TOUNG VS. REACHI SOLIS (CHILD CUSTODY)
91453-COA · Nevada (SCOTN/COA) · June 16, 2026
Disposition:Affirmed. ("ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.")Custody & RelocationPosture Danial Toung appealed from a final order of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County (Senior Judge Frank P. Sullivan), concerning child custody. On appeal, Danial challenged only the district court's physical custody decision, along with alleged procedural irregularities, the denial of his motion to disqualify a district court judge, and evidentiary rulings. The Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada reviewed and affirmed.
Statutes cited
Key holdings
Practitioner summary
Standard of review: The court reviews a child custody decision for an abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007); see also Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996) (a decision regarding parenting time is a custody determination). A district court abuses its discretion only when "no reasonable judge could reach a similar conclusion under the same circumstances." In re Guardianship of Rubin, 137 Nev. 288, 294, 491 P.3d 1, 6 (2021) (quoting Leavitt v. Siems, 130 Nev. 503, 509, 330 P.3d 1, 5 (2014)). Factual findings are affirmed if supported by substantial evidence — evidence a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment. Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. Doctrinal framework for modification: A court may modify physical custody only when the movant demonstrates "(1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best interest is served by the modification." Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 5, 501 P.3d 980, 983 (2022) (abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev. 401, 404-05, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023)). The sole consideration is the best interest of the child. NRS 125C.0035(1); Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 451, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015). The NRS 125C.0035(4) best interest factors are non-exhaustive and should be considered along with any other relevant information the district court deems significant. Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 243. The court presumes the district court properly exercised its discretion in determining the child's best interest. Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440, 92 P.3d 1224, 1226-27 (2004). Application — best-interest factors: The district court determined joint physical custody was not in the children's best interest under NRS 125C.003(1)(a) based on Danial's "sporadic" contact with the children since 2023, and made specific findings under the NRS 125C.0035(4) factors. Only the sibling-relationship factor, NRS 125C.0035(4)(i), favored Danial. The court found the cooperation, conflict, and domestic violence factors — NRS 125C.0035(4)(d), (e), (k) — favored Sauri based on evidence that Danial punched her in December 2023 (an incident in which he was arrested for domestic battery involving his brother), had little contact with and "ghosted" the family, was argumentative and aggressive, and was subject to a temporary protection order arising from harassing communications. The mental-and-physical-health factor, NRS 125C.0035(4)(f), favored Sauri; the parent-child-relationship factor, NRS 125C.0035(4)(h), favored Sauri. The court found neutral the factors under NRS 125C.0035(4)(c), (g), and (j) (the child-abuse factor being neutral for insufficient corroboration of the allegation that Danial grabbed N.T.'s arm). The court determined the remaining factors were inapplicable. The Court of Appeals held the factual findings supporting the best-interest determinations were supported by substantial evidence. Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. It declined Danial's invitation to reweigh evidence or credibility determinations. Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 365-66, 212 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009). Danial's hearsay argument failed because he did not identify the challenged hearsay and thus failed to cogently argue the issue. Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). Name change: In a footnote, the court treated the district court's failure to specifically deny Danial's second name-change request as an effective denial. Bd. of Gallery of Hist., Inc. v. Datecs Corp., 116 Nev. 286, 289, 994 P.2d 1149, 1150 (2000). The court concluded Danial failed to show an abuse of discretion, citing Magiera v. Luera, 106 Nev. 775, 777, 802 P.2d 6, 7 (1990) (the burden is on the party seeking the name change to prove, by clear and compelling evidence, that the substantial welfare of the child necessitates a name change). Due process / procedural irregularities: "Due process is satisfied where interested parties are given an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner," ordinarily in a live hearing. Mesi v. Mesi, 136 Nev. 748, 750, 478 P.3d 366, 369 (2020). Scheduling matters are vested in the trial court's sound discretion. Zupancic v. Sierra Vista Recreation, 97 Nev. 187, 192, 625 P.2d 1177, 1180 (1981); Matter of J.B., 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 39, 550 P.3d 333, 339 (2024). Danial was represented by counsel, could present evidence and cross-examine, and did not explain how the trial's timing or conduct denied a fair hearing, nor specify the allegedly "perjured" testimony; his arguments were not cogently argued. Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38. To the extent the second judge repeated prior findings, the court found no error, citing Nance v. Ferraro, 134 Nev. 152, 153, 418 P.3d 679, 681 (Ct. App. 2018) (a district court may review the facts and evidence underpinning its prior rulings in deciding whether modification is in the child's best interest). Disqualification: A decision on a motion to disqualify is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Ivey v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. 154, 162, 299 P.3d 354, 359 (2013). "A judge is presumed to be unbiased, and the burden is on the party asserting the challenge to establish sufficient factual grounds warranting disqualification." Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 439, 216 P.3d 213, 233 (2009) (overruled on other grounds by Romano, and abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew). The record supported the chief judge's finding that Danial failed to establish grounds for disqualifying the first judge. As to alleged bias by the second judge, Danial did not show the decision was based on knowledge acquired outside the proceedings or reflected "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. 104, 107, 506 P.3d 334, 337 (2022); see In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988) (rulings made during official proceedings generally do not establish grounds for disqualification); Rivero, 125 Nev. at 439, 216 P.3d at 233. Nor did he show this was one of the exceedingly rare cases requiring reassignment to preserve public confidence. Williams v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 142 Nev., Adv. Op. 5, 583 P.3d 223, 230 (2026). Excluded evidence and witnesses: Danial did not identify the specific evidence or witnesses and thus failed to cogently argue the issue. Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38.
In plain language
Danial Toung and Sauri Reachi Solis were never married but had three children together: A.T. (born 2016), N.T. (born 2020), and H.R.S. (born 2024). Over the years, courts issued custody orders. A 2016 decree gave the parents joint legal and joint physical custody of A.T. In 2021, a new decree gave them joint legal custody but gave Sauri primary physical custody of A.T. and N.T., while granting Danial parenting time. That 2021 decree was the most recent final custody order before this case. After H.R.S. was born in 2024, Sauri asked the court to change custody, arguing circumstances had changed. She claimed Danial had "simply checked out on the family in favor of his new family," had stopped contacting his children, and had been arrested for domestic violence against her. She asked for sole physical custody of all three children. Danial disputed her claims, saying he had not checked out and had never been arrested for domestic violence against her. Danial also filed petitions asking the court to change H.R.S.'s name. The district court entered temporary orders adding H.R.S. to the case and giving Sauri primary physical custody of all three children. Because of an act of violence between Danial and his brother that happened in front of the children, the court ordered that Danial's parenting time be supervised. The court partially granted Danial's name-change request by adding his surname to H.R.S.'s name and adding him to the birth certificate as the father. Danial then filed an unsuccessful motion to disqualify the district court judge, and later filed a second name-change petition. A trial was held in July 2025 before a different district court judge. Both parents testified. The court considered testimony about alleged acts of child abuse and domestic violence — including a December 2023 incident in which Sauri said Danial punched her in the back — Danial's lack of contact with the children, and each parent's relationship with the children. The court decided that joint physical custody was not in the children's best interest because Danial had only "sporadic" contact with them since 2023. It denied Sauri's request for sole physical custody but ruled that Sauri should keep primary physical custody of A.T. and N.T. and receive primary physical custody of H.R.S. The court ordered Danial's parenting time supervised and gave Sauri sole legal custody. On appeal, Danial argued that the custody decision was wrong, that the court relied on hearsay and unproven claims, that there were procedural problems and he was denied a fair trial, that his motion to disqualify a judge was wrongly denied, and that the court refused to admit key evidence and excluded witnesses. The appeals court explained that it does not re-decide these cases from scratch; instead, it checks whether the trial judge abused his discretion and whether the findings are supported by "substantial evidence" — evidence a reasonable person would accept as enough to support the decision. The court found that the trial court's findings were supported by the record, that the appeals court cannot re-weigh evidence or second-guess who the trial judge believed, and that many of Danial's arguments were too vague to consider because he did not point to the specific hearsay, testimony, evidence, or witnesses he was complaining about. The court also concluded that Danial had not shown any judge was biased. Accordingly, the appeals court affirmed the district court's decision.
This summary is independently verified against the source opinion. It is an informational research aid, not legal advice, and no substitute for reading the decision.