TEAMER VS. SUMMERS (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed two issues: (1) the district court's decision to permit withdrawal of deemed admissions under NRCP 36(b), and (2) the district court's weighing of the NRS 125C.0035(4) best-interest factors. **Withdrawal of admissions.** The court reviewed the discovery/evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. Abid v. Abid, 133 Nev. 770, 772, 406 P.3d 476, 478 (2017); Club Vista Fin. Servs. L.L.C. v. Eight Jud. Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. 224, 228, 276 P.3d 246, 249 (2012). Under NRCP 36(a)(3), a matter is admitted unless answered or objected to within 30 days. Citing Estate of Adams ex rel. Adams v. Fallini, 132 Nev. 814, 821, 386 P.3d 621, 626 (2016), the court explained that the admissions rule serves "truth-seeking in litigation and efficiency in dispensing justice," and that NRCP 36(b) permits withdrawal or amendment where it would (1) promote presentation of the merits and (2) the court is not persuaded the requesting party would be prejudiced in maintaining or defending the action on the merits. Applying the first prong, the court held withdrawal promoted presentation of the merits, emphasizing that in custody matters "the sole consideration of the court is the child's best interest." Blanco v. Blanco, 129 Nev. 723, 730, 311 P.3d 1170, 1174 (2013); NRS 125C.0035(1). It cited Citta v. Facka, 812 N.W.2d 917, 926 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012) for the proposition that custody determinations should not be made solely on unanswered requests for admission. The court noted Quinten's non-response stemmed from his counsel's withdrawal and that counsel, not Quinten, had opened the electronically served requests. On the second prong (prejudice), the court acknowledged that "[o]rdinarily, permitting withdrawal of admissions after the last day of an evidentiary hearing would prejudice the requesting party such that—at a minimum—a continuance would be necessary," but found no prejudice under the unique circumstances: Ariel cross-examined Quinten extensively on the admissions' subject matter on both hearing days; roughly three months separated the two hearing dates, affording time to prepare; and Ariel failed to cogently argue what additional evidence she would have introduced or how it would have affected the custody outcome. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). The court also noted Ariel actually testified to the relevant facts (that Quinten attacked her and encouraged the child to fight bullies), and that the court had A.S.'s Family Mediation Center interview regarding the smoking allegation, which - because Ariel did not provide it on appeal - was presumed to support the district court's decision. See Morrison v. State, 140 Nev. 214, 224 n.10, 548 P.3d 431, 441 n.10 (Ct. App. 2024). **Harmless error / abduction presumption.** The court held that, even assuming an abuse of discretion, any error was harmless because it did not affect Ariel's substantial rights. NRS 47.040(1); cf. NRCP 61. An error affects substantial rights where "but for the alleged error, a different result might reasonably have been reached." Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 465, 244 P.3d 765, 778 (2010). Under NRS 125C.0035(7), a finding by clear and convincing evidence that a parent committed an act of abduction triggers a rebuttable presumption against sole or joint physical custody or unsupervised visitation by the perpetrator. The district court found clear and convincing evidence of abduction under NRS 200.359(5) (relocation to Arizona in June 2022 without permission, in violation of NRS 125C.006), and that Ariel failed to rebut the presumption. The court reasoned that where a perpetrator is statutorily precluded from unsupervised visitation, primary physical custody is also unavailable, citing Soldo-Allesio v. Ferguson, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 9 n.5, 565 P.3d 842, 848 n.5 (Ct. App. 2025). Because Ariel did not address the abduction-presumption findings on appeal, she waived any challenge. Palmieri v. Clark County, 131 Nev. 1028, 1033 n.2, 367 P.3d 442, 446 n.2 (Ct. App. 2015). **Due process.** The court held that any due-process defect in the timing of the withdrawal ruling was harmless because Ariel did not show a different result would have followed. A due-process violation does not warrant reversal where the error is harmless. Mesi v. Mesi, 136 Nev. 748, 751-53, 478 P.3d 366, 369-71 (2020). **Best-interest factors.** The court reviewed the custody determination for clear abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is clearly erroneous, Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 336, 419 P.3d 157, 159 (2018), with substantial evidence being that which a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment. The court does not reweigh evidence or witness credibility. Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244; Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev. 163, 171, 535 P.3d 274, 285 (Ct. App. 2023). The court held that the NRS 125C.0035(4)(g) factor (physical, developmental, and emotional needs), which the district court found neutral, was supported by substantial evidence - chiefly Quinten's testimony that A.S. had not had an asthma attack in his care. It declined to give that factor controlling weight, noting that NRS 125C.0035(4) "does not mandate that any factors be given controlling weight," citing Roberts v. Andrino, No. 89438, 2025 WL 3119014, at *2 (Nev. Nov. 4, 2025) (Order of Affirmance). Any error would also be harmless given the unrebutted NRS 125C.0035(7) presumption. The court noted in a footnote that the district court awarded Ariel unsupervised out-of-state parenting time despite NRS 125C.0035(7)'s prohibition, but that Quinten did not appeal, so the issue was not before the court. Palmieri, 131 Nev. at 1033 n.2, 367 P.3d at 446 n.2.

In plain language

Ariel Teamer and Quinten Summers share a daughter, A.S., born in 2015. In 2018, the parents agreed to a custody arrangement: joint legal custody, with Ariel having primary physical custody and Quinten getting parenting time on alternating weekends and certain holidays. In 2019, the court let Ariel move with the child from Las Vegas to Reno, over Quinten's objection, on the condition that she facilitate at least one weekly video call between the child and Quinten and continue his alternating weekends if he gave 21 days' notice. Things changed in late 2021 and 2022. Ariel stopped letting Quinten see the child in person (December 2021), stopped the video calls (April 2022), and then secretly moved with the child from Reno to Arizona (June 2022). Quinten asked the court to hold Ariel in contempt and to give him sole custody. At a February 2023 hearing, Ariel denied she had moved to Arizona. The court later held an evidentiary hearing that Ariel did not attend, and in June 2023 it awarded Quinten sole legal and physical custody, finding Ariel had effectively abducted the child by moving without permission and cutting off contact. In October 2023, Ariel asked the court to change the arrangement back so she would have primary physical custody and could relocate to Arizona. She made several allegations against Quinten - that he had been in car accidents with the child, was not treating her asthma, smoked marijuana around her, and had committed domestic violence. As part of preparing for a hearing, Ariel sent Quinten written "requests for admission" - formal questions a party can send asking the other side to admit certain facts. Under the court rules, if you don't respond within 30 days, the statements are automatically treated as admitted (true). Neither Quinten nor his attorney responded - the attorney was in the process of withdrawing and each thought the other was handling it. So Ariel argued the statements were automatically admitted. The two-day evidentiary hearing was split over roughly three months (February 2024 and May 2024). On the first day, the judge said it could not, "at this point," treat the admissions as conclusively established, and that it would deal with the issue at trial. Ariel then questioned Quinten extensively about the very topics in the admissions, and he denied them. Quinten's new attorney asked the court to let him formally withdraw the admissions. After the hearing ended, the judge granted that request, relying on a Nevada Supreme Court case (Blanco v. Blanco) for the principle that custody cases cannot be decided by default as a punishment for discovery violations because the child's best interest must drive the decision. The court then found a substantial change in circumstances and went through the statutory best-interest factors. It found most factors favored Quinten and that Ariel's act of abduction triggered a legal presumption against giving her sole or joint custody or unsupervised time with the child - a presumption she failed to overcome. The court ultimately gave Quinten primary physical custody, gave the parents joint legal custody, gave Ariel unsupervised out-of-state parenting time during school breaks, denied her relocation request, and ordered her to pay child support. On appeal, Ariel argued the judge should have ruled on the admissions earlier so she could have built her case around them, and that the timing was unfair. The appeals court disagreed. It found no abuse of discretion in allowing the admissions to be withdrawn, because doing so let the case be decided on its actual merits (which matters most in custody cases) and because Quinten's failure to respond came from the confusion around his attorney's withdrawal. The court also found Ariel was not unfairly harmed: she had a chance to question Quinten on those same topics over two days, and she did present testimony on the key facts. The court added that, even if there had been an error, it would not have changed the outcome - because Ariel never challenged the finding that she had abducted the child, and that finding alone created a presumption that blocked her from getting primary physical custody. The court also rejected Ariel's argument that the judge gave too little weight to the child's asthma. Quinten testified the child had no asthma attacks in his care, and the appeals court does not re-weigh evidence or decide who was more believable. Because no single factor must be given controlling weight, the appeals court found no abuse of discretion. It affirmed the district court's order.