STOJANOVICH VS. STOJANOVICH (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The only issues concerned the district court's disposition of property. Petor did not contest the characterization of the home as community property, challenging only its award. The court held the trial judge abused his discretion. The clear intent of the order (dividing the home, the stock, and the funds) was to make a reasonably equal division, with the husband's interest in the home equalized by awarding him the community bank account; because that purpose was not accomplished, the judge overstepped the bounds of judicial discretion. The court reaffirmed that although the district court has broad discretion in dividing community property (Herzog v. Herzog, 69 Nev. 286, 249 P.2d 533 (1952)), 'Equal distribution of the community property appears to be the rule in most cases,' Weeks v. Weeks, 75 Nev. 411, 415, 345 P.2d 228 (1959), and that there must be a clearly expressed reason for the manner, purpose, and beneficiary of any division. The court observed that the legitimate goal of allowing the children to remain in the home during their minority could be achieved by imposing a burden on the community home for their benefit under NRS 125.150(1), rather than vesting sole ownership in the wife, particularly where child support and the father's income and reserved jurisdiction assured the children's support. The court further held the district court erroneously set aside items of the husband's separate property to the wife. Because the judgment did not state the separate property was awarded for the support of the wife or children under NRS 125.150(3), and the record showed no such need, the court was without power to divest the husband of his separate property, rendering that portion of the judgment void. Zahringer v. Zahringer, 76 Nev. 21, 348 P.2d 161 (1960); Thorne v. Thorne, 74 Nev. 211, 326 P.2d 729 (1958); cf. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 83 Nev. 73, 422 P.2d 1005 (1967).

In plain language

Petor and Barbara Stojanovich married in 1960 and had two young children. Petor had bought a house before the marriage, and both before and during the marriage improvements were made to it. By the time of the divorce, the home had an equity of about $18,000. The trial court granted Barbara the divorce, gave her custody and child support of $150 per month per child, and divided the couple's property. The court treated the home as community property (Petor did not dispute that on appeal) and awarded the entire home equity to Barbara, trying to offset that by giving Petor the bank account and stock. Petor appealed the property division. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the property issue. It explained that equal distribution of community property is the rule in most cases and that, while the trial court has broad discretion, it must clearly express the reason, purpose, and beneficiary of any unequal division. Here the trial judge's own stated intent was to make a roughly equal division, but by giving Barbara the whole home equity while giving Petor a much smaller offset, he failed to achieve that intent and thereby overstepped his discretion. The court noted the judge's legitimate concern that the children keep living in the family home could have been met by imposing a 'burden' on the home for the children's benefit (letting the mother and children live there during the children's minority) without giving Barbara sole ownership. The court also held the judge improperly gave Barbara several items of Petor's separate property; because the judgment did not set that property aside for support of the wife or children and the record showed no such need, the court lacked power to divest Petor of his separate property, and that part of the judgment was void.