SHAHROKHI VS. BURROW C/W 82245

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Constitutional review was de novo under Jackson v. State, 128 Nev. 598, 603, 291 P.3d 1274, 1277 (2012). The court rejected Ali's facial challenge to NRS 125C.0035, relying on Rico v. Rodriguez, 121 Nev. 695, 704, 120 P.3d 812, 818 (2005), for the proposition that as between two fit parents with equal fundamental rights, the best-interest standard governs. Procedural due process challenges were resolved under J.D. Constr., Inc. v. IBEX Int'l Grp., 126 Nev. 366, 376, 240 P.3d 1033, 1040 (2010), and Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007), with the court noting no right to a jury trial in family proceedings under In re Parental Rights as to M.F., 132 Nev. 209, 215, 371 P.3d 995, 999-1000 (2016), and Barelli v. Barelli, 113 Nev. 873, 879, 944 P.2d 246, 249 (1997). Disqualification was reviewed for abuse of discretion under Ivey v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 154, 162, 299 P.3d 354, 359 (2013). Applying Towbin Dodge, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 251, 260, 112 P.3d 1063, 1069 (2005), and NCJC Rule 2.11(A), the court held that judicial rulings do not establish disqualification grounds (Matter of Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988)), absent "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible" (Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 1007, 923 P.2d 1102, 1119 (1996), quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). Under City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Hecht, 113 Nev. 644, 649, 940 P.2d 134, 138 (1997), a party cannot create a conflict (here, a federal civil rights suit against the judge) and then demand disqualification. Campaign-contribution arguments failed under City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 640, 644, 5 P.3d 1059, 1062 (2000), and Ivey. The presumption of judicial impartiality was reaffirmed via Millen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 1245, 1254-55, 148 P.3d 694, 701 (2006). The domestic violence findings were made under NRS 125C.0035(5), which creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding physical custody to a parent who has committed acts of domestic violence; NRS 33.018 was cited only definitionally. The court relied on NRS 3.223(1)(a) and Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. 175, 186-88, 251 P.3d 163, 170-71 (2011), for family court jurisdiction. The substantial-evidence standard from Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 102-03, 86 P.3d 1042, 1045-46 (2004), governed appellate review, and the court declined to reweigh credibility. NRCP 9's heightened pleading standards were noted to be inapplicable to custody/domestic-violence allegations. For relocation, the court reviewed the legal standard de novo (Stacco v. Valley Hosp., 123 Nev. 526, 530, 170 P.3d 503, 505-06 (2007)). Because no prior court order awarded physical custody, NRS 125C.006 / 125C.0065 / 125C.007 did not apply; the Druckman v. Ruscitti, 130 Nev. 468, 473, 327 P.3d 511, 514-15 (2014), framework controlled, incorporating the Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 382-83, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1991), factors. The good-faith reasons analysis tracked Jones v. Jones, 110 Nev. 1253, 1260-61, 885 P.2d 563, 568-69 (1994). The custody award was reviewed under Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996), and Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007), with NRS 125C.0035 best-interest factors supplying the substantive framework. The SCR 251 challenge to the six-month resolution rule was rejected under the invited error doctrine (Pearson v. Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d 343, 345 (1994)), because the record showed Ali caused the delays. Attorney fees were reviewed for abuse of discretion under Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 130 Nev. 67, 82, 319 P.3d 606, 616 (2014). NRS 125C.250 authorizes fees to the prevailing party; Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 623-24, 119 P.3d 727, 730 (2005), required consideration of income disparity, which the district court did via the parties' financial disclosure forms. In Docket No. 83726, NRAP 3(g) review revealed jurisdictional defects under NRAP 3A(b) and Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels, 100 Nev. 207, 209, 678 P.2d 1152, 1153 (1984): orders denying transfer between departments, denying a post-judgment motion to dismiss (including a post-judgment anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss), denying NRCP 11 sanctions, and denying a "Demand for Bill of Particulars" are not appealable. Rodriguez v. Fiesta Palms, LLC, 134 Nev. 654, 656, 428 P.3d 255, 257 (2018), supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for the NRCP 60(b) ruling; the court found no basis under NRCP 60(b)(2), (3), (4), or (6). The denial of writ-proceeding costs was affirmed because neither NRS 18.060 nor NRAP 39 authorizes such costs in original writ proceedings (Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 264, 350 P.3d 1139, 1141 (2015); Pack v. LaTourette, 128 Nev. 264, 267, 277 P.3d 1246, 1248 (2012)). The NRS 18.020(4) argument was waived under Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981).

In plain language

Ali Shahrokhi and Kizzy Burrow were never married but share one child. After their relationship ended, Kizzy obtained a temporary restraining order, and both parents filed for custody. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and awarded Kizzy sole legal and physical custody, allowed her to move to Oregon with the child, and ordered Ali to pay her attorney fees and costs. Ali appealed those rulings and additional later orders. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected each of Ali's challenges. On his constitutional arguments, the court explained that because both parents have equal fundamental rights to care for their child, the "best interest of the child" standard properly governs custody disputes. The court also found that Ali received notice and an opportunity to be heard for each motion he claimed had been decided without due process. On his motion to disqualify the trial judge, the court held that a judge's rulings during a case are not, by themselves, grounds for disqualification, and that a party cannot manufacture a conflict (such as suing the judge in federal court) and then demand disqualification. Campaign contributions within legal limits also do not require disqualification. On the domestic violence findings, the court explained these were civil findings made under the custody statute (NRS 125C.0035(5)), not criminal findings, so the additional protections that criminal defendants receive did not apply. The court found substantial evidence in the record (text messages, testimony, prior TPO proceedings, and an interview with the child) supporting the finding that Ali committed domestic violence against Kizzy, including threats and harassment. On relocation, the court applied the framework from Druckman v. Ruscitti and concluded the district court properly evaluated Kizzy's good-faith reasons for moving (her relationship with her fiancé and a desire to escape Ali's behavior) and the factors bearing on the child's best interest. On attorney fees, the court found NRS 125C.250 authorized fees to the prevailing party in a custody case, and that the trial court properly considered the parties' financial disclosures, including any income disparity. On the post-judgment orders in Docket No. 83726, the court held that several of the orders (denying transfer to another department, denying a post-judgment motion to dismiss, denying NRCP 11 sanctions, denying a "Demand for Bill of Particulars") are not appealable, so it dismissed those portions of the appeal. The court affirmed the denial of relief under NRCP 60(b), finding the "new" evidence was available before trial and was not fraudulently concealed. It also affirmed the denial of costs related to a prior writ proceeding, explaining that neither NRS 18.060 nor NRAP 39 authorizes costs to the prevailing party in an original writ proceeding.