RANDALL VS. STATE OF CAL.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court reviewed the denial of a motion to modify child support for abuse of discretion, citing Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 7, 501 P.3d 980, 985 (2022), and will uphold the district court's determination if supported by substantial evidence, citing Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440, 92 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2004), and Levy v. Levy, 96 Nev. 902, 904, 620 P.2d 860, 861 (1980). Interpretation of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure and statutory construction are reviewed de novo. Humphries v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 788, 792, 312 P.3d 484, 487 (2013). On the constitutional challenge to WFDCR 31(2)(c)'s automatic referral of child support matters to masters and to the clearly-erroneous standard for reviewing master reports, the court applied waiver. Under Venetian Casino Resort, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 118 Nev. 124, 130, 41 P.3d 327, 330 (2002), a party who wishes to object to the appointment of a special master must do so at the time of appointment or within a reasonable time, or the objection is waived. The court reinforced this with SFR Investments Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, 130 Nev. 742, 757, 334 P.3d 408, 418 (2014), for the proposition that due process requires diligence by a party with actual, timely knowledge. On the standard-of-review challenge premised on the 2019 amendment removing "clearly erroneous" from NRCP 53(f)(2), the court declined to reach the merits because the argument was not raised below and was not cogently developed. Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). The court reiterated the framework from Venetian, 118 Nev. at 132, 41 P.3d at 331-32, that clear-error review applies to a master's findings of fact and de novo review applies to conclusions of law. On the merits of the changed-circumstances and imputed-income findings, the court held substantial evidence supported the master's credibility determinations and the conclusion that Randall failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances since the 2020 order imputing income to him. The court cited NAC 425.125(2) for the factors used in imputing income, and Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 431, 216 P.3d 213, 228 (2009) (overruled in part on other grounds by Romano), for the rule that a court cannot modify a child support order if the predicate facts are substantially unchanged. The court invoked Klabacka v. Nelson, 133 Nev. 164, 173, 394 P.3d 940, 948 (2017), and Cavell v. Cavell, 90 Nev. 334, 339-40, 526 P.2d 330, 333 (1974) (Batjer, J., concurring in the result), for deference to the trial court's credibility determinations. On interest, the court rejected Randall's reading of NRS 125B.140. NRS 125B.140(2)(c)(1) permits inclusion of interest on arrearages. Because the 2020 order resolved a 2017 motion to modify and did not adjudicate or enforce arrears, the later inclusion of interest on unadjudicated arrears was not a retroactive modification barred by NRS 125B.140(1)(a) and (3). The master also found no undue hardship under NRS 125B.140(2)(c)(1), noting Randall would no longer be paying his claimed $2,200 insurance expense. A footnote observes that penalties under NRS 125B.095 applied only through January 31, 2020, because that statute was repealed effective February 1, 2020, and that interest and penalties were tied to underpayments tracing back to a December 2015 temporary support order with first payment due in January 2016. On the 30-day window for proof of California overpayments, the court found Randall failed to provide cogent argument or authority, Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38, and failed to demonstrate aggrievement, since he did not allege the District Attorney had refused credit for proof submitted outside that window.

In plain language

Jeffrey Randall and Fanchon Brianna Caldwell have two children. One child is covered by a 2017 California child support order; the other is covered by a 2020 Nevada child support order. After the California order was registered in Nevada, Randall asked the Nevada family court to lower his support obligations and to set up a $1,000-per-month plan to pay down what he already owed (his "arrears"). He argued that the parties' financial situations had changed. In Washoe County family court, motions like this are first heard by a "master" - a court official who reviews the evidence and recommends a result to the judge. The master here did not believe Randall's claim that circumstances had changed, found him not credible on several points, kept in place the prior court's finding that Randall was willfully underemployed (so income could be "imputed" to him as if he were earning more), and recommended that Randall pay interest on the back-owed support. The district judge agreed with the master and denied Randall's objections. On appeal, Randall raised four main complaints. First, he argued that automatically sending child support cases to masters violates the constitution because it improperly hands judicial power to a non-judge. The Supreme Court declined to address the merits, holding that Randall was told his case would be heard by a master and that he could object, and because he did not object at the time, he gave up that argument. Second, Randall argued that the district court should have reviewed the master's findings from scratch ("de novo") rather than only checking for "clear error." He pointed to a 2019 amendment to NRCP 53. The Supreme Court rejected this argument because Randall did not raise it in the district court and did not provide a developed legal argument explaining why the rule change required de novo review. Third, Randall challenged the substance of the master's findings about changed circumstances, imputed income, and the addition of interest and penalties to his arrears. The Supreme Court found that "substantial evidence" - meaning enough credible evidence in the record - supported the master's conclusions, including the conclusion that Randall lacked credibility, that he was effectively trying to avoid paying child support entirely, and that he had not produced enough documentation to overturn the prior willful-underemployment finding. The court also rejected Randall's argument that NRS 125B.140 forbids charging interest on arrears, explaining that the statute actually permits it. Fourth, Randall complained that the master's order gave him only 30 days to submit proof of any overpayments he had made in California. The court noted that Randall did not show he had actually been harmed by the 30-day window - for example, he did not claim the District Attorney had refused to credit him for late-submitted proof - and stated it was confident he would be credited if he produces proof. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order in full.