SMITH VS. SMITH (CHILD CUSTODY)
25-46489 · 89755-COA · Nevada (SCOTN/COA) · October 24, 2025
Disposition:Affirmed. ("ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.")Custody & RelocationDivorce, Property & AlimonyPosture Ronald Lee Smith appealed from a decree of divorce entered by the Fifth Judicial District Court, Nye County (Judge Robert W. Lane). He argued that the district court deprived him of procedural due process by failing to enforce the mandatory financial disclosure rules under NRCP 16.2, by allowing the evidentiary hearing to proceed without financial disclosures from respondent Rachel Smith, and by allowing undisclosed witnesses to testify, all of which he contended led to an unequal distribution of community property. The Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada affirmed.
Statutes cited
Key holdings
Practitioner summary
The Court of Appeals reviewed Ronald's procedural due process arguments for plain error, citing Hamm v. Arrowcreek Homeowners' Ass'n, 124 Nev. 290, 300, 183 P.3d 895, 903 (2008), abrogated on other grounds by Saticoy Bay, LLC, Series 9720 Hitching Rail v. Peccole Ranch Cmty. Ass'n, 137 Nev. 516, 495 P.3d 492 (2021). The court noted that Ronald had not supplied the evidentiary-hearing transcript demonstrating he raised these issues below, invoking Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007) (presumption that missing record documentation supports the district court's decision) and Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (points not urged in the trial court are forfeited). On the due process framework, the court applied the principle that "[p]rocedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard," and that "[d]ue process is satisfied where interested parties are given an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner," quoting Mesi v. Mesi, 136 Nev. 748, 750, 478 P.3d 366, 369 (2020). The court recited that NRCP 16.2 requires early and full disclosure of all financial records in family court proceedings and that each party must complete, file, and serve a General Financial Disclosure Form, citing NRCP 16.2(c) and NRCP 16.205(c). Applying these standards, the court found the record demonstrated that Ronald was served with Rachel's financial disclosure form, which carried a certificate of service reflecting mailing to the California address Ronald listed in his filings, and that Rachel's pretrial memorandum (listing witnesses and documents) was mailed to the same address. Because service was complete upon mailing under NRCP 5(b)(2)(C), the court concluded Ronald had adequate notice, citing Matter of Guardianship of D.M.F., 139 Nev. 342, 351, 535 P.3d 1154, 1163 (2023), for the standard that notice satisfies due process where it is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." The court further held that the onus was on Ronald to update the court with his current address, citing 66 C.J.S. Notice § 15 n.1 (2025). Regarding the community property distribution, the court applied NRS 125.150(1)(b), which requires equal division of community property unless the court finds a compelling reason for an unequal distribution and sets forth its reasons in writing. The standard of review for disposition of community property is abuse of discretion, per Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 135 Nev. 64, 75, 489 P.3d 397, 406 (2019). The court defers to factual findings unless clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence, citing Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009), with substantial evidence defined under Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). The court found it could not evaluate Ronald's claims because he failed to request the evidentiary-hearing transcripts, and therefore presumed the transcripts supported the district court's findings under Cuzze. The court further held that Ronald presented no cogent argument because he did not identify what evidence he would have offered or how it would have changed the result, citing Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). Finally, the court declined to reweigh witness credibility or evidence, citing Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 103, 86 P.3d 1042, 1046 (2004), and Quintero v. McDonald, 116 Nev. 1181, 1184, 14 P.3d 522, 524 (2000), and discerned no abuse of discretion in the decree. The court addressed Ronald's custody challenge only to the extent he argued he was denied an opportunity to advocate for O.S., concluding he failed to explain how he was so denied and, lacking the transcript, established no basis for relief, again citing Cuzze and Edwards. The court also rejected, as unsupported by the record, his contention that he was unaware the evidentiary hearing would address all pending issues rather than only the home sale, noting the September 16 hearing was specifically continued for an evidentiary hearing on the remaining issues.
In plain language
Ronald and Rachel Smith were married in 2015 and have one child, O.S., born in 2013. In April 2024, Rachel filed for divorce and child custody, and she obtained a temporary protection order (TPO) - a court order limiting contact - based on allegations that Ronald was behaving in a hostile and irrational way. The couple's main income came from running an Airbnb out of their home, and they had fallen behind on payments and risked losing the home to foreclosure. Rachel asked for, and the court granted, permission to list the marital residence for sale. For several months Ronald did not respond to the case. Because of this, Rachel asked for a "prove-up hearing" - a hearing where a party can prove their case when the other side has not participated. Shortly before that hearing, Ronald began filing his own documents as a self-represented party. He asked the court to let the parties share custody, to stop the sale of the home, and to allow discovery into more than $100,000 in claimed community debt. At a September 2024 hearing, Ronald objected to a $444,000 offer on the home, saying it was unfair, and the court continued the matter for an evidentiary hearing - a hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is presented. At the evidentiary hearing, both parties appeared and Ronald represented himself. Rachel's witnesses - a real estate agent and the home loan holder - testified. The real estate agent testified that Ronald posted information online that hindered the sale, causing the parties to lose the $444,000 offer, leaving a next-best offer of $300,000, and that Ronald made bad repairs that created code-compliance problems. The loan holder testified that Rachel was willing to sell but Ronald refused to sign off. Rachel also testified about her efforts to sell the home, the assets and debts, and her role as the child's primary caregiver. Ronald did not testify, but he gave opening and closing statements and cross-examined the witnesses. The court then issued the divorce decree. It found that Ronald had incurred $6,000 in community waste by staying in expensive Las Vegas hotel rooms during the divorce, that the parties lost the higher offer on the home, and that Ronald claimed over $100,000 in community debt but provided no evidence of it. Finding compelling reasons for an unequal split, the court awarded Ronald 50 percent of the home-sale proceeds and gave Rachel the remaining personal property (worth about $40,000, including vehicles and equipment) plus a vacant plot of land, with Ronald receiving $5,000 more from the sale proceeds as an equalization payment for that land. The court awarded Rachel sole legal and primary physical custody, with Ronald receiving supervised parenting time, finding this was in the child's best interest. On appeal, Ronald argued he was denied a fair process because he claimed he never received Rachel's financial disclosure form or witness list, and because the hearing went forward without full disclosures. The appeals court rejected these arguments. The record showed Rachel mailed her financial disclosure form and her pretrial memorandum (which listed her witnesses and documents) to the California address Ronald himself had listed in his filings. Under the rules, service is complete when documents are mailed to a party's last known address, so the court found Ronald had adequate notice. The court also said that if the address was wrong, it was Ronald's responsibility to keep the court informed of his current address. A key problem for Ronald's appeal was that he did not provide the appeals court with a transcript of the evidentiary hearing. Without it, the court could not tell whether Ronald raised these issues below, what evidence he claimed he was prevented from offering, or how any such evidence might have changed the result. When necessary parts of the record are missing, the appeals court presumes the missing materials support the lower court's decision. The court also noted it does not re-weigh witness credibility or evidence on appeal. For these reasons, it affirmed the divorce decree.
This summary is independently verified against the source opinion. It is an informational research aid, not legal advice, and no substitute for reading the decision.