PATTERSON VS. WAINWRIGHT (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the child custody determination for abuse of discretion, affirming factual findings supported by substantial evidence. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241-42 (2007). The sole consideration in a custody determination is the best interest of the child. NRS 125C.0035(1); Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 451, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015). A court may award one parent primary physical custody if it determines joint physical custody is not in the child's best interest. NRS 125C.003(1). The court emphasized it will not reweigh evidence or credibility determinations, Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244; Quintero v. McDonald, 116 Nev. 1181, 1183, 14 P.3d 522, 523 (2000), and that it presumes the district court properly exercised its discretion where it made substantial factual findings, Culbertson v. Culbertson, 91 Nev. 230, 233-34, 533 P.2d 768, 770 (1975). On the custody challenge, the district court expressly considered the best-interest factors under NRS 125C.0035(4), found Patterson's testimony not credible on several issues, and found specified factors favoring Wainwright. Because Patterson's arguments turned on evidence and testimony from the evidentiary hearing and a subsequent hearing, and because he requested transcripts but did not file them with the court as required by NRAP 9(b)(1)(B) for pro se litigants not granted in forma pauperis status, the court applied Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007), presuming the missing documents supported the district court's determination. The court concluded substantial evidence supported the best-interest findings and that Patterson failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the primary physical custody award. The court reviewed the child support order for abuse of discretion. Edgington v. Edgington, 119 Nev. 577, 588, 80 P.3d 1282, 1290 (2003). An abuse of discretion occurs when findings are not supported by substantial evidence, Miller v. Miller, 134 Nev. 120, 125, 412 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2018), meaning evidence a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment, Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. The court noted review is deferential but does not extend "to legal error or to findings so conclusory that they may mask legal error." Davis, 131 Nev. at 450, 352 P.3d at 1142. The court set out the regulatory framework: a support order "must be based on the obligor's earnings, income and other evidence of ability to pay," with a rebuttable presumption that the guidelines under NAC Chapter 425 meet the child's basic needs, NAC 425.100(1), (2); deviations require supporting findings, NAC 425.100(3); a parent of one child pays 16 percent of the first $6,000 in monthly gross income, NAC 425.140(1)(a); a court may order a downward adjustment considering, among other factors, a party's legal responsibility for the support of others, NAC 425.150(1)(b); and the court "must consider the reasonable costs of child care paid by either or both parties and make an equitable division thereof," NAC 425.130. As to the $312 basic support calculation and the denial of a downward deviation, the court again applied the missing-transcript presumption under Cuzze and affirmed, presuming the transcripts supported the district court's findings. The court noted Patterson did not challenge the $52.83 monthly medical insurance premium award. As to child care costs, the court reversed. The district court was required to consider both whether the child care costs were reasonable and whether their division was equitable, but the order addressed neither—particularly whether an equal division was equitable in light of the court's finding that Patterson earns only $1,950 per month and its rejection of Wainwright's willful underemployment argument. The order also made no findings on whether the parties agreed to divide the costs equally, as opposed to merely agreeing to the program. Given the conclusory nature of these findings and that inclusion of half the child care costs brought Patterson's obligation to $1,052.33 on a $1,950 monthly income, the court declined to presume the missing transcripts supported the determination, invoking Davis, 131 Nev. at 450, 352 P.3d at 1142. The court reversed the child care cost portion and remanded for reevaluation consistent with its order.

In plain language

This case is a dispute between two parents, Austin Patterson and Kalena Wainwright, over the custody of and financial support for their minor child. Wainwright originally asked the court for sole legal custody and primary physical custody, along with child support that would include child care costs (which she said ran about $2,000 per month). Patterson answered and asked for joint legal and physical custody. Both parents submitted financial disclosure forms: Wainwright reported earning about $5,934 per month, and Patterson reported earning $1,950 per month. At first, the court entered a temporary order giving both parents joint legal and physical custody and directing Wainwright to pay Patterson $328 per month in temporary support. Wainwright later asked the court to change that arrangement, arguing that she was the child's primary guardian and was paying the child's ongoing care and education costs. She also raised concerns about Patterson's conduct. Patterson opposed her request and disputed her allegations. After an evidentiary hearing where both parents testified, the district court entered a written order. It kept joint legal custody but gave Wainwright primary physical custody. The court walked through the "best interests of the child" factors that Nevada law requires it to consider and found several of them favored Wainwright. Among its findings: Patterson did not give credible testimony about the child's medical issues, failed to make sure the child received proper medical care and physical therapy (including for the child's toe walking), did not communicate with Wainwright about the child's medical needs, kept two dogs in his home even though the child has allergy-induced asthma and is allergic to dogs, and did not work full-time. Because of these findings, the court also decided Wainwright should have the final say on medical decisions if the parents disagreed. On money, the parties agreed after the hearing that the child would attend a child care program costing $1,375 per month. The court ordered that cost split evenly, so each parent would pay $687.50 per month. The court also split the child's medical costs and gave Wainwright $52.83 per month for Patterson's share of the medical insurance premium. The court calculated Patterson's basic support at $312 per month based on his stated income, declined to increase (impute) his income even though he mentioned "side gigs," and declined to reduce his obligation for his other children. In total, Patterson's monthly support obligation came to $1,052.33. Patterson appealed. He argued the court got the custody decision wrong, misread his testimony, focused too much on his low income, wrongly refused to lower his support for his other children, and should not have made him pay $687.50 for child care, which he said was really a preschool and could have been cheaper. The appeals court ruled partly for each side. On the custody decision and the basic $312 support calculation, the court explained that a party who appeals must provide transcripts of the hearings where the evidence was presented. Patterson requested transcripts but never filed them with the court. Without the transcripts, the appeals court said it had to assume the missing records supported the district judge's findings, so it upheld those parts of the decision. But on the child care costs, the appeals court found a problem it could see on the face of the order itself. Nevada regulations require a court to consider whether child care costs are reasonable and whether splitting them is fair (equitable). The district court's order did not make findings on either point, and it did not explain how an even split was fair given that Patterson earns only $1,950 per month while his total support obligation climbed to $1,052.33. The court also did not make a finding on whether the parents had actually agreed to split the child care costs equally (as opposed to merely agreeing on the program). Because the order lacked these findings, the appeals court declined to assume the missing transcripts filled the gap and reversed the child care cost portion, sending it back to the district court to reconsider.