RENDON VS. GARCIA (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the relocation/custody order for abuse of discretion, citing Johnson v. Bennett, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 35, 575 P.3d 1023, 1027 (Ct. App. 2025). An abuse of discretion occurs "when a district court's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is clearly erroneous." Id. (citing Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 336, 419 P.3d 157, 159 (2018)). Substantial evidence is "evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). The court set out the governing relocation framework. Where a joint physical custody order exists and one parent intends to relocate, that parent must follow NRS 125C.0065(1): attempt to obtain the written consent of the non-relocating parent, and if refused, petition the court for primary physical custody for the purpose of relocating. The substantive relocation analysis is governed by NRS 125C.007, which, per Monahan v. Hogan, 138 Nev. 58, 59, 507 P.3d 588, 589 (Ct. App. 2022), "comprises NRS 125C.007(1) (the threshold test), NRS 125C.007(2) (the six relocation factors), and NRS 125C.007(3) (the burden of proof)." The relocating parent bears the burden of proving relocation is in the child's best interest and must prove each element of the NRS 125C.007 threshold test by a preponderance of the evidence. Johnson, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 35, 575 P.3d at 1030 (citing Monahan, 138 Nev. at 60, 507 P.3d at 590). First, the court declined to address Arturo's argument that Lea violated NRS 125C.0065 by "relocating" part-time to Boise without the child, because he did not raise it before the district court. See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been [forfeited] and will not be considered on appeal."). The court further noted that Arturo did not challenge the other two factors under NRS 125C.007(1) (including the best interests factor) or the remaining five factors under NRS 125C.007(2), and deemed those arguments forfeited for lack of cogent argument or relevant authority. See Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.8, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). An argument raised for the first time in Arturo's reply (regarding diversity at Sacred Heart and folkloric dance classes) was also deemed forfeited. See Khoury v. Seastrand, 132 Nev. 520, 530 n.2, 377 P.3d 81, 88 n.2 (2016) (citing NRAP 28(c)). On the preserved "actual advantage" challenge under NRS 125C.007(1)(c), the court applied the principle that it "is not at liberty to weigh the evidence anew, and where conflicting evidence exists, all favorable inferences must be drawn towards the prevailing party," Quintero v. McDonald, 116 Nev. 1181, 1183, 14 P.3d 522, 523 (2000), and that a bench determination on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, Fletcher v. Fletcher, 89 Nev. 540, 542, 516 P.2d 103, 104 (1973). The court held the district court's findings — that Lea's Boise job gave her better access to the child and increased income benefiting both, and that Boise offered educational and recreational opportunities and ease of access to relatives — were supported by substantial evidence. Both parties' documentary evidence supported that the proposed Boise school ranked higher academically, and Lea's paystubs and testimony supported that tuition was covered and the cost of living was lower. On the NRS 125C.007(2)(b) challenge, Arturo argued Lea's motive was to limit his time and influence. The court held he failed to show the district court's finding that Lea's motives were honorable was clearly erroneous, Bautista, 134 Nev. at 336, 419 P.3d at 159, and failed to present cogent argument or relevant authority that seeking primary physical custody at the outset or later requesting relocation, without more, is inherently dishonorable. See Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38. Concluding the preserved challenges lacked merit and the remaining challenges were forfeited, the court affirmed.

In plain language

Arturo Rendon and Lea Garcia married in 2012, had a child in 2017, and divorced in 2021. They had agreed to share joint legal and physical custody, eventually settling into a rotating week-on/week-off schedule that they managed without going back to court. In 2023, Lea — who works for the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) — was offered a job at the BLM office in Boise, Idaho. She gave Arturo written notice asking permission to move there with their child. She also conditionally accepted the Boise promotion and arranged a rental there. Arturo said no to the move. After that, Lea worked on-site in Boise during the weeks she did not have the child and traveled back to Nevada during the weeks she did. According to the opinion, she never actually relocated with the child before getting the court's permission. Lea then filed a motion in the district court asking to be allowed to move with the child and to be given primary physical custody. She argued the new job paid more and offered career advancement she couldn't get in Elko, and that schools in the Boise area rated higher than the child's school in Elko. Arturo opposed, arguing the pay increase wasn't large enough to justify uprooting the child's social life and that schooling, medical care, and other factors were roughly equal between the two places. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, hearing from both parents, a former coworker of Lea's, and Lea's mother. The testimony showed the parents cooperated well and were both deeply involved in the child's life, though there had been a few conflicts since the divorce. Lea emphasized her promotion, the lower cost of living in Boise, and better-rated schools. Arturo emphasized the child's need for stability, the child's friendships and good performance at her current school, his disagreement with the curriculum at a Catholic school Lea favored (Sacred Heart), concerns about moving the child away from Hispanic culture, and safety concerns about the highway between Boise and Elko used for custody exchanges. The district court granted Lea's motion, found she had met her legal burden under the relevant statutes, found the impending move was a substantial change in circumstances justifying a custody modification, and awarded her primary physical custody, subject to Arturo's parenting time. On appeal, Arturo raised three main points. First, he argued Lea didn't comply with the relocation statute because she effectively "relocated" part-time to Boise (without the child) before getting permission. The court declined to consider this because Arturo had not raised it in the district court. Second, he argued the court wrongly found that the move offered a real advantage to Lea and the child. Third, he argued the court wrongly found Lea's motives for moving were honorable. The court rejected both remaining arguments, explaining that it does not re-weigh evidence on appeal and that the district court's findings were supported by substantial evidence. The court also noted that Arturo had not challenged several of the other statutory factors, so those were treated as forfeited. The Court of Appeals affirmed.