SHAHROKHI VS. BURROW C/W 81978

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Constitutional issues are reviewed de novo. Jackson v. State, 128 Nev. 598, 603, 291 P.3d 1274, 1277 (2012). The court held that the constitutional challenge to NRS 125C.0035 fails because, between two fit parents, the fundamental right to care for one's child is equal, and the dispute is properly resolved using the best-interest standard. Rico v. Rodriguez, 121 Nev. 695, 704, 120 P.3d 812, 818 (2005). Procedural due process requires only "notice and an opportunity to be heard," J.D. Constr., Inc. v. IBEX Int'l Grp., 126 Nev. 366, 376, 240 P.3d 1033, 1040 (2010); Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007), and the record demonstrated service of motions and either written opposition, hearing appearance, or failure to request a hearing under local rule. The court additionally noted there is no right to a jury trial in family court proceedings, citing In re Parental Rights as to M.F., 132 Nev. 209, 215, 371 P.3d 995, 999-1000 (2016), and Barelli v. Barelli, 113 Nev. 873, 879, 944 P.2d 246, 249 (1997). Disqualification is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Ivey v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 154, 162, 299 P.3d 354, 359 (2013). Most of Shahrokhi's contentions stemmed from rulings and official actions, which under Matter of Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988), do not establish cognizable grounds for disqualification absent "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible," Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 1007, 923 P.2d 1102, 1119 (1996) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). A pending civil rights action initiated by the moving party does not support disqualification. City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Hecht, 113 Nev. 644, 649, 940 P.2d 134, 138 (1997). Within-limits campaign contributions from a party or attorney do not ordinarily require recusal. City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 640, 644, 5 P.3d 1059, 1062 (2000); Ivey, 129 Nev. at 162, 299 P.3d at 359. The presumption of judicial impartiality requires a showing of extreme bias, Millen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 1245, 1254-55, 148 P.3d 694, 701 (2006), which Shahrokhi failed to make. The domestic violence findings were made under NRS 125C.0035(5), which creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding physical custody to a parent who has committed domestic violence; the district court properly invoked NRS 33.018 only to define the term. Family courts have exclusive jurisdiction over NRS Chapter 125C proceedings under NRS 3.223(1)(a), and possess the same authority as other district court judges. Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. 175, 186-88, 251 P.3d 163, 170-71 (2011). The presumption is analyzed on a totality of the evidence, and credibility determinations will not be reweighed on appeal. Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 102-03, 86 P.3d 1042, 1045-46 (2004). Substantial evidence supported application of the presumption. Whether the correct legal standard was applied is reviewed de novo. Stalk v. Valley Hosp., 123 Nev. 526, 530, 170 P.3d 503, 505-06 (2007). The Druckman v. Ruscitti, 130 Nev. 468, 473, 327 P.3d 511, 515 (2014), framework governs relocation requests when no prior court order has awarded physical custody. A stipulated temporary sole physical custody order does not trigger the NRS 125C.007 relocation factors, which apply only when a prior order under NRS 125C.006 or NRS 125C.0065 establishes primary or joint physical custody. Burrow established a good-faith basis for relocation, and the district court's findings on the Schwartz factors (Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 382-83, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1991)) and NRS 125C.0035 best-interest factors were supported by substantial evidence. Custody orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion, Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996), and factual findings supported by substantial evidence will not be set aside, Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). The custodial parent's interest in pursuing another relationship is integral to that parent's well-being. Jones v. Jones, 110 Nev. 1253, 1260-61, 885 P.2d 563, 568-69 (1994). The SCR 251 six-month deadline argument was barred by the invited-error doctrine. Pearson v. Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d 343, 345 (1994). The rule expressly permits extensions for "[e]xtraordinary cases that present unforeseeable circumstances" with specific findings, which the district court made. Attorney fee awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 130 Nev. 67, 82, 319 P.3d 606, 616 (2014). NRS 125C.250 authorizes fees to the prevailing party in custody matters. The district court properly considered the parties' income disparity through their financial disclosure forms. Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 623-24, 119 P.3d 727, 730 (2005). Appellate jurisdiction requires statutory or rule-based authorization. Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels, 100 Nev. 207, 209, 678 P.2d 1152, 1153 (1984); NRAP 3A(b). No authority permits appeal from orders denying transfer to a different department, post-judgment motions to dismiss (including post-judgment anti-SLAPP motions), NRCP 11 sanctions motions, or "Demand for Bill of Particulars" motions invoking the Sixth Amendment. NRCP 60(b) rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rodriguez v. Fiesta Palms, LLC, 134 Nev. 654, 656, 428 P.3d 255, 257 (2018). Evidence available before trial does not satisfy NRCP 60(b)(2)-(3); collateral evidence does not support relief; and arguments unsupported by cogent argument or authority will not be considered. Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). Eligibility for statutory costs is reviewed de novo. Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 264, 350 P.3d 1139, 1141 (2015). Neither NRS 18.060 nor NRAP 39 authorizes costs in original writ proceedings; an argument not raised below is waived. Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981). The court applied the right-for-any-reason principle of Pack v. LaTourette, 128 Nev. 264, 267, 277 P.3d 1246, 1248 (2012).

In plain language

Ali Shahrokhi and Kizzy Burrow had one child together but never married. After their relationship ended, Burrow obtained a temporary restraining order against Shahrokhi, and the parties filed competing custody complaints. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court awarded Burrow sole legal and physical custody, allowed her to move with the child to Oregon, and ordered Shahrokhi to pay her attorney fees and costs. Shahrokhi appealed those rulings and several later orders. The Nevada Supreme Court resolved all three appeals together. The court rejected Shahrokhi's constitutional arguments. It explained that when two fit parents dispute custody, both have equal constitutional rights to their child, so courts decide by asking what is in the child's best interest. The court also found that Shahrokhi received notice and a chance to be heard on the motions he complained about, which is what due process requires. The court noted that there is no right to a jury trial in family court cases. On the request to disqualify Judge Mathew Harter, the court held that most of Shahrokhi's complaints were about the judge's rulings during the case, which generally cannot be the basis for disqualification. His pending federal civil rights lawsuit against the judge did not require disqualification, because a party cannot manufacture a conflict and then use it to remove a judge. Campaign contributions from Burrow's lawyer that were within statutory limits also did not require disqualification. On the domestic violence findings, the court explained that the district court applied a family-law statute, NRS 125C.0035(5), which creates a presumption that giving custody to a parent who has committed domestic violence is not in the child's best interest. Because this was a family-law proceeding rather than a criminal case, the criminal-procedure protections Shahrokhi invoked did not apply. The court found substantial evidence supported the finding that Shahrokhi committed acts of domestic violence against Burrow, including threats and harassment. On custody and relocation, the court held that the trial court applied the right legal framework (the Druckman factors) because there was no prior court order awarding physical custody before Burrow's relocation request. The court found Burrow had good-faith reasons to move (a relationship with her fiancé and a desire to escape Shahrokhi's behavior) and that the record supported awarding Burrow sole physical custody. On the six-month deadline for resolving custody cases under SCR 251, the court found Shahrokhi himself caused most of the delay through writ petitions, continuance requests, and disqualification motions, so he could not now complain about it. On attorney fees, the court held that NRS 125C.250 allows the prevailing party in a custody case to recover fees and costs, and the trial court properly considered both sides' financial disclosures. For the post-judgment orders in Docket No. 83726, the court dismissed parts of the appeal because some of the challenged orders are not the kind that can be appealed under Nevada law - including denials of motions to transfer to a different judge, denials of post-judgment motions to dismiss, denials of NRCP 11 sanction motions, and denials of a "Demand for Bill of Particulars." On the NRCP 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment, the court held the new evidence Shahrokhi cited was available before trial or was unrelated to the custody, relocation, and child support issues actually decided. On his motions for costs related to a separate writ proceeding, the court held that neither NRS 18.060 nor NRAP 39 authorizes an award of costs to a prevailing party in an original writ proceeding.