VERHEYDEN VS. VERHEYDEN (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court reversed both a $19,125 award to the wife of an interest in the husband's residence and the award to the wife of a jointly titled 1982 Honda as a purported gift. The house. The husband acquired the Santa Barbara Street residence before the marriage, in an exchange with his sister, and there was no evidence he intended to transmute it to community property; the house was therefore his separate property. NRS 123.130. The court rejected the wife's pro tanto theory: under Sly v. Sly, 100 Nev. 236, 239, 679 P.2d 1260, 1262 (1984), where community funds pay part of the purchase price of a spouse's separate property, the community acquires a pro tanto interest in proportion to its contribution; but here there was no purchase-money mortgage on which the community made payments, and the community did not directly contribute to the purchase price. The court declined to extend Sly to the wife's indirect-contribution theory. The wife's improvement theory failed for lack of substantial evidence that the improvements were community-funded or increased the home's value (the expenditures appeared to be routine maintenance). The findings, unsupported by substantial evidence, were reversed. Todkill v. Todkill, 88 Nev. 231, 238, 495 P.2d 629, 633 (1972). The automobile. Property acquired during marriage is presumptively community property, rebuttable only by clear and certain proof. Roggen v. Roggen, 96 Nev. 687, 689, 615 P.2d 250 (1980). A spouse's mere oral expression that an item purchased during marriage is a 'gift' does not meet that standard, Milisich v. Hillhouse, 48 Nev. 166, 228 P. 307 (1924), and the opinion of either spouse is of no weight, Stockgrowers & Ranchers Bank v. Milisich, 52 Nev. 178, 283 P. 913 (1930). The trial court's gift finding was thus unsupported by substantial evidence and reversed. The court additionally noted that NRS 123.220(1) requires a writing to transmute community property to a spouse's separate property. Remanded for entry of a decree consistent with the reversal.

In plain language

William and Camille Verheyden divorced. On appeal, William challenged two parts of the trial court's ruling: (1) awarding Camille a $19,125 interest in a house on Santa Barbara Street that he owned, and (2) awarding Camille a 1982 Honda - which the parties owned jointly - on the theory that William had given it to her as a gift. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed on both points. As to the house: William had acquired it in January 1981, before the marriage, in an exchange with his sister (he traded her a less valuable house and cancelled a $30,000 debt she owed him). Because he owned it before the marriage and there was no evidence he intended to convert it into community property, the house was his separate property. Camille argued the community (the marital partnership) had acquired an interest by helping pay for it and by improving it. The court rejected both. There was no purchase-money mortgage that community funds paid down, so the rule that lets the community earn a proportional ('pro tanto') interest when it helps pay the purchase price did not apply, and the court declined to extend that rule to Camille's indirect-contribution theory. As for improvements, there was no substantial evidence they were paid with community funds or that they increased the home's value; the spending looked like routine maintenance. As to the Honda: property bought during a marriage is presumed to be community property, and that presumption can be overcome only by clear and certain proof. Camille testified William told her the car was a gift and it was always called 'her car.' But the court held that a spouse's mere oral statement that something bought during the marriage is a 'gift' is not clear and certain proof, and the opinion of either spouse carries no weight. So the trial court's finding that the car was a gift was unsupported and was reversed. The court also noted that Nevada law requires a written agreement to convert community property into one spouse's separate property. The case was sent back for entry of a decree consistent with the reversals.