TESHOME VS. JIRU (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review: a district court's relocation decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 486, 440, 92 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2004), and factual findings are upheld if supported by substantial evidence, Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). Framework: under NRS 125C.007(1), the relocating parent bears the threshold burden of demonstrating (a) a sensible, good-faith reason for the move that is not intended to deprive the non-relocating parent of parenting time; (b) that the child's best interests are served by the relocation; and (c) that the child and the relocating parent will benefit from an actual advantage from the relocation. Only if this initial burden is met does the court weigh the six relocation factors in NRS 125C.007(2). "The district court must issue specific findings for each of the NRS 125C.007(1) factors." Pelkola v. Pelkola, 137 Nev. 271, 274, 487 P.3d 807, 810 (2021) (citing Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 451, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015)). Under Monahan v. Hogan, 138 Nev. 58, 67, 507 P.3d 588, 595 (2022), when evaluating NRS 125C.007(1)(b), "the district court should consider the best interest custody factors [from NRS 125C.0035(4)] and any other factors the court deems relevant," must make specific findings as to the applicable factors, and must "take its specific findings as to the applicable factors and tie them to its conclusion regarding the child's best interests." Application: the district court's findings on NRS 125C.007(1)(a) - that Jiru had a sensible, good-faith reason to relocate to have a relationship with people from Ethiopia and did not intend to deprive Teshome of parenting time - were supported by substantial evidence. However, the court abused its discretion under NRS 125C.007(1)(b): its statements that A.N.T. "will be fine regardless of where he resides" and that "what is best for [Jiru] is best for [A.N.T.]" were conclusory and insufficient, particularly because the court did not evaluate any NRS 125C.0035(4) factors. See Druckman v. Ruscitti, 130 Nev. 468, 473, 327 P.3d 511, 515 (2014) (the child's best interest must form the ultimate basis of a relocation decision); Davis, 131 Nev. at 451, 352 P.3d at 1143 (specific findings required). The court failed to address its own prior findings that Teshome was more likely to allow frequent associations with Jiru and that "each parent" was bonded with A.N.T., cf. Monahan, 138 Nev. at 67, 507 P.3d at 595, and failed to evaluate economic evidence bearing on Jiru's ability to provide for the child in Virginia (higher housing costs, state income tax, no daycare, and a change from $21.82/hour roasting-plant work to barista work with different pay), cf. id. at 67-68, 507 P.3d at 595-96. The court also abused its discretion under NRS 125C.007(1)(c): it found only that Jiru would benefit from improved mental health and made no findings that A.N.T. would benefit from an actual advantage. Cf. Pelkola, 137 Nev. at 274, 487 P.3d at 810. Because Jiru's motion stated her mental health struggles did not impact her ability to parent, her actual advantage "is not automatically an actual advantage for A.N.T." Because the threshold analysis failed, the panel did not reach Teshome's challenge to the district court's analysis of the NRS 125C.007(2) factors. See Miller v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 588-89 & n.26, 188 P.3d 112, 1118-19 & n.26 (2008). The panel also rejected Teshome's request for reassignment to a different judge on remand: judges are presumed impartial, and the party asserting bias bears the burden, see Ybarra v. State, 127 Nev. 47, 51, 247 P.3d 269, 272 (2011); Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 21, 535 P.3d 274, 291 (Ct. App. 2023); Teshome failed to establish bias.

In plain language

This case is about what a parent must prove before a Nevada court can let that parent move out of state with a child over the other parent's objection. Teshome and Jiru were never married but share one young child, A.N.T., born in March 2021. In August 2022, the district court entered an initial custody order giving the parents joint legal and physical custody on a week on/week off schedule. Before that order, Teshome had asked for primary custody so he could move to Georgia, but the court denied that request, finding joint custody was in the child's best interest. After the order was entered, Teshome decided not to move to Georgia because he did not want to give up joint custody, and the parents followed the alternating-week schedule for about seven months. In March 2023, Jiru asked the court to give her primary custody and let her move with A.N.T. to Richmond, Virginia, where she had previously lived and had friends and a godmother, and where she believed she and the child would have a support network and the child could learn about his Ethiopian heritage. After a hearing, the district court granted her request. It found she had a sensible, good-faith reason for the move, that the move was not intended to cut into Teshome's parenting time, that "what is best for [Jiru] is best for [A.N.T.]," and that Jiru's mental health would improve in Virginia. The Court of Appeals reversed. Nevada law (NRS 125C.007(1)) requires a relocating parent to prove three threshold things: a sensible, good-faith reason for the move that is not intended to deprive the other parent of parenting time; that the move serves the child's best interests; and that both the child and the relocating parent will gain an actual advantage from the move. The appellate court agreed that the district court's findings on the first factor - Jiru's good-faith reason - were supported by the evidence. But it held that the district court failed on the other two. On the child's best interests, the district court said only that A.N.T. "will be fine regardless of where he resides" and that what is best for Jiru is best for the child. The Court of Appeals called these "conclusory statements" - broad conclusions without the specific, factor-by-factor findings the law requires. The district court never evaluated the statutory best-interest factors in NRS 125C.0035(4), even though its own earlier custody order had found that Teshome was more likely to foster the child's relationship with Jiru and that "each parent" was bonded with A.N.T. The court also did not weigh evidence that the move could affect Jiru's ability to provide for the child - higher rent, state income tax, no daycare lined up, and a job change from a roasting-plant position paying $21.82 per hour to a barista job with different pay. On the "actual advantage" requirement, the district court found only that Jiru's mental health would improve. It made no findings that the child would benefit, and the Court of Appeals noted that Jiru herself had stated her mental health struggles did not affect her parenting - so her advantage from moving "is not automatically an actual advantage for A.N.T." Because the threshold requirements were not properly analyzed, the appellate court reversed and sent the case back to the district court. It declined Teshome's request to assign the case to a different judge, concluding he had not shown the judge was biased.