STEVENS VS. LANEY (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

• -Under the UCCJEA, a Nevada court must recognize and enforce a registered child custody determination of another state and may decline enforcement only where the foreign order was summarily issued without the substantive findings required by the rendering state's law (NRS 125A.475(2); Ferguson).
• -A fit parent's stipulation to a custody agreement, approved by the rendering court, is presumed to be in the child's best interest and satisfies the best-interest inquiry (St. Mary).
• -Kayden's Law (NRS 125C.243; NRS 125C.248) constrains a district court's issuance of an order mandating reunification therapy but, absent a retroactive command, does not reach enforcement of a reunification obligation that originated in a 2021 foreign stipulated judgment where the Nevada order required no further reunification therapy.
• -Incremental therapeutic parenting-time adjustments recommended by a reunification therapist, subject to the court's supervision and ultimate custody order, are reasonably understood as therapeutic progress rather than prohibited delegation of custody decision-making authority under the facts presented.
• -An affidavit compliant with NRS 22.030(2) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an indirect contempt proceeding; a validly issued OSC is not extinguished when its noticed hearing date is continued or vacated.
• -The NRS 22.030(3) different-judge protection applies only upon timely objection, and a different judge is generally not required in family court contempt proceedings (NRS 22.030(3)(b)).
• -A contempt sanction is civil where it is conditional and contains a purge mechanism allowing the contemnor to avoid the sanction by complying with the court's conditions (Lewis; Rodriguez; NRS 22.100).
• -A joint-physical custody arrangement may be modified only upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare and that modification serves the child's best interest, and a substantial change may be found where a previously severed parent-child relationship has been restored (Romano; Ellis).
• -A custody modification may not be used to punish parental misconduct, but underlying conduct may be considered insofar as it bears on the statutory best-interest factors (Sims; NRS 125C.0035(4)).
• -An award of attorney fees and costs is a special order made after final judgment and independently appealable; a party who fails to file a separate notice of appeal from the final fee order cannot fold that order into a previously filed notice of appeal (Smith; NRAP 3A(b); Weddell).

Practitioner summary

**Standards of review.** The court identified competing framings of the reunification issue and conducted a two-part inquiry: (1) whether Kayden's Law impacts the custody order, and (2) whether the district court's reunification-related findings are supported by substantial evidence. Legal error is reviewed de novo; discretionary custodial determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. Contempt is reviewed for abuse of discretion, though purely legal questions embedded in a contempt challenge are reviewed de novo (Detwiler, 137 Nev. at 206, 486 P.3d at 715; Pengilly, 116 Nev. at 650, 5 P.3d at 571). Child custody determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and factual findings are affirmed if supported by substantial evidence (Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242). **Enforcement of the foreign reunification judgment / Kayden's Law.** In any custody determination the sole consideration is the child's best interest (NRS 125C.0035(1)). A stipulation may narrow a dispute without dictating the court's decision; Nevada courts retain discretion to adopt, reject, or modify stipulations (Lewis v. Lewis, 53 Nev. 398, 411-13, 2 P.2d 131, 136-37 (1931); Fernandez v. Fernandez, 126 Nev. 28, 34-36, 222 P.3d 1031, 1035-36 (2010); Mizrachi v. Mizrachi, 132 Nev. 666, 671-72, 385 P.3d 982, 985-86 (Ct. App. 2016)). A fit parent's choice to stipulate to a custody agreement is presumed to be in the child's best interest (St. Mary v. Damon, 129 Nev. 647, 658-59, 309 P.3d 1027, 1035-36 (2013) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000))). Under the UCCJEA, Nevada courts must recognize and enforce a registered child custody determination of another state (NRS 125A.475(2)); a Nevada court may decline enforcement only where the foreign order was summarily issued without the substantive findings required by the rendering state's law (Ferguson v. Krepper, 83 Nev. 408, 410-11, 482 P.2d 668, 669-70 (1967)). The court held the district court correctly enforced the stipulated California judgment because it was predicated on a proper best-interest finding. The court described Kayden's Law (NRS 125C.248; 2025 Nev. Stat., ch. 414 § 5.1(a), at 2657-58; NRS 125C.243) as limiting court-ordered reunification therapy and barring reunification orders absent findings that treatment is safe, effective, and will not harm or isolate the child from a qualifying parent. Applying Nevada's presumption of prospective statutory operation (Pub. Emps.' Benefits Program v. LVMPD, 124 Nev. 138, 154-56, 179 P.3d 542, 553-54 (2008)), the court held Kayden's Law did not impact the custody order because the reunification obligation originated in the 2021 stipulated California judgment (not a Nevada order) and the Nevada custody order required no further reunification therapy. The statute became effective in July 2025 and contains no retroactive command; applying it to invalidate the 2021 obligation enforced under the UCCJEA since 2023 would impair settled expectations. The court further noted Stevens did not appeal the California judgment or object to the reunification requirement below, did not move to reopen or file post-judgment motions (NRCP 52(b), 59(e); EDCR 5.516), raised reunification-completion arguments for the first time in her reply brief (Weaver v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 121 Nev. 494, 502, 117 P.3d 193, 198-99 (2005); NRAP 28(c); Detwiler v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 137 Nev. 202, 204 n.3, 486 P.3d 710, 714 n.3 (2021)), and invited/failed-to-preserve error (Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52-53, 623 P.2d 981, 983-84 (1981); NRS 47.040(1)(a); Eivazi v. Eivazi, 139 Nev. 408, 429, 537 P.3d 476, 494 (Ct. App. 2023); Chadwick v. State, 140 Nev. 104, 115, 546 P.3d 215, 227 (Ct. App. 2024)). The court also credited Dr. Wilburn's testimony as substantial evidence of achieved reunification and declined to reweigh credibility (Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244). **Improper delegation.** Third-party parenting coordinators serve an important function, but custodial-determination power belongs exclusively to the court and cannot be delegated, although a court may appoint a third party to perform limited quasi-judicial duties (Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 336-37, 419 P.3d 157, 159-60 (2018) (citing Cosner v. Cosner, 78 Nev. 242, 245, 371 P.2d 278, 279 (1962))). Delegated authority must be limited to non-substantive matters and cannot extend to modifying the ultimate arrangement, including a significant timeshare change (Bautista; Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev. 163, 172, 178, 535 P.3d 274, 285-86, 290 (Ct. App. 2023); Harrison v. Harrison, 132 Nev. 564, 572, 376 P.3d 173, 178 (2016)). The court held the custody order limited Dr. Wilburn's role to therapeutic services while the district court retained final authority, and the incremental parenting-time increases were reasonably understood as therapeutic progress implementing the stipulated judgment rather than prohibited modification. The court also noted the delegation theory was unpreserved (Old Aztec Mine; Eivazi) and invoked Nevada's public policy favoring continuing relationships with both parents (NRS 125C.001(1), (2); Mizrachi, 132 Nev. at 671-72, 385 P.3d at 985-86). Bias/nondisclosure allegations against Dr. Wilburn were not cogently argued and would require reweighing credibility (Ellis). **Contempt.** An affidavit compliant with NRS 22.030(2) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an indirect contempt proceeding (Awad v. Wright, 106 Nev. 407, 409, 794 P.2d 718 (1990), abrogated on other grounds by Pengilly, 116 Nev. at 649, 5 P.3d at 571). The court held the district court scrutinized the affidavit and proceeded only on the count in which the affidavit correctly cited the operative order; the OSC was served, re-served, and acknowledged. Stevens cited no authority that a validly issued OSC is extinguished when its hearing date is continued or vacated (Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006)), and EDCR 5.509(c)(3), (e) suggests the opposite. NRS 22.030(3)'s different-judge protection applies only upon timely objection, which Stevens did not make before the January 2025 hearing (Detwiler, 137 Nev. at 207-08, 486 P.3d at 717); moreover, the trying judge did not issue the underlying OSC (Awad, 106 Nev. at 410-11, 794 P.2d at 715), and NRS 22.030(3)(b) generally does not require a different judge in family court contempt proceedings. On the merits, a contempt order requires an order spelling out compliance in clear, specific, and unambiguous terms (Cunningham v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 102 Nev. 551, 559-60, 729 P.2d 1328, 1333-34 (1986)); the written "privacy alone" order met that standard, and clear and convincing evidence supported the willful-violation finding (NRS 22.010(3)). The sanction was civil because it was conditional with a purge opportunity (Lewis v. Lewis, 132 Nev. 453, 457-58, 373 P.3d 878, 880-81 (2016); Rodriguez v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 798, 813-14, 102 P.3d 41, 51 (2004); NRS 22.100). **Custody modification.** A court may modify a joint-physical custody arrangement only when the movant shows (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare and (2) that the child's best interest is served by modification (Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 5, 501 P.3d 980, 983 (2022), abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev. 401, 404-05, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023); Ellis, 123 Nev. at 150, 161 P.3d at 242). The court held both prongs satisfied: the wholesale restoration of the previously severed parent-child relationship (from supervised contact to unsupervised extended contact) constituted a substantial change, and the district court's factor-by-factor findings under NRS 125C.0035(4) - with five factors strongly favoring Laney (NRS 125C.0035(4)(c), (d), (e), (g), (j)) and factor (i) favoring Stevens - were supported by substantial evidence. The court found no impermissible use of custody to punish misconduct (Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 1149, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (1993)), noting the district court expressly stated the contempt finding had no bearing on the custodial determination and considered the underlying conduct only insofar as it bore on statutory factors (NRS 125C.0035(4)(c); cf. Lewis, 132 Nev. at 458-60, 373 P.3d at 881-82). Remaining contentions sought reweighing of credibility, which the court declined (Ellis). **Attorney fees and costs / jurisdiction.** The court did not reach the merits of Stevens's fee arguments (raised under NRCP 54(d), NRS 18.110(1), and Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969)). The custody order did not finally resolve fees and costs because it contemplated further motion practice and a later final order (Rennels v. Rennels, 127 Nev. 564, 569, 257 P.3d 396, 399 (2011)); the appeal was premature as to those issues. An award of attorney fees and costs is independently appealable as a special order after final judgment (Smith v. Crown Fin. Servs. of Am., 111 Nev. 277, 280 n.2, 890 P.2d 769, 771 n.2 (1995); NRAP 3A(b)(8)), and the premature notice of appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction (NRAP 4(a)(6)). Because the final $15,000 fee-and-cost order was entered after the notice of appeal and Stevens filed no separate appeal, the court lacked jurisdiction over that challenge (NRAP 3A(b); Weddell v. Stewart, 127 Nev. 645, 651, 261 P.3d 1080, 1084 (2011); Rust v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 688, 747 P.2d 1380, 1381 (1987)) and dismissed that portion of the appeal. **Reassignment.** Because the court affirmed and ordered no remand, Stevens's reassignment request was moot (cf. Roe, 139 Nev. at 180-82, 535 P.3d at 291-93). The court added that any merits claim would fail because the alleged bias did not stem from an extrajudicial source and adverse rulings do not establish bias (Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. 104, 107, 506 P.3d 334, 337 (2022); Lewis, 132 Nev. at 461 n.5, 373 P.3d at 883 n.5).

In plain language

This case involves a custody fight over a child identified as A.L., the youngest of three children born to Kimberly Stevens and Jefferson Davis Laney. The couple married in 2006 and divorced under a Nevada decree in 2021. Because California was the children's "home state" under an interstate custody law called the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), the Nevada divorce decree said the actual custody arrangement would be worked out in California courts. In November 2021, a California court entered a judgment - based on an agreement the parties made (a "stipulation") - that gave Stevens primary physical custody and required Laney and the children to take part in "reunification therapy," a process meant to rebuild the relationship between the children and their father. The parties agreed this therapy was in the children's best interest, agreed to jointly pick the therapist, and agreed to follow the therapist's plan and schedule. Early attempts at reunification with two therapists failed, and those therapists reported that Stevens interfered with the process. The parties then jointly selected Dr. Donna Wilburn as the reunification therapist. In May 2023, after Nevada took over jurisdiction (California gave it up), the Nevada court began enforcing the existing reunification plan. The court ordered daily 7:00 a.m. video calls between Laney and the children, and specifically ordered that the children "shall have privacy alone with [Laney]" during those calls. Private investigators hired by Laney later observed Stevens positioning herself about sixteen feet from A.L. during a scheduled call, with an older daughter hidden under a picnic table about five feet from A.L. - people apparently not visible to Laney on the call. Investigators observed similar concealment on other dates. The case eventually went to a two-day evidentiary hearing in early 2025 on custody and contempt. By the time that hearing concluded, Dr. Wilburn testified that reunification had been achieved, that it went well after initial obstacles were resolved, and that she found no signs the children had been abused by either parent. As a "mandated reporter" (someone legally required to report suspected abuse), she made no abuse report. She recommended joint physical and joint legal custody of A.L. The district court found Dr. Wilburn and Laney credible and found Stevens's testimony inconsistent, evasive, and self-serving. The court held Stevens in contempt for violating the "privacy alone" order, imposing a 25-day jail sentence that she could avoid ("purge") by paying a $500 fine, complying with court orders, and paying certain attorney fees. On custody, the court found a substantial change in circumstances and, after going through the statutory best-interest factors, found most favored Laney. Even so, the court awarded joint physical and joint legal custody of A.L. (not primary custody to Laney), partly to preserve A.L.'s bond with her sisters and Stevens. On appeal, the court rejected each of Stevens's arguments. It held that "Kayden's Law" - a 2025 Nevada statute limiting court-ordered reunification therapy - did not apply, because the reunification requirement came from the 2021 California judgment, not from a Nevada order, and Nevada was required under the UCCJEA to recognize and enforce that judgment. The court also held that no improper delegation to the therapist occurred, that the contempt finding was proper, and that the custody modification was supported by substantial evidence. As for the fee award, the court dismissed that part of the appeal, explaining it lacked jurisdiction because the final fee order was entered after Stevens filed her notice of appeal and she never filed a separate appeal from that order. Because the judgment was affirmed and no remand was ordered, Stevens's request to reassign the case to a different judge was moot.