SPECTOR VS. SPECTOR (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Per Curiam. The court reversed a district court order that had denied a former husband's motion to terminate alimony and held the parties' contractual cohabitation provision void ab initio as against public policy. William and Marion Spector's voluntary child-support and property-settlement agreement, incorporated into the 1992 divorce decree, provided for $1,500/month alimony until, among other triggering events, Marion 'cohabits with an adult male not a member of her family in a romantic relationship.' On William's 1995 motion to modify, the district court elicited Marion's admission that she was living with and sexually involved with a man, but decided the dispositive issue was the provision's enforceability and held it void as against public policy. The court held the cohabitation provision is not against public policy, finding persuasive the substantial weight of authority from other jurisdictions enforcing voluntary agreements to terminate alimony upon the recipient's cohabitation (collecting cases and noting Jones v. Jones, 93 Nev. 545, 571 P.2d 103 (1977)), and observing that Marion cited no contrary authority. The court accordingly reversed the order declaring the provision void ab initio and remanded for further proceedings. (Steffen, C.J., did not participate.)

In plain language

When William and Marion Spector divorced, their voluntary settlement agreement (folded into the divorce decree) said William would pay Marion $1,500 per month in alimony until certain events happened - one of which was Marion 'cohabit[ing] with an adult male not a member of her family in a romantic relationship.' In 1995 William moved to modify the decree, believing Marion was living with a man romantically. At the hearing, the judge stopped William's lawyer from presenting evidence of cohabitation and instead got Marion to admit she was living with a man she was sexually involved with. But the judge said the real question was whether this 'cohabitation provision' was even enforceable, and ruled that the provision was void from the start as against public policy. The judge therefore denied William's motion. William appealed. The Supreme Court reversed. Pointing to an ample body of decisions from other states allowing spouses to agree that alimony ends upon the recipient's cohabitation, and noting Marion offered no authority to the contrary, the Court held that a voluntary provision ending alimony upon the recipient's romantic cohabitation is not against public policy. It reversed the district court's ruling that the provision was void from the beginning and sent the case back for further proceedings (where the actual question of whether Marion's living situation triggered the provision could be addressed).