motion would fail because Norman knew about Stamper's new job and income before he settled and relied on that information when he agreed. The court found his other arguments did not show fraud and would have been better raised in an appeal from the decree. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the district court. The court noted that Norman's own sworn testimony showed he knew by August 26 that Stamper was making or expected to make at least $75,000 a year, and had her exact income figure on August 28 — the day before the settlement conference. Despite this, he agreed to pay $550 a month in child support and agreed to keep the children on his own health insurance without raising any concern with the court or filing an appeal. The court found nothing in the record showing he ever asked about Stamper's health insurance. As a result, these points did not justify setting aside the decree. The court declined to consider Norman's argument that he was forced into the settlement because his counsel abandoned him, because he had not raised that argument below in the way he framed it on appeal. The court also treated his remaining arguments (about the administrative child-support rule, whether Stamper's income was supported by the record, alleged child abuse, and temporary orders) as waived because he did not address on appeal the specific reasons the district court gave for rejecting them.