SNYDER VS. SNYDER C/W 82756/83029

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Docket No. 81887-COA (divorce decree). The court reviewed the subject matter jurisdiction challenge de novo. Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 667, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009). Raymond argued that neither party satisfied the six-week durational residency requirement of NRS 125.020(2) when he filed his complaint. The trial evidence showed Raymond was not a resident for six weeks before filing, that Lauara had resided in Nevada roughly three weeks before the complaint, but that she resided in Nevada more than six weeks before filing her answer and counterclaim. The district court treated Lauara's counterclaim as commencing an independent action for purposes of NRS 125.020(2). Relying on City of Reno v. Second Judicial District Court, 84 Nev. 322, 325, 440 P.2d 395, 397-98 (1968), the court recognized the independent nature of a counterclaim and, invoking NRCP 1, concluded the district court properly treated the counterclaim as an independent action. The court declined to read NRS 125.020(2) to deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction under these facts, citing Young v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 136 Nev. 584, 586, 473 P.3d 1034, 1036 (2020), and observing the durational residency policy was satisfied because Lauara was not a stranger to Nevada, citing Senjab v. Alhulaibi, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 64, 497 P.3d 618 (2021), and Lewis v. Lewis, 50 Nev. 419, 423-26, 264 P. 981, 981-983 (1928). The court rejected Lauara's waiver argument, noting subject matter jurisdiction "is not waivable" and "can be raised by the parties at any time, or sua sponte by a court of review," per Swan v. Swan, 106 Nev. 464, 469, 796 P.2d 221, 224 (1990). It found judicial estoppel inapplicable under Friedman v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 842, 852, 264 P.3d 1161, 1168 (2011), because Lauara denied Raymond's residency allegation. On personal jurisdiction, the court held Raymond waived any objection to personal jurisdiction or manner of service by failing to raise it in his reply to the counterclaim or in a pre-answer NRCP 12(b) motion, citing NRCP 12(b), (h)(1)(B) and NRCP 7(a)(3). Property division was reviewed for abuse of discretion, with findings undisturbed if supported by substantial evidence. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 126 Nev. 87, 90, 225 P.3d 1273, 1275 (2010); Williams v. Williams, 120 Nev. 559, 566, 97 P.3d 1124, 1129 (2004). The court declined to reweigh credibility determinations. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 152, 161 P.3d 239, 244 (2007); Quintero v. McDonald, 116 Nev. 1181, 1183, 14 P.3d 522, 523 (2000). Businesses: Substantial evidence supported the finding that Mountain West, Inc. and its subsidiaries were Lauara's separate property, based on her testimony that she acquired a 50 percent interest before marriage (NRS 123.130), a post-nuptial agreement (NRS 123.070; NRS 123.080), and redemption of her ex-husband's interest. The court rejected Raymond's loan-based, commingling, and SBA-guaranty transmutation theories. On transmutation and commingling it cited Potthoff v. Potthoff, 627 P.2d 708, 713 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981), and Malmquist v. Malmquist, 106 Nev. 231, 245, 792 P.2d 372, 381 (1990). On the SBA personal financial statement it applied Schulman v. Schulman, 92 Nev. 707, 713, 716-17, 558 P.2d 525, 528-29, 531 (1976), which evaluates whether the SBA intended to rely on separate or community property. The court affirmed that the businesses were separate property but remanded for resolution of (1) allocation of unrepaid community-fund loans to the businesses and (2) whether the community was entitled to reimbursement for community funds used on a business's legal expenses. Cash transfers to joint accounts: Directing Raymond to cooperate in amending joint tax returns and to divide any IRS obligation equally was within discretion. NRS 123.220; NRS 125.150(1)(b). But because the district court did not address whether the approximately $200,000 in transfers constituted loans and, if so, how the community debt should be allocated, the court reversed and remanded. Improvements to the marital residence: The court applied Malmquist, 106 Nev. at 248, 792 P.2d at 383, and Kerley v. Kerley, 111 Nev. 462, 466, 893 P.2d 358, 360 (1995), noting the Malmquist formulae apply when separate property increases in value through community efforts or vice versa. Because Lauara presented no evidence that the claimed $260,000 in expenditures increased the property's value - the burden being on the party seeking reimbursement (citing Tester v. Tester, 597 P.2d 194, 197 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Suter v. Suter, 546 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Idaho 1976); Gabriele v. Gabriele, 421 P.3d 828, 840 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018); In re Marriage of Brady, 750 P.2d 654, 655 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988)) - the $130,000 reimbursement was not supported by substantial evidence, and the court reversed and remanded. Workers' compensation disability benefits: The court affirmed the finding that Raymond received the funds as workers' compensation, citing Breen v. Caesars Palace, 102 Nev. 79, 83, 715 P.2d 1070, 1072-73 (1986), and NRS 616C.435-616C.500, and declining to reweigh credibility. On classification, the court adopted the "analytic approach," which classifies workers' compensation disability benefits by reference to what they are intended to replace: benefits are divisible insofar as they compensate for economic losses during the marriage (lost wages, reduced earning capacity, medical expenses) and separate to the extent they compensate for post-marital losses. The court cited Crocker v. Crocker, 824 P.2d 1117, 1121-23 (Okla. 1991); Hardin v. Hardin, 801 S.E.2d 774, 776 (Ga. 2017); In re Marriage of Cupp, 730 P.2d 870, 872 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); In re Marriage of Fisk, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 95, 98-99 (Ct. App. 1992); and 30 A.L.R.5th 139 (1995). The court analogized to disability retirement benefits under Powers v. Powers, 105 Nev. 514, 516, 779 P.2d 91, 92-93 (1989), and Slassi v. Leavitt, Nos. 74209-COA & 75119-COA, 2019 WL 1873552 (Nev. Ct. App. April 24, 2019). Because the district court did not consider whether any portion compensated post-marital losses, and citing Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 450, 352 P.3d 1139, 1142 (2015), reversal was required. The court remanded for the district court to evaluate the underlying nature of the benefits and, if a portion is separate, to reconsider tracing of the personal account under Malmquist, 106 Nev. at 245, 792 P.2d at 381, and Walsh v. Walsh, 103 Nev. 287, 288, 738 P.2d 117, 117 (1987) (pre-marital retirement benefits are separate property). Payment to attorney Heideman: The district court had ordered Raymond to pay Lauara $75,000, reflecting a marital-waste conclusion regarding $150,000 of community funds used to hire an attorney who also represented Raymond's son, in violation of the court's order disqualifying attorney Wasielewski for a concurrent conflict of interest under NRPC 1.7 and Brown v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 1200, 1205, 14 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2000). The court held Raymond waived any challenge to the disqualification order by raising it only in reply, citing Khoury v. Seastrand, 132 Nev. 520, 530 n.2, 377 P.3d 81, 88 n.2 (2016). It concluded that, if the funds were community property, the $75,000 reimbursement was not an abuse of discretion under NRS 125.150(1)(b) and Lofgren v. Lofgren, 112 Nev. 1282, 1283, 926 P.2d 296, 297 (1996). Because classification of the account funds must be reconsidered on remand, this determination must also be revisited. 401K and IRA accounts: Because both parties used potentially community funds for non-community expenses and the district court did not address those expenditures, and because account characterization is affected by the remand, the court reversed the equal-split ruling and remanded. The court rejected Raymond's QDRO-related argument regarding the IRAs, noting a QDRO is not required to distribute an IRA, citing 29 U.S.C. § 1051(6), 26 U.S.C. § 408, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), and State ex rel. Koster v. Bailey, 493 S.W.3d 423, 428-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). Promissory notes: The court found no basis for relief and held Raymond waived his challenge to the award of the Adam Lisk promissory notes under Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981), while noting he was not precluded from seeking relief under NRCP 60(b). Attorney fees: Reviewed for abuse of discretion. Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. 619, 622-23, 119 P.3d 727, 729-30 (2005). Fees require authority under statute, rule, or contract (U.S. Design & Constr. Corp. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 118 Nev. 458, 462, 50 P.3d 170, 173 (2002)) and a stated basis (Henry Prods. Inc. v. Tarmu, 114 Nev. 1017, 1020, 967 P.2d 444, 446 (1998)), and courts must consider the Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969), factors along with income disparity under Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 1370, 970 P.2d 1071, 1073 (1998). The district court cited no specific authority, though its findings suggested reliance on NRS 18.010(2)(b) or 4JDCR 16; it did not cite Brunzell or Wright or make relevant findings, and it did not apportion fees between the litigation involving Raymond and that involving Casey, as required under Mayfield v. Koroghli, 124 Nev. 348, 353-54, 184 P.3d 362, 369 (2008), and Sierra Site Sols., LLC v. SRS Liquidation, LLC, No. 64834, 2016 WL 207641, at *1 (Nev. Jan. 15, 2016). The award was reversed and remanded. Docket No. 82756-COA (March 31 order) and Docket No. 83029-COA (May 5 judgment and QDRO). Appellate jurisdiction exists only when authorized by statute or court rule. Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 100 Nev. 207, 209, 678 P.2d 1152, 1153 (1984); NRAP 3A(b). The court held that an order declining to resolve a motion for post-judgment relief is not substantively appealable, and that the contempt, enforcement, sanctions, and supersedeas-bond rulings in the March 31 order were not appealable, citing Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev. 912, 920, 59 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2002); Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Ass'n, 116 Nev. 646, 649, 5 P.3d 569, 571 (2000); and Brunzell Constr. Co. v. Harrah's Club, 81 Nev. 414, 419, 404 P.2d 902, 905 (1965). It also concluded the March 31 order's $70,000 motorhome directive merely enforced the decree's effective $140,000 valuation. The May 5 judgment and QDRO likewise merely enforced obligations under the decree without altering the parties' rights and were not special orders after final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(8). Both appeals were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

In plain language

This case arose from a contentious divorce between Raymond Snyder and Lauara Snyder. Raymond filed for divorce first, claiming he had lived in Nevada for six weeks before filing. Lauara answered and filed her own counterclaim for divorce, denying that Raymond met the residency requirement but stating that she herself had lived in Nevada for more than six weeks before filing her answer and counterclaim. After a trial, the district court granted the divorce, divided the couple's property, and awarded Lauara attorney fees. Raymond then appealed the divorce decree and several later orders. The Court of Appeals split its analysis across three appeals. In the first appeal (the divorce decree), Raymond argued the trial court had no authority to grant the divorce at all, because neither spouse met Nevada's requirement that someone live in the state for at least six weeks before starting a divorce case. The evidence showed Raymond did not meet that six-week requirement when he filed, and Lauara had lived in Nevada only about three weeks when Raymond filed. But Lauara did meet the six-week requirement by the time she filed her counterclaim. The trial court treated Lauara's counterclaim as essentially its own independent divorce action, and the appeals court agreed this was proper. The court reasoned that if Lauara had simply filed her own separate divorce complaint, there would be no question the court had authority to hear it, so the same result should follow when she raised the claim as a counterclaim. The court also rejected Raymond's argument that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because Lauara did not personally serve him with her counterclaim, holding that Raymond gave up (waived) that objection by not raising it at the proper time. On the property disputes, the court reviewed the trial court's decisions for "abuse of discretion" - meaning the appeals court would not disturb findings supported by reasonable evidence. The court upheld several rulings but sent others back for more work. It affirmed the trial court's conclusion that four businesses were Lauara's separate property, largely because the trial court found Raymond was not a credible witness and because Lauara presented consistent evidence that she owned the businesses before the marriage and never transferred an interest to Raymond. However, the court found the trial court had left several narrower questions unresolved - such as how to handle loans the couple made to the businesses from shared funds, and whether the marital community should be reimbursed for community money used on a business's legal expenses. Those issues were sent back. The court also reversed and remanded several other property rulings. On improvements to the marital residence, the trial court had ordered Raymond to reimburse Lauara $130,000, but the appeals court found there was no evidence showing that the money spent actually increased the home's value, which is required. On funds Raymond received as workers' compensation disability benefits, the court adopted a new framework (explained below) for classifying such benefits in a divorce and sent the issue back. Because that classification could change how money in Raymond's personal bank account is traced, related rulings - including the split of the couple's 401K and IRA retirement accounts and a $75,000 reimbursement Raymond was ordered to pay - also had to be reconsidered. Finally, on attorney fees, the court found the trial court did not identify a clear legal basis for the award and did not make the findings Nevada law requires before awarding fees, including weighing certain factors and separating out fees related to different parts of the litigation. That award was reversed and remanded too. In the second and third appeals (the March 31 order and the May 5 judgment and QDRO), the court did not reach the merits at all. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear those appeals because no statute or court rule allows an appeal from those particular kinds of orders. Those two appeals were dismissed.