NORRIS VS. NORRIS (CHILD SUPPORT)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court (Thompson, J.) affirmed the termination of a father's decree-based child support obligation upon his son reaching the reduced age of majority. The 1972 decree ordered support 'until said children respectively reach the age of majority or are otherwise emancipated,' when NRS 129.010 fixed majority for males at 21; a 1973 amendment reduced majority to 18 for all persons. When the son turned 18 in 1975, the father ceased payments, and the district court held it lacked jurisdiction under NRS 125.140(2) to order continued support or college funds. The court distinguished Bingham v. Bingham, 91 Nev. 539, 539 P.2d 118 (1975), in which the intervening reduction of the age of majority did not affect the father's obligation to support until 21 - because there the obligation was initially fixed by an agreement merged into the decree, evidencing the parties' intent that support continue during minority as then defined (age 21). Here, no agreement fixed the obligation; it derived solely from the decree, and the parties' intent was not disclosed. The court's power to order child support is limited to the minority of the child under NRS 125.140(2). Cavell v. Cavell, 90 Nev. 334, 526 P.2d 330 (1974). The court further held a child's right to decreed support does not vest until each payment accrues; accrued payments are vested and not subject to modification, but unaccrued payments are subject to modification by the court or to termination by subsequent legislative enactment. Day v. Day, 82 Nev. 317, 417 P.2d 914 (1966). Because the son did not reach 18 until 1975, application of the 1973 amendment was prospective and affected no vested rights. Denial of attorney's fees was proper. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 89 Nev. 540, 516 P.2d 103 (1973). Affirmed.

In plain language

When Joseph and Joan Norris divorced in 1972, the court ordered Joseph to pay $200 a month to support each of their two children 'until said children respectively reach the age of majority or are otherwise emancipated.' At that time, Nevada law set the age of majority for males at 21. In 1973, the legislature changed the age of majority to 18 for everyone. In 1975, when the parties' son turned 18, Joseph stopped paying support for him. Joan asked the court to make Joseph keep paying or provide money for the son's college education, and also sought attorney's fees. The district judge ruled that once the son reached the new age of majority (18), he was no longer entitled to support, and that the court had no jurisdiction to order the relief Joan wanted. The judge also denied attorney's fees. Joan appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Joan relied on an earlier case, Bingham v. Bingham, where the court had held that lowering the age of majority did not cut off a father's duty to support until 21. But the Supreme Court distinguished that case: in Bingham, the support obligation had been fixed by the parties' agreement (later merged into the decree), showing the parties intended support to continue to age 21. Here, there was no agreement; the support duty came only from the decree, so there was no expression of the parties' intent to extend it. The court's power to order child support is limited to the child's minority, and once the statute lowered majority to 18, the son was no longer a minor. The court also explained that a child's right to a support payment does not become a vested (locked-in) right until each payment actually comes due. Payments that had already accrued were vested and untouchable, but payments not yet due could be modified by the court or ended by a later change in the law. Applying the 1973 statute here was proper and only prospective, because the son did not turn 18 until 1975 - well after the statute took effect - so no vested rights were disturbed. The denial of attorney's fees was also upheld.