RODRIGUEZ VS. RODRIGUEZ (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court held that a district court may not consider either party's marital misconduct or fault when deciding whether to award alimony. The 1993 amendment to NRS 125.150(1), which deleted the phrase 'having regard to the respective merits of the parties,' was enacted in direct response to decisions suggesting fault could be considered, and reflects the Legislature's intent that, as a no-fault divorce state, a party's fault or bad conduct not be considered in alimony or community property division. The court distinguished the treatment of community property: under Lofgren v. Lofgren, 112 Nev. 1282, 1283, 926 P.2d 296, 297 (1996), and Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 113 Nev. 1185, 1190, 946 P.2d 200, 203 (1997), financial misconduct with economic impact may constitute a compelling reason for an unequal division of community property, but the court declined to engraft any 'misconduct resulting in economic impact' exception onto the alimony statute. Alimony is a creature of statute and is governed by principles of what is just and equitable. Heim v. Heim, 104 Nev. 605, 607, 763 P.2d 678, 679 (1988). The dictum in Heim suggesting the 'merits' language allowed consideration of good or bad behavior was undermined by the 1993 amendment. The Buchanan factors, Buchanan v. Buchanan, 90 Nev. 209, 215, 523 P.2d 1, 5 (1974), remain the guiding, nonexhaustive considerations (financial condition, property, contributions, duration of the marriage, income, earning capacity, age, health, and ability to earn), but marital fault is not among the additional factors. Applying those factors to a twenty-one-year marriage, a large income disparity, and Glenda's ill health and limited earning capacity, the court held the trial judge abused his discretion in denying alimony, reversed, and remanded to fix a just and equitable amount without regard to fault. The court noted the child support miscalculation issue was moot.

In plain language

Glenda and Antonio Rodriguez were married for more than twenty-one years. Antonio, a hotel catering director, earned at least $75,000 a year; Glenda, a school hall monitor, earned about $14,000 a year and had health problems. Despite the long marriage and the large income gap, the trial judge refused to award Glenda any alimony. The judge did so largely because Glenda had had an extramarital affair, had left the family, and had taken money from the parties' adult son's injury settlement (the judge found both spouses had wrongly taken that money). The Supreme Court reversed. It held that a trial judge may not consider a spouse's marital fault or misconduct when deciding whether to award alimony. The Court explained that in 1993 the Legislature amended the divorce statute (NRS 125.150) and deleted the phrase 'having regard to the respective merits of the parties,' which had been the basis for older suggestions that fault could matter. The amendment reflected the Legislature's intent that, in a no-fault divorce state, a party's fault should not affect alimony. Alimony, the Court said, is financial support paid when justice and equity require it; it is 'not a sword to level the wrongdoer' or 'a prize to reward virtue.' Applying the long-standing 'Buchanan factors' (things like the length of the marriage, each spouse's income, health, age, and ability to earn), the Court concluded Glenda plainly had a meritorious claim for alimony given the twenty-one-year marriage, her low income and poor health, and Antonio's much greater earning power. The trial judge abused his discretion by punishing Glenda for her affair. The Court reversed the denial of alimony and sent the case back to set a just and equitable amount without regard to Glenda's fault.