SAVARD VS. SAVARD (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

**Jurisdiction over the amended decree.** The court applied NRAP 4(a)(2) and NRAP 4(a)(6), holding that "[a] notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision or order—but before the entry of the judgment or order—is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry," and that "[a] premature notice of appeal . . . does not divest the district court of jurisdiction until it becomes effective by entry of the final written order or judgment." Because Marc's notice preceded entry of the amended decree, it was premature and did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction. **Child custody — standard and framework.** Custody determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion (Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007)), with factual findings affirmed if supported by substantial evidence, "which is evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." The sole consideration is the best interest of the child (NRS 125C.0035(1); Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 451, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015)), and the NRS 125C.0035(4) factors are non-exhaustive (Ellis). The court presumes proper exercise of discretion (Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440, 92 P.3d 1224, 1226-27 (2004)) and recognizes a preference for joint physical custody when statutory conditions are met (NRS 125C.0025(1); Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev. 163, 173, 535 P.3d 274, 286 (Ct. App. 2023)). On the domestic-violence contention, the court found Joanna's conduct (the water-bottle incident, forcibly taking phones, kicking a hole in a wall) inappropriate but not acts of domestic violence within NRS 125C.0035(4)(k), citing Soldo-Allesio v. Ferguson, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 9, 565 P.3d 842, 849 (Ct. App. 2025). Because no domestic violence was proven by clear and convincing evidence, the NRS 125C.0035(5) rebuttable presumption did not apply. The court declined to reweigh evidence or credibility (Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 366, 212 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009)). **Relocation framework.** Because no prior final custody order existed, NRS 125C.007 did not govern (Druckman v. Ruscitti, 130 Nev. 468, 472-78, 327 P.3d 511, 514 (2014)), but the district court properly used the statutory framework as a guide. A court must consider a pending relocation motion in making the initial permanent custody determination (McGuinness v. McGuinness, 114 Nev. 1431, 1435, 970 P.2d 1074, 1077 (1998)) and must base the decision on the child's best interest (Druckman). The threshold inquiry is whether the moving parent established a "sensible, good faith reason for the move," followed by the five-factor Druckman analysis (quoted in full in the opinion); see also Shahrokhi v. Burrow, Nos. 81978, 82245, & 83726, 2022 WL 1509740, at *3 (Nev. May 12, 2022). The district court found Marc's asserted benefits speculative, found his motive was to interfere with Joanna's relationship with the children, and found no realistic substitute parenting-time opportunity. EDCR 5.503(b): the court rejected Marc's argument that Joanna's purported failure to oppose entitled him to relief, noting a court's discretion under local rules (Las Vegas Fetish & Fantasy Halloween Ball, Inc. v. Ahern Rentals, Inc., 124 Nev. 272, 278 & n.15, 182 P.3d 764, 768 & n.15 (2008); Bd. of Gallery of Hist., Inc. v. Datecs Corp., 116 Nev. 286, 289, 994 P.2d 1149, 1150 (2000)). Relocation rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion (Monahan). **Child support.** Reviewed for abuse of discretion (Edgington v. Edgington, 119 Nev. 577, 588, 80 P.3d 1282, 1290 (2003)); underlying findings undisturbed if supported by substantial evidence (Miller v. Miller, 134 Nev. 120, 125, 412 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2018)). The award "must be based on the obligor's earnings, income and other evidence of ability to pay" (NAC 425.100(1)); disputed gross monthly income is determined "after considering all financial or other information relevant to the earning capacity of the obligor" (NAC 425.120(1)(b)); medical support provisions are required (NAC 425.135(1)). The court relied on NAC 425.100(8) and NAC 425.150(1)(f) for guideline adjustments. It found Marc not underemployed, did not impute income, and properly considered both his wages from Kate's business and performance income. **Community property and debts.** Reviewed for abuse of discretion (Eivazi v. Eivazi, 139 Nev. 408, 411, 537 P.3d 476, 482 (Ct. App. 2023)), with deferential review of factual findings. NRS 125.150(1)(b) requires equal disposition absent a "compelling reason." Dissipation or waste can be a compelling reason (Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 135 Nev. 64, 75, 439 P.3d 397, 406 (2019); Lofgren v. Lofgren, 112 Nev. 1282, 1283, 926 P.2d 296, 297 (1996)), as can financial misconduct such as wasting or secreting funds (Putterman v. Putterman, 113 Nev. 606, 608, 939 P.2d 1047, 1048 (1997)). The court found Marc "intentionally manipulated community monies and strategically mislead the court," including misrepresenting finances, overstating business expenses, failing to account for more than $400,000 in MSI grant money, and incurring post-separation crypto/stock losses; post-separation, non-community debt was properly excluded (Barry v. Linder, 119 Nev. 661, 671, 81 P.3d 537, 543 (2003), superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in LaBarbera v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 134 Nev. 393, 395, 422 P.3d 138, 140 (2018)). Valuation fell within Alba v. Alba, 111 Nev. 426, 427, 892 P.2d 574, 574-75 (1995). The conceded misstatement regarding MSI's 2022 tax records was held harmless (Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 465, 244 P.3d 765, 778 (2010); cf. NRCP 61). **Alimony.** Reviewed under broad district-court discretion (Kogod, 135 Nev. at 66, 439 P.3d at 400). Under NRS 125.150(1)(a), alimony may be awarded "as appears just and equitable," including "as specified periodic payments." The court considers what is just and equitable on each case's circumstances (Shydler v. Shydler, 114 Nev. 192, 199, 954 P.2d 37, 41 (1998)) and the NRS 125.150(9) factors (Kogod). The district court's findings invoked NRS 125.150(9)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), and (k), and found Marc's superior earning capacity, the parties' minimal assets, the lengthy marriage, the "very comfortable, upper-class standard of living," and Joanna's 18 years as homemaker and caregiver. The court upheld both the award and the requirement that Marc maintain a life insurance policy naming Joanna as beneficiary to secure alimony and child support. **Attorney fees.** Reviewed for manifest abuse of discretion (Kahn v. Morse & Mowbray, 121 Nev. 464, 479, 117 P.3d 227, 238 (2005)); an abuse occurs where the decision lacks substantial evidence (Otak Nev., LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. 799, 805, 312 P.3d 491, 496 (2013)). Family-law fee awards require analysis of the Brunzell factors (Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969)) and the income-disparity consideration of Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 1370, 970 P.2d 1071, 1073 (1998); Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 623-24, 119 P.3d 727, 730 (2005). Disparity-based fees may be awarded "to ensure an even playing field" (Sargeant v. Sargeant, 88 Nev. 223, 226-27, 495 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1972)); NRS 125.150(4) authorizes fees in divorce. Under NRS 18.010(2)(b), fees may be awarded to a "prevailing party" when a claim "was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party," construed liberally; "[a] claim is frivolous or groundless if there is no credible evidence to support it" (Roe, 139 Nev. at 183, 535 P.3d at 293); see also Allianz Ins. Co. v. Gagnon, 109 Nev. 990, 996, 860 P.2d 720, 724 (1993). The court upheld the award and the denial of Marc's own fee request, which Marc did not support with cogent argument (Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006)); EDCR 5.507 also factored in. **Motion to alter or amend.** Reviewed for abuse of discretion (AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 589, 245 P.3d 1190, 1197 (2010)); "[a]n abuse of discretion occurs when no reasonable judge could reach a similar conclusion under the same circumstances" (Leavitt v. Siems, 130 Nev. 503, 509, 330 P.3d 1, 5 (2014)). The denial rested on credibility determinations the court declined to disturb. **Bias.** Disqualification requires an extrajudicial source or "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible" (Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. 104, 107, 506 P.3d 334, 337 (2022)); judicial rulings generally do not establish grounds for disqualification (In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988)); the burden is on the movant (Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 439, 216 P.3d 218, 233 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 6, 501 P.3d 980, 984 (2022), abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev. 401, 535 P.3d 1167 (2023)). Marc also failed to show this was one of the "exceedingly rare cases" warranting reassignment (Williams v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 142 Nev., Adv. Op. 5, 583 P.3d 223, 230 (2026)).

In plain language

Marc and Joanna Savard married in 1998, had four children, and divorced after Marc filed for divorce in 2020. Following a lengthy trial, the district court issued a decree of divorce addressing child custody, child support, division of the couple's property and debts, and alimony. The court later issued an amended decree to fix a child support calculation error and clarify several points. Marc appealed, raising a series of challenges. The Court of Appeals rejected all of them and left the district court's decisions in place. First, Marc argued the district court had no authority (jurisdiction) to enter the amended decree because he had already filed his notice of appeal. The appellate court explained that under the appellate rules, a notice of appeal filed before the final written order is entered is treated as premature and does not strip the district court of its power to enter that order. Because Marc filed his notice before the amended decree was entered, the district court still had jurisdiction. Second, Marc challenged the custody decision. He wanted primary physical custody and wanted to move with the children to Canada. The trial court instead awarded joint physical custody and refused the move. The trial heard testimony about incidents in which Joanna threw a water bottle that bounced near a child, forcibly took the children's phones, and kicked a hole in a wall. Joanna explained she had been under stress from the divorce and had learned to handle it better. The district court found these incidents inappropriate but not acts of domestic violence. The appellate court said custody decisions are reviewed for "abuse of discretion" - a deferential standard - and that it will not second-guess the trial judge's findings if a reasonable person could accept the supporting evidence. It also said appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or re-decide who was believable. On the request to move to Canada, the district court applied a test that asks, first, whether the parent has a "sensible, good faith reason for the move," and then weighs several additional factors about quality of life and visitation. The court found Marc's claimed benefits - climate, schools, healthcare, and family proximity - were largely speculative. It noted, for example, that Marc listed only $432 a month in health insurance costs and that higher Canadian taxes undercut his claim of major savings. The court concluded Marc actually wanted to move to interfere with Joanna's relationship with the children, and that there was no realistic way for Joanna to keep a meaningful relationship if the children moved. The appellate court found these findings supported by the evidence. Third, on child support, Marc argued the court wrongly counted his girlfriend Kate's income, wrongly imputed income to him, and should have reduced his obligation for paying the children's health insurance. The appellate court found the record showed the court considered Marc's own wages (including the $8,000 a month he earned working for Kate's business and about $4,700 a month net from cruise-ship performances), not Kate's income, and that the court did not impute income. It upheld the support amounts. Fourth, on dividing property and debts, the law generally requires an equal split unless there is a "compelling reason" for an unequal one. The district court found Marc committed financial misconduct - misrepresenting community finances, overstating business expenses, filing financial disclosure forms with inflated figures, failing to fully account for more than $400,000 in pandemic grant money received by the couple's company (MSI), and using community funds after separation on cryptocurrency and a stock-trading venture that lost substantial money. The court found Marc "intentionally manipulated community monies and strategically mislead the court" to disadvantage Joanna. Even though Joanna conceded the court misread one line on a 2022 tax filing, the appellate court found that error harmless because of the court's many other supported findings, so the unequal division stood. Fifth, on alimony, the district court awarded Joanna permanent, periodic alimony until her remarriage or the death of either party, and ordered Marc to keep a life insurance policy naming Joanna as beneficiary to secure the alimony and child support. The court found Marc's earning capacity superior given his talent and experience, that Joanna had been a full-time homemaker and primary caregiver for 18 years, that the marriage was long, and that the couple had enjoyed "a very comfortable, upper-class standard of living." The appellate court upheld the award. Sixth, on attorney fees, the district court awarded fees to Joanna, citing the income disparity between the parties and finding Marc had maintained his relocation request "without reasonable grounds and to harass Joanna." It also reviewed billing records and analyzed the required factors about counsel's skill and the work involved. The appellate court upheld the award and also upheld the court's refusal to award Marc fees for an earlier motion, partly because Marc had not timely filed a required financial disclosure form and did not make a developed argument on appeal. Finally, Marc argued the judge denied his motion to alter or amend improperly and was biased against him. The appellate court found the judge simply did not believe Marc's version of events, which is a credibility call within the judge's discretion, and that Marc did not show the kind of "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible" needed to establish bias. The court affirmed the entire judgment.