PELKOLA VS. PELKOLA (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review: Statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo. Young v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 136 Nev., Adv. Op. 66, 473 P.3d 1034, 1036 (2020). The court applies plain-meaning analysis absent ambiguity or absurd results; here, both parties stipulated to plain-meaning analysis, and the court limited its inquiry accordingly, citing Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008), and the principle of party presentation. Scope of NRS 125C.006(1): The statute applies when the custodial parent "intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of this State" (or to a sufficiently distant place within Nevada) and intends to take the child. The court rejected the interpretation - adopted by the district court and urged by Heidi - that the statute reaches only relocations originating in Nevada. The court emphasized that the statutory text refers to "relocat[ing] . . . to a place outside of" Nevada, not "relocating out of" Nevada, and that the plain text encompasses subsequent moves from one out-of-state location to another. Because Heidi was the primary physical custodian, intended to move to Ohio, and intended to take the children, NRS 125C.006 applied and required her to petition for permission given Greg's refusal to consent. Findings required under NRS 125C.007: Once NRS 125C.006 applies, the petitioning parent must demonstrate the three threshold factors of NRS 125C.007(1): (a) a sensible, good-faith reason not designed to deprive the non-relocating parent of parenting time; (b) the child's best interests are served; and (c) the child and relocating parent will benefit from an actual advantage. The district court must issue specific findings on each factor. The court analogized to Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 451, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015), which requires specific findings for best-interest determinations. If the NRS 125C.007(1) threshold is met, the court must weigh the six factors in NRS 125C.007(2)(a)-(f), addressing quality-of-life improvements, motives of each parent, compliance with substitute visitation orders, opposition motives, the realistic opportunity for substitute visitation, and any other relevant factor. Specific findings must be made on each applicable factor. The district court's only findings here - that Heidi's move "would [not] substantially impede the current timeshare" and that "Greg can still exercise his current timeshare" - touched only on NRS 125C.007(2)(e) and were inadequate. Waiver: The court rejected Heidi's argument that Greg waived an evidentiary hearing, observing in a footnote that because findings under NRS 125C.007 are required, the court was "unpersuaded that either party may waive the necessary evidentiary hearing." Attorney fees: The court reversed the attorney-fee award as to the petition to relocate and instructed the district court to recalculate as necessary. Greg's separate challenge to additional attorney fees was not considered because he cited no authority and his argument was not cogent, citing Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). Disposition: Reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing and findings under each applicable NRS 125C.007 factor.

In plain language

Greg and Heidi Pelkola divorced in 2014 and share legal custody of their three children, with Heidi having primary physical custody. After the divorce, Heidi obtained court permission under Nevada's relocation statute (NRS 125C.006) to move with the children from Nevada to Arizona. In October 2019, she asked the district court for permission to move again, this time from Arizona to Ohio. Greg did not consent. The district court told Heidi she did not actually need permission for this second move, reasoning that the Nevada statute only governed her original move out of Nevada. The court nevertheless granted permission and made limited findings about how the Ohio move would affect Greg's visitation. Greg appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with him on two points. First, the court read the statute's words literally: NRS 125C.006 requires permission whenever a custodial parent intends to relocate the child "to a place outside of" Nevada, and that language covers a move from one out-of-state location (Arizona) to another (Ohio), not just a move directly out of Nevada. The court noted that the opposite reading would let a parent who had moved with permission to a nearby state then move anywhere in the world - even Japan - without notice to the other parent. Second, because the relocation statute did apply, the district court was required by NRS 125C.007 to make specific findings on a list of factors, including whether there was a sensible, good-faith reason for the move, whether the move served the children's best interests, and whether the move offered an actual advantage to the relocating parent and child. If those threshold factors are met, the court must then weigh additional factors about quality of life, motives, and visitation. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not make the required findings and so abused its discretion by granting the petition. The Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back so the district court can hold an evidentiary hearing and issue specific findings on each applicable factor. The court also reversed the attorney-fee award tied to the relocation petition and instructed the lower court to recalculate it as necessary.