SHEETS VS. SHEETS (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed an initial permanent custody determination combined with a relocation request. Because no prior custody order existed, the court noted that NRS 125C.007 did not govern the petition; under Druckman v. Ruscitti, 130 Nev. 468, 472-73, 327 P.3d 511, 514 (2014), NRS 125C.200 (the predecessor to NRS 125C.007) applies only where there is a prior custody determination. The court therefore addressed Timothy's challenges to the NRS 125C.007 findings only to the extent they overlapped with the best-interest factors or the Schwartz relocation factors. Standard of review: The district court enjoys "broad discretionary powers to determine child custody matters," and its determinations will not be disturbed "absent a clear abuse of discretion." Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007). "An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is clearly erroneous." Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 336, 419 P.3d 157, 159 (2018). Substantial evidence is "evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. The court does not reweigh evidence or witness credibility on appeal. Quintero v. McDonald, 116 Nev. 1181, 1183, 14 P.3d 522, 523 (2000); Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244; Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 366, 212 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009). The abuse of discretion standard does not ask whether the reviewing court would have reached the same result. Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 766, 263 P.3d 235, 247 (2011). Doctrinal framework: Courts must consider a pending motion to relocate when making the initial permanent custody determination. McGuinness v. McGuinness, 114 Nev. 1431, 1435, 970 P.2d 1074, 1077 (1998). When resolving a relocation motion and making an initial permanent custody determination, "the district court must base its decision on the child's best interest." Druckman, 130 Nev. at 473, 327 P.3d at 515. The court must consider "whether it is in the best interest of the child to live with parent A in a different state or parent B in Nevada." Potter v. Potter, 121 Nev. 613, 618, 119 P.3d 1246, 1250 (2005). "The circumstances and well-being of the parents are inextricably entwined with the best interest of the child." McGuinness, 114 Nev. at 1433, 970 P.2d at 1076. As a threshold matter, the moving parent must establish a "sensible, good faith reason for the move," Druckman, 130 Nev. at 473, 327 P.3d at 515, after which the court must incorporate the five Schwartz relocation factors into its best-interest analysis. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 382-83, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1991). Application—good faith threshold: The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Samantha had a sensible, good faith reason to relocate, based on her testimony regarding proximity to family, free childcare and rent from her mother, and a job opportunity at Dr. Kayla Erickson's animal hospital, with Dr. Erickson corroborating the job title, pay rate, and schedule options. Timothy's argument that Samantha's motives were pretextual amounted to a request to reweigh evidence and credibility, which the court declined to do. Application—Schwartz factors: Timothy challenged three of the five Schwartz factors. On quality of life, the court distinguished Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 443, 92 P.3d 1224, 1229 (2004), noting the district court found Samantha credibly testified that relocation would improve both her and P.S.'s quality of life through rent-free housing, free childcare, mentorship-based career opportunity, and a more rural lifestyle; economic factors may be considered, Monahan v. Hogan, 138 Nev. 58, 67-68, 507 P.3d 588, 595-96 (Ct. App. 2022). On honorable motives, the court declined to reweigh competing evidence about alleged collusion. On the noncustodial parent's motives in resisting relocation, the court acknowledged "reasonable minds could have considered this factor differently" but concluded the overall Schwartz analysis favoring relocation was supported by substantial evidence. Application—best-interest factors: Timothy challenged the district court's findings under NRS 125C.0035(4)(c), (g), and (h), and its treatment of NRS 125C.0035(4)(i). On factor (h), the court acknowledged reasonable minds could have found it neutral, but deferred to the district court's credibility-based finding that Samantha provided a more nurturing, consistent relationship. On factor (c), the court found support in testimony that Samantha encouraged P.S. to call her father, traveled with P.S. to visit Timothy, and that Timothy had previously threatened to remove P.S. from Samantha. On factor (g), the court relied on Samantha's status as primary caregiver and testimony regarding Timothy permitting physical activity despite the child's broken femur and his out-of-state absences. As to factor (i), which favored Timothy, the court found its weight "mitigated" by the uncertainty over Jodi's potential relocation. The court declined Timothy's request to take judicial notice of a filing in a separate matter regarding Jodi, citing the general rule that appellate courts do not take judicial notice of records in other cases. Mack v. Est. of Mack, 125 Nev. 80, 91, 206 P.3d 98, 106 (2009). Application—parenting time: The court reviews parenting time schedules for abuse of discretion. Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 428, 216 P.3d 213, 226 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 3, 501 P.3d 980, 982 (2022). The district court awarded one week of uninterrupted parenting time, defaulting to the first through second Friday of each month, but expressly permitting adjustment by mutual agreement. Because Timothy presented no evidence clarifying his work schedule and offered no alternative schedule, the court found no abuse of discretion, citing Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (court need not consider claims unsupported by cogent argument). The order was affirmed.

In plain language

Timothy and Samantha Sheets share the same last name but were never married. They are the parents of a daughter, P.S., born in September 2022. Their relationship ended about a year after the child's birth, though Samantha continued living with P.S. in a house Timothy rented. The couple briefly reconciled in early 2024 and discussed moving away from Las Vegas, possibly to Montana, where Samantha had friends and family. In May 2024, after returning from a trip to Montana, the two had an altercation that led Samantha to call law enforcement. Timothy then filed a custody complaint seeking joint legal custody and primary physical custody, claiming Samantha had "abducted" the child. Samantha responded with her own request, asking for primary physical custody so she could relocate with P.S. to Billings, Montana. She gave several reasons: her extended family lived there, she would have free childcare, she had received a better job offer, and the area had cleaner air and water and a more rural lifestyle. Timothy opposed the move, arguing it would damage his relationship with the child and her relationship with her three half-siblings (his children from prior relationships, who lived in Las Vegas), and that Samantha was acting in bad faith to limit his contact and gain advantages in court. The district court first issued a temporary order giving Samantha primary physical custody, with arrangements built around Timothy's work schedule, which required him to work out of state—including in North Dakota—for two weeks each month. After a full evidentiary hearing with numerous witnesses, the court issued a detailed written order granting Samantha primary physical custody and permission to relocate to Billings. It awarded Timothy one week of parenting time per month, with a default schedule that the parties could adjust by mutual agreement to fit Timothy's work schedule. Timothy appealed. The Court of Appeals explained that a trial court has broad discretion in custody matters, and an appeals court will not disturb those decisions unless there was a clear abuse of discretion—meaning the decision was not supported by substantial evidence or was clearly erroneous. The appeals court emphasized that it does not re-weigh the evidence or re-judge the credibility of witnesses; that is the trial judge's job because the judge actually saw and heard the witnesses. Applying that standard, the court found that substantial evidence supported the district court's conclusion that Samantha had a "sensible, good faith reason for the move." Samantha and her prospective employer, Dr. Kayla Erickson, both testified about the legitimacy of the job offer, and Samantha testified about wanting to live near family, obtain free childcare and housing from her mother, and pursue better career opportunities. The court also reviewed the relocation factors from a Nevada Supreme Court case called Schwartz and the statutory "best interest of the child" factors, concluding that the trial court's findings—including that Samantha was more likely to support the child's relationship with her father and better suited to meet the child's needs—were supported by the evidence. While the court acknowledged that the child's relationship with her half-siblings favored Timothy, the trial court found that factor was "mitigated" by uncertainty over whether one half-sibling's mother (Jodi) would herself relocate closer to Montana. On the parenting time schedule, the appeals court noted that Timothy himself had not presented evidence clarifying how his work schedule was set or how far in advance he knew it, and he offered no concrete alternative schedule the trial court could have adopted. Because the order allowed the parties to adjust the default schedule by mutual agreement, the court found the schedule was supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order in full.