ROWAN VS. WALKER

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's child support and alimony rulings for abuse of discretion, citing Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996), and Gilman v. Gilman, 114 Nev. 416, 422, 956 P.2d 761, 764 (1998), while reviewing questions of statutory interpretation de novo under MGM Mirage v. Nev. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 125 Nev. 223, 226, 209 P.3d 766, 768 (2009). The court first addressed mootness. Citing Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010), for the proposition that the court's duty is to resolve actual controversies by an enforceable judgment rather than render advisory opinions, the court held the appeal was not moot. The district court's later-set evidentiary hearing addressed a different, second motion to modify; any modification flowing from that motion would only affect payments from July 2024 onward and would not alter the award amounts at issue in this appeal. The court relied on Hildahl v. Hildahl, 95 Nev. 657, 660, 601 P.2d 58, 60 (1979), for the rule that "[P]ayments once accrued for either alimony or support of children become vested rights and cannot thereafter be modified or voided." On the merits of child support, the court applied NRS 125B.145(4), which provides that "a change of 20 percent or more in gross monthly income...shall be deemed to constitute changed circumstances requiring a review for modification of the order for the support of a child." Relying on Backman v. Gelbman, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 8, 565 P.3d 330, 335-36 (Ct. App. 2025), the court reiterated that a moving party's prima facie showing of changed circumstances under NRS 125B.145(4) "necessitate[es] a full hearing," including a "substantive review of the child support order." The court underscored Backman's distinction that "[w]hile presentation of evidence of a greater than 20-percent decrease in income requires a review of a child support order, it does not require modification of a child support order." Because it was undisputed that Rowan presented prima facie evidence of a greater-than-20-percent income decrease, he was entitled to a full hearing. The court tied the hearing requirement to due process and the function of evidentiary hearings, citing Backman for the rule that a court must conduct a substantive review when the movant presents "some credible evidence" supporting the requested relief; Myers v. Haskins, 138 Nev. 553, 558, 513 P.3d 527, 532 (Ct. App. 2022), for the principle that "the place to present evidence for a district court to weigh is at an evidentiary hearing"; and Mesi v. Mesi, 136 Nev. 748, 750, 478 P.3d 366, 369 (2020), for the proposition that due process requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The court reasoned that without a hearing developing a record, it could not fully evaluate the district court's best-interest conclusion. It took no position on whether discovery is necessary. In a footnote, the court rejected Walker's forfeiture argument, declining to treat Rowan's argument as forfeited merely because his motion requested a "hearing" rather than expressly an "evidentiary hearing." On alimony, the court applied NRS 125.150(12), observing that it "contains the same 'review' language as NRS 125B.145(4)." The court compared the two provisions - NRS 125.150(12) ("a change of 20 percent or more in the gross monthly income... shall be deemed to constitute changed circumstances requiring a review for modification of the payments of alimony") and NRS 125B.145(4) (parallel language for child support) - and, citing Poole v. Nev. Auto Dealership Inv., LLC, 135 Nev. 280, 283-84, 449 P.3d 479, 482-83 (Ct. App. 2019), for construing statutes with similar language and purpose alike, held that once a movant demonstrates a prima facie case of changed circumstances requiring a review of alimony payments, the district court must hold a hearing. Because no hearing was held, the court reversed and remanded as to alimony for the same reasons. The court declined to reach the parties' remaining arguments and suggested, without requiring, that the district court could combine the remanded hearing with the hearing already set on Rowan's second motion.

In plain language

Christopher Rowan and Heather Walker married in 2004, had two children, and divorced in June 2021 under a stipulated divorce decree (an agreement the divorcing spouses reach themselves that the court then adopts). Under the decree, Rowan was ordered to pay Walker both child support and alimony (ongoing payments to a former spouse). In June 2023, Rowan asked the court to lower both payments, saying his gross monthly income had dropped by more than 20 percent. Walker opposed the request. The district court denied Rowan's motion without holding a hearing. The court acknowledged that Rowan claimed a drop of more than 20 percent in his income, but concluded that his ability to earn had not actually changed and that any decrease resulted from his own voluntary decision to quit his job. The court also said that even if Rowan had shown changed circumstances, lowering child support would not be in the children's best interest, and it denied the alimony request for essentially the same reasons. While this appeal was pending, Rowan filed a second motion to modify support and alimony, claiming his income had fallen even further. The district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where parties present evidence) on that second motion, but said it would not revisit the earlier denial being appealed. Walker argued that the new hearing made this appeal moot - meaning there was no longer a live dispute for the court to decide. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that any change resulting from the later motion would only affect payments from July 2024 forward and would not change the amounts at issue in this appeal, because payments that have already come due become fixed and cannot later be modified. So the appeal still presented a real controversy. On the merits, the Court of Appeals agreed with Rowan that the district court was required to hold a hearing once he presented preliminary evidence (a "prima facie case") that his income had dropped by more than 20 percent. Under Nevada law, a change of 20 percent or more in gross monthly income is deemed to be changed circumstances that require a review of a support or alimony order. The court emphasized that requiring a review is not the same as requiring a reduction - the judge still gets to decide, after the hearing, whether to actually change the payments. But the judge must hold the hearing first, because that is where evidence is presented and weighed, and skipping it deprived Rowan of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Because no hearing was held, the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of both the child support and the alimony requests and sent the case back so the district court can hold an evidentiary hearing. The court also suggested that the district court could combine that hearing with the one already scheduled on Rowan's second motion, to reduce the burden on everyone, but it took no position on whether discovery would be necessary.