ROWLAND VS. YZAGUIRRE (CHILD CUSTODY)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of a motion to modify custody, without an evidentiary hearing, for abuse of discretion. Myers v. Haskins, 138 Nev. 553, 556, 513 P.3d 527, 531 (Ct. App. 2022); see also Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 548 (1996) (treating a parenting-time decision as a custody determination). A court abuses its discretion where "no reasonable judge could reach a similar conclusion under the same circumstances." Leavitt v. Siems, 130 Nev. 503, 509, 330 P.3d 1, 5 (2014). The court restated the framework for obtaining an evidentiary hearing on a motion to modify physical custody. A district court must hold an evidentiary hearing if the movant demonstrates "adequate cause." Rooney v. Rooney, 109 Nev. 540, 542, 853 P.2d 123, 124 (1993). Adequate cause requires a prima facie case for modification, id. at 543, 853 P.2d at 125, which under Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 3, 501 P.3d 980, 982 (2022) (abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev. 401, 535 P.3d 1167 (2023)), requires the movant to show "(1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best interest is served by the modification." The changed-circumstances prong rests on res judicata principles and prevents serial, repetitive motions based on essentially the same facts. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 151, 161 P.3d 239, 243 (2007). Demonstrating a prima facie case is "a heavy burden." Myers, 138 Nev. at 560, 513 P.3d at 534. On the statutory question, the court quoted SB 275 as enacted. The statute provides that a district court shall not "remove the child from a parent ... or restrict contact between the child and a parent" when taken "for the sole purpose of improving a deficient relationship between a child and the other parent of the child." 2025 Nev. Stat., ch. 414, § 5, at 2657-58. It further provides that "[t]he court shall, in making any finding relating to an allegation of domestic violence or child abuse, consider all relevant and admissible evidence of past domestic violence or child abuse committed by the parent who is the subject of the allegation ...." 2025 Nev. Stat., ch. 414, § 6, at 2658. Applying the framework, the court held Rowland failed to show a substantial change in circumstances because she sought modification based on factual allegations already considered in the custody decree—precisely what the changed-circumstances prong forecloses. See Ellis, 123 Nev. at 151, 161 P.3d at 243; Nance v. Ferraro, 134 Nev. 152, 160, 418 P.3d 679, 686 (Ct. App. 2018) (a party generally cannot relitigate prior instances of domestic violence the court has previously addressed and decided); Romano, 138 Nev. at 5, 501 P.3d at 983. The court also concluded Rowland did not demonstrate that no reasonable judge would have reached the district court's conclusion that SB 275 did not affect the existing arrangement, noting the district court had already considered both parties' domestic-violence allegations and that the custody decision was not made for the sole purpose of improving the child's relationship with Yzaguirre but also accounted for Rowland's physical abuse and abduction of the child. Leavitt, 130 Nev. at 509, 330 P.3d at 5; Myers, 138 Nev. at 556, 513 P.3d at 531. As to the admonishment that future filings "must be grounded in fact and applicable law," the court invoked the inherent power of district courts to control proceedings and to fashion appropriate sanctions for conduct abusing the judicial process, State v. Desavio, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 25, 568 P.3d 897, 902 (2025), and found no abuse of discretion, Leavitt, 130 Nev. at 509, 330 P.3d at 5. On the bias claim, the court applied Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. 104, 107, 506 P.3d 334, 337 (2022), explaining that disqualification is unwarranted unless an alleged bias originates in an extrajudicial source or the judge formed an opinion reflecting "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." See also In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988) (rulings during official judicial proceedings generally do not establish grounds for disqualification); Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 439, 216 P.3d 213, 233 (2009) (placing the burden on the party asserting bias), overruled on other grounds by Romano, 138 Nev. at 6, 501 P.3d at 984. The court also found Rowland failed to show this was one of the exceedingly rare cases where reassignment is necessary to preserve public confidence in a judicial proceeding. Williams v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 142 Nev., Adv. Op. 5, 583 P.3d 223, 226 (2026).

In plain language

Wendy Rowland and Barry Yzaguirre share one child, born in 2010. In 2023, a Nevada district court entered a custody decree. According to the opinion, the court found that Rowland had been convicted of an offense of child abuse and neglect involving the child and had permitted an ex-boyfriend to harm the child, and on that basis found she had committed acts of domestic violence against the child. The court also noted that Yzaguirre had been abusive toward Rowland when she was pregnant, but treated those acts as carrying less weight because, in the court's view, they did not compare to the domestic violence Rowland committed against the child. The court further found clear and convincing evidence that Rowland had abducted the child, and concluded a custody arrangement was needed to protect the child from another abduction. The court gave Yzaguirre primary physical custody, directed that the child relocate to Illinois with him, and gave Rowland supervised video calls. Rowland had already tried before to change the custody arrangement. An earlier appeal was decided against her by this same court in 2024. After more proceedings, in March 2025 the district court adjusted the arrangement to let Rowland have supervised parenting time with the child in Illinois and to let her other children join supervised video calls. In the motion at issue here, Rowland argued that a newly enacted law, SB 275, required the court to reconsider the domestic-violence allegations, asserting that Yzaguirre's conduct was worse than hers. She also argued that SB 275 prohibits a court from removing a child from a capable, protective parent simply to improve the child's relationship with the other parent. She asked for unsupervised parenting time and for the child to be allowed to spend time with her in Nevada. Yzaguirre opposed the motion. The district court denied it without holding an evidentiary hearing (a court session where witnesses testify and evidence is presented), and Rowland appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. To change physical custody, a parent must first show "adequate cause" for an evidentiary hearing, which means presenting a preliminary ("prima facie") case that (1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare, and (2) the change in custody would serve the child's best interest. The court explained that the "changed-circumstances" requirement exists to stop people who are unhappy with a custody ruling from filing repeated motions based on essentially the same facts until they get a different result. The court found that Rowland was relying on factual allegations the district court had already considered when it entered the original custody decree, so she did not show a substantial change in circumstances. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that SB 275 did not change the existing custody arrangement, because the court had already considered the domestic-violence allegations of both parties, and because the custody decision was not made for the sole purpose of improving the child's relationship with Yzaguirre but also rested on Rowland's physical abuse and abduction of the child. Rowland separately objected to the district court telling her that future filings "must be grounded in fact and applicable law." The Court of Appeals explained that district courts have inherent power to control proceedings and to sanction conduct that abuses the judicial process, and found no abuse of discretion in the admonishment. Finally, Rowland argued the judge was biased. The court rejected this, explaining that bias generally must come from a source outside the proceedings, and that Rowland had not shown the deep-seated favoritism or antagonism needed to disqualify a judge.