TYLER VS. DIST. CT. (TYLER) (FAMILY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

This is an original proceeding on an emergency petition for a writ of mandamus challenging district court orders that denied a motion to recuse and held a hearing in abeyance in a family law matter. The Court of Appeals framed its authority as extraordinary and discretionary, citing NRS 34.160, Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004), and Smith v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 679, 818 P.2d 849, 851, 853 (1991). The court concluded that "our extraordinary and discretionary intervention is not warranted." On the recusal issue, the court applied the deferential standard from Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 439, 216 P.3d 213, 233 (2009), which provides that appellate courts give "substantial weight" to a judge's decision not to recuse and will overturn that decision only for a "clear abuse of discretion." Rivero was noted as overruled in part on other grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 7, 501 P.3d 980, 985 (2022). Applying that standard, the court held that the petitioner had not shown that recusal was warranted. On the request to compel a hearing on the petitioner's school choice motion, the court noted that the district court held that hearing in abeyance due to the petitioner's pending motion for reconsideration of the presiding judge's order denying recusal. Because the court could not determine from the documents provided whether that reconsideration motion had been resolved, it declined to exercise its discretion to grant the requested relief. The court denied the petition and, in light of that disposition, denied as moot the petitioner's motions to expedite and to transmit recordings.

In plain language

This case involves a family law dispute in Washoe County. One of the people in that case, Jefferson Tyler, asked the Court of Appeals to step in on an emergency basis by issuing a writ of mandamus - a court order directing a lower court to do (or undo) something. Tyler was unhappy with two decisions the district court made: (1) a decision denying his request that the judge step aside from his case (a "motion to recuse"), and (2) a decision to pause, or hold "in abeyance," a hearing. The Court of Appeals declined to intervene. It explained that this kind of extraordinary intervention is discretionary - meaning the court does not have to act and only does so in limited circumstances. On the request to force the judge off the case, the court concluded that Tyler had not shown that recusal was warranted. The court noted that appellate courts give a judge's own decision not to step aside significant deference, overturning it only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. On the request to force the district court to hold a hearing on Tyler's school choice motion, the court explained that the district court had paused that hearing because Tyler had a pending motion asking the presiding judge to reconsider the earlier decision denying recusal. The Court of Appeals said it could not tell from the documents it had been given whether that reconsideration motion had been resolved, and for that reason it declined to grant the relief. The court denied the petition. Because it denied the petition, the court also denied as moot (no longer needing a decision) Tyler's related motions to expedite the case and to transmit recordings.