PRINS VS. PRINS (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court affirmed an order modifying a divorce decree that, among other things, defined and conditioned the father's visitation, continued custody with the mother, entered judgment for support arrearages, and conditioned resumption of visitation on payment of the arrears and current support. Because the appellant failed to docket the transcript of the nearly three-day hearing or provide a statement of the evidence under NRCP 75(n), the court presumed sufficient evidence supported the trial court's findings and ruling (Fenkell v. Fenkell, 86 Nev. 397, 469 P.2d 701 (1970)). Trial courts have vast discretionary power to determine the best interests of a child in modifying visitation (NRS 125.140; Howe v. Howe, 87 Nev. 595, 491 P.2d 38 (1971)), and the court presumed the evidence warranted conditioning visitation on payment of support arrearages and remaining current (cf. Chesler v. Chesler, 87 Nev. 335, 486 P.2d 1198 (1971)). The award of attorney fees was authorized under NRS 125.180(1) and was not shown to be unreasonable. Remaining assignments of error, unsupported by any showing of prejudice or citation of authority, were rejected. Affirmed.

In plain language

A 1968 divorce gave the mother custody of the child, ordered the father to pay $50 per month support, and gave him 'reasonable' visitation, but it did not spell out the details of when support was due or what visitation was reasonable. In 1969 the parties signed an agreement defining exactly when visitation and payments would occur. The relationship later deteriorated. In 1971 the mother asked the court to terminate the father's visitation for nonpayment of support and to enter judgment for the unpaid support; the father responded by seeking to hold her in contempt for denying visitation and to transfer custody to him, each parent claiming the other was unfit. After a hearing lasting nearly three days, the court kept custody with the mother, continued the father's visitation but defined it and imposed conditions on it, continued the $50 per month support, entered judgment for the support arrears, and ruled that the father's visitation would not resume until he paid the arrears and stayed current; it also awarded the mother attorney fees. The father appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by turning his previously unqualified visitation into conditional visitation and by tying visitation to payment of support. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Because the father did not provide a transcript of the lengthy hearing, the Court had to presume the evidence supported the trial court's findings; trial courts have broad discretion to determine a child's best interests when modifying visitation, and the attorney-fee award was authorized and not shown to be unreasonable.