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SHANK VS. SHANK (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

100 Nev. 695, 691 P.2d 872 (1984) · 15312 · Nevada Supreme Court · December 10, 1984

Disposition:Reversed. ("Reversed.") The court held the alimony obligation terminated upon the payee spouse's remarriage ceremony and that the district court erred in reinstating it.Divorce, Property & Alimony

Posture Appeal from a district court order reinstating alimony payments. The parties' divorce decree terminated alimony upon the wife's remarriage. The wife remarried, the husband ceased paying, and the wife later obtained an annulment because her new husband was already married; she then sought reinstatement and arrearages. The district court denied full arrearages but reinstated alimony from the annulment date. The husband appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court, per curiam, reversed.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

- Under NRS 125.150(5) and a divorce decree terminating alimony on 'remarriage,' the term 'remarriage' means the solemnization or ceremony of remarriage, without regard to whether the remarriage is later determined to be void or voidable. - A payor spouse's alimony obligation terminates upon the payee spouse's remarriage ceremony even if that subsequent marriage is later annulled, and the district court cannot reinstate the terminated alimony.

Practitioner summary

Per Curiam (Springer, Mowbray, Steffen, and Gunderson, JJ., and Zenoff, Sr. J., concurring). The divorce decree and NRS 125.150(5) provided that alimony would cease upon the payee spouse's 'remarriage.' The payee remarried in December 1981; the payor stopped paying; the remarriage was later annulled in 1983 (the new husband being already married, rendering the marriage void under NRS 125.290). On this issue of first impression, the court held that 'remarriage,' as used in the decree and NRS 125.150(5), means the solemnization or ceremony of remarriage, without regard to whether the remarriage is later determined void or voidable. The court adopted the policy rationale of Glass v. Glass (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) and Sefton v. Sefton (Cal. 1955): the payor is entitled to rely on the remarriage ceremony to recommit assets; treating the ceremony as non-conclusive would leave obligations indefinitely uncertain; and the more active spouse should bear the loss from a stranger's misconduct. The court further emphasized the need to avoid stale alimony claims and to provide certainty in the parties' rights. Accordingly, the alimony obligation terminated upon the December 1981 ceremony, and the district court erred in reinstating it. Reversed.

In plain language

When this couple divorced in 1981, the decree required the husband to pay alimony ($400 a month for ten years, then $200 a month for another ten years), but it said the alimony would stop if the wife remarried. In December 1981 the wife remarried, and the husband stopped paying. It later turned out her new husband had never divorced his first wife, so the wife obtained an annulment of that second marriage in 1983. She then asked the court to reinstate the husband's alimony. The trial court denied her request for back alimony but ordered alimony reinstated starting from the date of the annulment. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Both the divorce decree and Nevada law say alimony ends on 'remarriage,' and the case turned on what 'remarriage' means when the new marriage is later declared void. This was a question of first impression in Nevada. Following courts in other states, the Nevada court held that simply going through the remarriage ceremony ends the alimony obligation - even if that new marriage is later found void or voidable. The reasoning: the paying ex-spouse is entitled to rely on the remarriage ceremony and put those funds to other uses; otherwise his obligation could stay uncertain for years while hidden grounds for annulment lingered; and courts should not be burdened with stale alimony claims arising long after a remarriage. So the wife's alimony ended when she went through her remarriage ceremony in December 1981, the husband was entitled to stop paying, and the trial court was wrong to reinstate it.

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