RAM VS. KIRAN (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review: Child custody decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007). An abuse occurs when "no reasonable judge could reach a similar conclusion under the same circumstances." Leavitt v. Siems, 130 Nev. 503, 509, 330 P.3d 1, 5 (2014). Factual findings are affirmed if supported by substantial evidence, Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242, and the appellate court will not reweigh evidence or credibility determinations, see Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244; Quintero v. McDonald, 116 Nev. 1181, 1183, 14 P.3d 522, 523 (2000). The court presumes the district court properly exercised its discretion in determining the child's best interest if it made substantial factual findings. See Culbertson v. Culbertson, 91 Nev. 230, 233-34, 533 P.2d 768, 770 (1975). Preservation of evidentiary objections: Citing Thomas v. Hardwick, 126 Nev. 142, 156, 231 P.3d 1111, 1120 (2010), the court noted that NRS 47.040(1)(a) requires a timely objection or motion to strike stating the specific ground, and that failure to specifically object below precludes appellate consideration; see also In re Parental Rights as to Dumais, 76 Nev. 409, 414, 356 P.2d 124, 126 (1960). Because Ram raised her challenges to testimony about her arrests and to alleged hearsay only in a motion for reconsideration, not by contemporaneous objection at the evidentiary hearing, the court declined to review those claims. Judicial bias: Applying Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 506 P.3d 334, 337 (2022), In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988), and Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410 (2009) (burden on the party asserting bias), the court held relief unwarranted because Ram did not show the district court's actions were based on knowledge acquired outside the proceedings or reflected "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Merits of the custody award: The sole consideration in a custody determination is the best interest of the child, NRS 125C.0035(1); Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 451, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015), and a court may award primary physical custody if joint physical custody is not in the child's best interest, NRS 125C.003(1). The district court evaluated the required best-interest factors under NRS 125C.0035(4), finding communication difficulties largely caused by Ram (NRS 125C.0035(4)(c), (e)); addiction, mental health, and lifestyle issues affecting Ram's ability to care for the children (NRS 125C.0035(4)(f), (g), (h)); and Ram's acts of domestic violence in 2014 and 2019 (NRS 125C.0035(4)(k)). These findings were supported by substantial evidence. To the extent the court's oral pronouncements differed from the written decree, the written order controls. See Rust v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 689, 747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987) ("An oral pronouncement of judgment is not valid for any purpose."). Children's wishes (NRS 125C.0035(4)(a)): Reading the decree together with the order denying reconsideration, the findings on this factor were sufficient; neither party presented evidence of the children's wishes, and it was the parties' responsibility to do so. Ram did not allege what the children would have stated or establish that additional findings would have reasonably resulted in a different outcome, so any error was not shown to be prejudicial. See Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 465, 244 P.3d 765, 778 (2010) ("When an error is harmless, reversal is not warranted."); cf. NRCP 61. Relocation factors: Even assuming, without deciding, that failing to consider the relocation factors was error, it was harmless because Ram did not establish that but for the error "a different result might reasonably have been reached." Wyeth, 126 Nev. at 465, 244 P.3d at 778. Substantial change in circumstances: Ram did not argue below that the court had to find a substantial change in circumstances before awarding Kiran primary physical custody, so the court declined to consider the issue. See Schuck v. Signature Flight Support of Nev., Inc., 126 Nev. 434, 437, 245 P.3d 542, 544 (2010) ("[P]arties may not raise a new theory for the first time on appeal, which is inconsistent with or different from the one raised below.").

In plain language

Venus Priya Ram and Cleavon Roy Kiran married in 2008 and have two children. In 2020, Kiran filed for divorce and asked the court for sole legal and primary physical custody. Kiran had moved to California but acknowledged Nevada was the children's home state; he asked for primary physical custody so the children could live with him in California. Ram answered and asked for joint legal custody and primary physical custody. While the case was pending, the district court entered a temporary order letting the children stay with Ram in Nevada, with Kiran having parenting time every other weekend. At an evidentiary hearing, both parents testified. Kiran testified about Ram's methamphetamine use, acts of domestic violence, and arrests; about the oldest child's dietary issues (possibly related to Crohn's disease) and mental health issues; and about his own good relationship with the children. Ram testified that the children had always lived with her, that she facilitated their contact with Kiran, that she took the oldest child to therapy, and that she was working toward sobriety, while acknowledging her methamphetamine use, her criminal history, that she was on probation, and that she had failed two drug tests while on probation. Nevada law requires courts deciding custody to focus on the "best interest of the child," using a list of factors set out in statute. The district court's written decree found that six of those factors favored Kiran and none favored Ram, and it awarded Kiran primary physical custody (with joint legal custody to both parents). Ram asked the court to reconsider, arguing among other things that the court had allowed the children to be relocated to California without considering the "relocation factors" and had admitted improper evidence. The court denied reconsideration, explaining in part that it was not required to consider relocation factors because no final custody order existed before the decree, and that neither party had presented evidence about the children's wishes. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected each of Ram's arguments. First, it declined to review her complaints about the evidence admitted at the hearing (testimony about her arrests and alleged hearsay) because she never objected at the hearing itself - raising the issue for the first time in a reconsideration motion was too late. Second, it rejected her claim that the judge's questioning showed bias, because Ram did not show the judge relied on information from outside the case or displayed "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Third, it held the custody award was not an abuse of discretion: the written findings were supported by substantial evidence, and an appellate court does not reweigh evidence or second-guess credibility calls. Where the judge's oral comments differed from the written decree, the written order controls. As to Ram's complaint that the court should have interviewed the children about their wishes, the appellate court noted that neither party presented such evidence and that Ram never explained what the children would have said or how it would have changed the result. Fourth, even assuming the district court should have considered the relocation factors, any error was harmless because Ram did not show a different result might reasonably have been reached. Finally, Ram's argument that the court needed to find a "substantial change in circumstances" before departing from the temporary order was never raised in the district court, so the appellate court would not consider it for the first time on appeal.