ROHMILLER VS. AKESON (FAMILY)
92850 · Nevada (SCOTN/COA) · July 31, 2026
Disposition:Appeal dismissed. ("ORDERS this appeal DISMISSED.")Other Family LawPosture Tina Rohmiller, appearing pro se (representing herself without a lawyer), filed a notice of appeal from what she described as any order "declaring or attempting to declare Appellant a 'vexatious litigant,'" including associated findings, rulings, or restrictions. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the notice of appeal and the documents before it and identified a jurisdictional defect, leading to dismissal.
Key holdings
Practitioner summary
The court resolved the matter on jurisdictional grounds. Framing its authority under NRAP 3A(b), which allows appeals from judgments or orders of the district court, the court first observed that the record did not appear to contain a written order entered by the district court declaring appellant a vexatious litigant. The court then held that, independent of the absence of a written order, no statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from a vexatious litigant order. It relied on Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 348, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013), for the proposition that the court "may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule," and on Peck v. Crouser, 129 Nev. 120, 124, 295 P.3d 586, 588 (2013), for the proposition that vexatious litigant orders are not independently appealable. Quoting Peck, the court reiterated that "[w]rit relief is the appropriate vehicle to review vexation litigant orders... ." Concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, the court ordered the appeal dismissed.
In plain language
Tina Rohmiller tried to appeal an order that she said labeled her a "vexatious litigant" — a designation courts sometimes apply to a person to place limits on their ability to keep filing lawsuits or motions. She represented herself in the appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court did not decide whether she actually is a vexatious litigant or whether any restrictions were fair. Instead, it looked at whether it had the power (called "jurisdiction") to hear the appeal at all, and concluded that it did not. The court gave two reasons. First, it found that there did not appear to be a written order from the district court actually declaring her a vexatious litigant — and appeals generally run from written judgments or orders. Second, and more importantly, the court explained that even if such an order existed, no statute or court rule allows a person to appeal a vexatious-litigant order directly. The court noted that the proper way to ask a higher court to review that kind of order is through a different procedure called a writ — a separate type of request to the court — rather than an ordinary appeal. Because it lacked jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal.
This summary is independently verified against the source opinion. It is an informational research aid, not legal advice, and no substitute for reading the decision.