TRENT VS. TRENT (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court applied Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 812 P.2d 1268 (1991), its only prior decision on NRS 125A.350. Schwartz requires a threshold showing that an actual advantage will be realized by both the child and the custodial parent from a move that virtually precludes weekly visitation, followed by consideration of quality-of-life improvement, the honorableness of the custodial parent's motives, compliance with substitute visitation, the noncustodial parent's motives, and whether realistic alternative visitation exists to preserve the parental relationship. The court cautioned that many district courts were misusing NRS 125A.350 to chain custodial parents to Nevada, contrary to the statute's purpose of preserving the noncustodial parent's relationship. Citing its contemporaneous decision in Jones v. Jones, 110 Nev. 1253, 885 P.2d 563 (1994), the court reiterated that once a custodial parent shows a sensible, good-faith reason for the move, the district court should weigh the remaining Schwartz factors focusing on the availability of adequate alternative visitation, and that a needed modification of the visitation schedule does not mean the move must be denied (quoting Helentjaris v. Sudano, 476 A.2d 828, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984)). Christi's desire to marry and the marked improvement in her and Corey's standard of living satisfied the actual-advantage threshold, and the remaining factors favored her; Douglas's finances made frequent visitation feasible. Reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the petition. (Steffen, C.J., did not participate.)

In plain language

Christi and Kenneth Trent were divorced and shared joint legal custody of their toddler son, Corey, with Christi holding primary physical custody. Christi wished to marry Douglas, a homeowner and construction-company vice-president in Dover, Ohio, and to move there with Corey, where she could stop working and give Corey a substantially better financial life. Kenneth, who had frequent visitation and a large extended family in Las Vegas, refused consent. Under NRS 125A.350, Christi petitioned the district court for permission to relocate. The district court denied the petition, emphasizing Kenneth's close bond with Corey, Corey's young age and relationships with extended family, and the relatively short time Christi had known Douglas, concluding Corey would lose too much. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the petition. The court explained that NRS 125A.350 is primarily a notice statute meant to stop one parent from 'stealing' a child by moving away to sever the other parent's contact - not a tool to 'chain' custodial parents (most often women) to Nevada when reasonable alternative visitation is possible. Applying the Schwartz factors, Christi made the required threshold showing of an actual advantage (marriage and a dramatically improved standard of living), had honorable motives, and would comply with substitute visitation; given Douglas's finances, adequate alternative visitation could preserve the father-son bond.