SIRAGUSA VS. SIRAGUSA (ALIMONY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Per Curiam. On appealability, the Court held that NRS 125.005(4) - which provides that a party's failure to timely object to a domestic relations referee's report precludes a later challenge in the district court - does not bar an appeal to the Supreme Court from the district court's order adopting the referee's findings; the Legislature did not intend to make the referee the final arbiter. On jurisdiction, NRS 125.150(7) makes accrued alimony non-modifiable but permits modification of unaccrued payments on a showing of changed circumstances. Under Schryver v. Schryver, 108 Nev. 190, 826 P.2d 569 (1992), the time alimony 'accrues' turns not only on whether payments were made but on the period of the award; a payor cannot deprive the court of jurisdiction by making advance payments - nor, the Court held, by failing to make payments. A judgment for alimony arrearages extends the payor's alimony obligation for the period of the judgment, and the obligation remains modifiable until that term expires. Because the arrearage judgment (with monthly installments plus interest) extended the award's period through September 1990, Joanne's August 31, 1990 motion was timely and the district court retained jurisdiction. On the merits, the Court held a district court may consider a spouse's discharged property-settlement obligation as a 'changed circumstance' supporting modification of alimony; doing so neither re-creates the discharged debt nor violates the Supremacy Clause or the bankruptcy 'fresh start' policy, consistent with the uniform weight of authority, In re Marriage of Clements, 184 Cal. Rptr. 756 (Ct. App. 1982); In re Marriage of Myers, 773 P.2d 118 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Eckert v. Eckert, 424 N.W.2d 759 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988); see Martin v. Martin, 108 Nev. 384, 832 P.2d 390 (1992) (dischargeability is a question of federal law; alimony/support obligations are non-dischargeable while property-division obligations are dischargeable).

In plain language

Vincent Siragusa, a prominent Las Vegas cardiologist, and Joanne Siragusa divorced in 1983. Their settlement required Vincent to pay alimony and to buy out Joanne's community interest in his medical practice for $1,250,000 over fifteen years. Vincent defaulted, then filed for bankruptcy: the bankruptcy court discharged (wiped out) his property-settlement obligation but not his alimony. Joanne obtained a $126,000 judgment for alimony arrearages, payable in monthly installments. After Vincent made his final arrearage payment, Joanne moved to modify (increase) the alimony. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to grant that modification. First, even though Vincent had failed to object to the referee's recommendation in the district court, he could still appeal to the Supreme Court. Second, the court still had jurisdiction to modify the alimony: under Nevada law, only 'accrued' alimony is unmodifiable, and whether payments have accrued depends on the period of the award, not just whether they were paid. A payor cannot escape the court's jurisdiction by paying early - or, as here, by falling into arrears. The arrearage judgment extended the alimony obligation through its payment period, and Joanne's motion came before that period ended. Most significantly, the Court held that a district court may treat a spouse's discharge of a property-settlement debt in bankruptcy as a 'changed circumstance' justifying an increase in alimony. Doing so does not re-create the discharged debt or violate federal bankruptcy law's 'fresh start' policy.