SCHICK VS. SCHICK (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

In this appeal from a final divorce decree the sole issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in distributing property. The Court (per curiam) reversed. The parties' only significant asset was a duplex (located in New York but litigated under Nevada law by consent) with roughly $31,000 in equity. The husband, the only witness to testify on financial matters, was disabled and received modest Social Security and VA benefits; the wife, who did not testify, resided in the duplex, covered the mortgage largely through rental income, and had comparable or better income. The district court awarded the entire duplex to the wife as her sole and separate property. The Court reaffirmed that the district court is vested with broad discretion in dividing property, Stojanovich v. Stojanovich, 86 Nev. 789, 476 P.2d 950 (1970); Herzog v. Herzog, 69 Nev. 286, 249 P.2d 533 (1952); see NRS 125.150(1), (4), but that equal distribution is the rule in most cases, Stojanovich, supra; Weeks v. Weeks, 75 Nev. 411, 345 P.2d 228 (1959). Applying Stojanovich, the Court observed that any concern for keeping the wife and child in the home could have been met by imposing a burden on the property for their benefit rather than vesting sole ownership in the wife. Because the wife's financial condition was at least equal to that of her disabled husband and there was no evidence the child's medical condition imposed a financial burden, the Court found no basis for the grossly unequal award of the only significant marital asset. It reversed the award of sole ownership and remanded for reconsideration.

In plain language

Raymond and Carmela Schick married in New York in 1965 and bought a duplex in 1970. They separated in 1975, and Raymond moved to Nevada and filed for divorce, asking that the duplex be sold and the money split evenly. Carmela asked instead that the duplex be given to her as her own separate property. At trial, Raymond was the only person who testified about money and property. Carmela was there but did not testify. Raymond said he was disabled, could not work, and received about $426 a month in Social Security and veterans' benefits. The couple's teenage daughter had been treated for cancer, which was in remission, and her treatment cost the parents nothing. The duplex was the only significant asset, with about $31,000 of equity. Carmela lived in it, made the $130 monthly mortgage payment, rented out the upstairs unit for enough to cover the mortgage, received $80 a month from a mortgage she held on other property, and she and the child each received about $166 a month in Social Security. The trial court gave the entire duplex to Carmela as her sole and separate property. Raymond appealed, saying that was an abuse of the court's discretion. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed and reversed. The court explained that while a trial judge has broad discretion to divide property, equal division is the rule in most cases. It pointed to an earlier decision holding that when the concern is keeping a family in the home, the judge can place a 'burden' on the property for the family's benefit rather than handing full ownership to one spouse. Here, Carmela's finances were at least as good as her disabled ex-husband's, and there was no evidence the child's medical condition created any financial burden. So there was no basis for the lopsided award of the only significant asset to Carmela, and the case was sent back for the property division to be reconsidered.