SHAHROKHI VS. BURROW (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Constitutional issues received de novo review. Jackson v. State, 128 Nev. 598, 603, 291 P.3d 1274, 1277 (2012). The court rejected Ali's facial challenge to NRS 125C.0035, reasoning that fit parents have equal fundamental rights to the child's care, leaving best interests as the dispositive standard. Rico v. Rodriguez, 121 Nev. 695, 704, 120 P.3d 812, 818 (2005). Procedural due process required only "notice and an opportunity to be heard," J.D. Constr., Inc. v. IBEX Int'l Grp., 126 Nev. 366, 376, 240 P.3d 1033, 1040 (2010); Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007), and the record showed Ali received service of motions and either opposed them, appeared at hearings, or failed to invoke the local rule. The court noted in passing that no jury trial right attaches in family court proceedings. In re Parental Rights as to M.F., 132 Nev. 209, 215, 371 P.3d 995, 999-1000 (2016); Barelli v. Barelli, 113 Nev. 873, 879, 944 P.2d 246, 249 (1997). Disqualification (Docket No. 81978). Reviewed for abuse of discretion. Ivey v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 154, 162, 299 P.3d 354, 359 (2013). Most allegations concerned rulings during proceedings, which under Matter of Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988), are not cognizable absent "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism," Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 1007, 923 P.2d 1102, 1119 (1996) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). The court invoked City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Hecht, 113 Nev. 644, 649, 940 P.2d 134, 138 (1997), to reject Ali's reliance on his own federal civil rights suit against the judge as a basis for disqualification. Lawful campaign contributions are not grounds for disqualification. City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 640, 644, 5 P.3d 1059, 1062 (2000); Ivey, 129 Nev. at 162, 299 P.3d at 359. Ali failed to overcome the presumption of impartiality articulated in Millen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 1245, 1254-55, 148 P.3d 694, 701 (2006). NCJC Rule 2.11(A) and Towbin Dodge, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 251, 260, 112 P.3d 1063, 1069 (2005) supplied the governing standard. Domestic violence findings. The court characterized the findings as civil determinations under NRS 125C.0035(5), supporting application of the statutory rebuttable presumption against awarding physical custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence. NRS 33.018 was used only definitionally. Family courts have jurisdiction under NRS 3.223(1)(a), and Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. 175, 186-88, 251 P.3d 163, 170-71 (2011), confirms broad family-court authority. Substantial evidence supported findings that Ali threatened Kizzy, harassed her, and intimated knowledge of her residence. Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 102-03, 86 P.3d 1042, 1045-46 (2004), governed the totality-of-evidence analysis and barred reweighing credibility on appeal. NRS 125C.0035(4)(k) requires consideration of domestic violence as a best-interest factor; NRCP 9 imposes no heightened pleading standard. Custody and relocation. Whether the correct legal standard was applied is reviewed de novo. Stacco v. Valley Hosp., 123 Nev. 526, 530, 170 P.3d 503, 505-06 (2007). Because there was no prior order awarding physical custody, the court applied the framework of Druckman v. Ruscitti, 130 Nev. 468, 473, 327 P.3d 511, 515 (2014), rather than the NRS 125C.007 factors that apply to relocation petitions under NRS 125C.006 or NRS 125C.0065. The temporary stipulated order granting Kizzy temporary sole physical custody did not constitute a prior physical-custody order. Kizzy's good-faith basis for relocation, including the well-being interest recognized in Jones v. Jones, 110 Nev. 1253, 1260-61, 885 P.2d 563, 568-69 (1994), supported the move. The Schwartz factors, see Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 382-83, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1991), and the NRS 125C.0035 factors were properly addressed. The custody decision, reviewed for abuse of discretion under Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996), and Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007), was supported by substantial evidence. SCR 251. The six-month resolution requirement permits extensions in extraordinary cases with specific findings. The court invoked the invited-error doctrine, citing Pearson v. Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d 343, 345 (1994), because Ali caused the delays through writ petitions, continuance requests, disqualification motions, and shifting positions on evaluations. Attorney fees (Docket No. 82245). Reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 130 Nev. 67, 82, 319 P.3d 606, 616 (2014). NRS 125C.250 authorizes fees to the prevailing party in a custody case, and the district court adequately considered the parties' financial disclosure forms. Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 623-24, 119 P.3d 727, 730 (2005). Post-judgment orders (Docket No. 83726). Pursuant to NRAP 3(g) and NRAP 3A(b), the court identified jurisdictional defects: orders denying a transfer request, a post-judgment motion to dismiss (including a post-judgment anti-SLAPP motion), an NRCP 11 sanctions motion, and a "Demand for Bill of Particulars and Cause of Accusation U.S. Constitution 6th Amendment" are not appealable. Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels, 100 Nev. 207, 209, 678 P.2d 1152, 1153 (1984). The denial of NRCP 60(b) relief was reviewed for abuse of discretion, Rodriguez v. Fiesta Palms, LLC, 134 Nev. 654, 656, 428 P.3d 255, 257 (2018), and the court found no basis under NRCP 60(b)(2)-(3), (4), or (6); the Pearson-related evidence was deemed collateral to custody, relocation, and child support. Arguments unsupported by cogent argument or authority were declined under Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). On costs related to the prior writ proceeding (Docket No. 82803), the court held that neither NRS 18.060 nor NRAP 39 authorizes costs in original writ proceedings. Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 264, 350 P.3d 1139, 1141 (2015); see also Pack v. LaTourette, 128 Nev. 264, 267, 277 P.3d 1246, 1248 (2012). Ali's NRS 18.020(4) argument was waived for failure to raise it below. Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981).

In plain language

Ali Shahrokhi and Kizzy Burrow were never married but had one child together. After their relationship ended, Kizzy obtained a temporary restraining order against Ali, and both sides filed competing requests for custody. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court gave Kizzy sole legal and physical custody, allowed her to move with the child to Oregon, and ordered Ali to pay her attorney fees and costs. Ali filed three separate appeals challenging those rulings and several follow-up orders. In the first appeal (Docket No. 81978), Ali raised constitutional objections, attacked the judge for alleged bias, challenged the court's findings that he committed domestic violence, and disputed the custody and relocation decision. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected each argument. It explained that when both parents are fit, custody is decided by what is best for the child. It found that Ali had received notice and a chance to be heard on the motions in the case. It concluded that the chief judge did not abuse her discretion in refusing to disqualify Judge Harter, noting that disagreements with a judge's rulings are not grounds for disqualification and that a party cannot manufacture a conflict (such as by filing a federal civil rights suit against the judge) and then demand removal. The court also held that the domestic violence findings were civil findings made under the custody statute, not criminal findings, and that they were supported by substantial evidence including Kizzy's testimony, an interview with the child, and text messages. On relocation, the court found Kizzy had good-faith reasons to move (her relationship with her fiancé and a desire to escape Ali's behavior) and that the district court properly applied Nevada's relocation framework. The court rejected Ali's argument that the case took too long under court rule SCR 251, concluding that Ali himself caused most of the delay. In the second appeal (Docket No. 82245), Ali challenged the attorney fee award. The court held that NRS 125C.250 authorizes fees to the prevailing party in a custody case and that the district court properly considered the parties' financial information. In the third appeal (Docket No. 83726), the court found that several of the orders Ali tried to appeal - including denials of a motion to transfer departments, a post-judgment motion to dismiss, an anti-SLAPP motion, an NRCP 11 sanctions motion, and a "Demand for Bill of Particulars" - are not the kind of orders Nevada law allows to be appealed, so it dismissed those parts of the appeal. As for Ali's motion seeking relief from the judgment under NRCP 60(b), the court concluded that the evidence he relied on was available before trial, that he had not shown fraud or lack of jurisdiction, and that his "newly discovered" evidence about Donald Pearson's Oregon business interest was collateral to the custody, relocation, and child support issues actually decided. Finally, the court held Ali was not entitled to costs related to an earlier writ proceeding because neither NRS 18.060 nor NRAP 39 authorizes costs in original writ proceedings.