STANISIC VS. SHEA

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court reviewed the district court's child support order for abuse of discretion, citing Edgington v. Edgington, 119 Nev. 577, 588, 80 P.3d 1282, 1290 (2003). A district court abuses its discretion when its findings are not supported by substantial evidence, Miller v. Miller, 134 Nev. 120, 125, 412 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2018), meaning evidence a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment, Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). The court noted that while it defers to discretionary determinations, "deference is not owed to legal error, or to findings so conclusory they may mask legal error," quoting Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 450, 352 P.3d 1139, 1142 (2015). The court framed DWSS's role as an enforcement agency responsible for carrying out the child support Program under Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq., citing NRS 425.370(1), NRS 425.365(2), and the DWSS Child Support Manual, ch. V § 502(B). DWSS may take steps to enforce a district court's support order and recover public assistance paid on behalf of a child. See NRS 425.370(1); NRS 425.3828(4). The court explained that by accepting public assistance, Stanisic was deemed to have assigned her support rights to DWSS, including accrued but unpaid support, under NRS 425.350(3), but that the amount of the assignment and any recovery "must not exceed the amount of public assistance provided or to be provided," NRS 425.350(3); see also NRS 425.360(2). The court observed that a 2005 notice and finding of financial responsibility indicated DWSS was providing public assistance, such that DWSS may have a claim for unreimbursed assistance under NRS 425.360(2), presuming it had not already recovered the funds. On the merits of the accrual issue, the court held that, absent an intervening court order or request to modify the 2006 obligation, Thomas's $100 obligation would have continued to accrue for the benefit of the child from May 2009 to August 2021. The court relied on NRS 125B.140(1)(a) (a support order is a judgment by operation of law on or after the date a payment is due, and may not be retroactively modified or adjusted) and NRS 125B.050(3) (no limitation on time to commence an action to collect arrearages or seek reimbursement of money paid as public assistance), and cited the DWSS Child Support Manual, ch. II § 214(C), for the proposition that case closure does not affect the support order or arrearages, which continue to accrue for the life of the order. Because nothing in the record showed the 2006 order was ever modified, arrears would have continued to accrue at the 2006 rate regardless of whether the DWSS case had closed. The court identified multiple procedural and evidentiary irregularities that inhibited appellate review: no motion seeking the requested relief was filed despite the notice referencing modification and adjudication of arrears; neither the notice, supporting exhibits, report and recommendation, nor the district court's order explained the basis for the arrears calculation or why arrears did not accrue during certain periods; and the report did not specify whether the arrears were recovery of public assistance or support owed to Stanisic, nor in whose favor the $5,809.97 judgment was entered. The court further noted DWSS advanced laches and incarceration arguments without citation to authority, and in a footnote observed that the lack of an underlying motion was prejudicial because Stanisic did not receive proper notice of the issues to be adjudicated. Invoking Davis, the court concluded it could not assess whether the request and award comported with Nevada law or whether the award was supported by substantial evidence. It reversed and remanded, directing the district court to address the nature and amount of DWSS's requested arrearages and Stanisic's entitlement to any arrears beyond those in DWSS's audit report, while expressly taking no position on the merits of the underlying dispute. The court declined to order an answering brief under NRAP 46A(c), finding one would not aid resolution.

In plain language

Shandell Stanisic and Thomas Shea have a child together, born in 2005. In 2006, while Stanisic was receiving public assistance from Nevada's Division of Welfare and Supportive Services (DWSS), the court found Thomas to be the father and ordered him to pay $100 a month in child support. Thomas was incarcerated at the time and did not try to change that amount. In 2009, Stanisic moved to Arizona. She says she told DWSS her new address but then heard nothing from the agency for eleven years and received no child support payments during that time. In 2021, after Thomas was released from incarceration, she contacted DWSS to enforce the old order, figure out how much back support was owed (called "arrears"), and update Thomas's payment amount because his income had changed. DWSS filed a notice setting a hearing before a "hearing master" (an official who hears certain family cases and recommends decisions to a judge). Oddly, although the notice referred to a "motion to modify," the record shows no such motion was actually filed. DWSS attached records, including an audit of Thomas's payment history. That audit showed that for the period from May 2009 (about when Stanisic moved) to August 2021 (when she got back in touch), Thomas's monthly amount owed was listed as $0 rather than the $100 set by the 2006 order. The hearing master concluded Thomas owed $5,809.97 in total arrears from 2006 to 2021 and set his new monthly support at $516. When Stanisic asked where Thomas's earlier payments had gone, the master told her to take that up with her caseworker. Stanisic objected, arguing the records were inaccurate because they left out roughly $14,700 in support that should have piled up between 2009 and 2021. DWSS responded, without citing any legal authority, that the case had become "recovery only," that arrears might not have accrued if a party was incarcerated, and that Stanisic had "waived" her claim through the "doctrine of Laches" (a legal principle about losing rights by waiting too long) because she lost contact with the agency. The district court affirmed the master without holding a hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that under Nevada law, once a court orders child support, each payment becomes a judgment by operation of law when it comes due and cannot be reduced after the fact, and there is no time limit on collecting arrears. So unless someone had gotten the 2006 order changed, Thomas's $100 monthly obligation should have kept accruing the entire time, even if Stanisic's case with the agency had closed. The court also found the record too unclear to review: no proper motion was ever filed, and neither DWSS's paperwork, the master's report, nor the district court's order explained how the $5,809.97 figure was calculated, or even in whose favor the judgment was entered. Because it could not tell whether the arrears figure was money DWSS was recovering for public assistance it had paid, or support money owed to Stanisic, the court sent the case back for the district court to sort out the nature and amount of the arrears and Stanisic's entitlement to any further amounts. The court stressed it was taking no position on who is ultimately right about the arrears.