WASHOE CTY HUMAN SERVS. AGENCY VS. DIST. CT. (R.) (C/W 84277)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court addressed justiciability rather than the merits. Mootness is "one of justiciability," and Nevada appellate courts render judgments only on actual controversies. Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010); NCAA v. Univ. of Nev., Reno, 97 Nev. 56, 58, 624 P.2d 10, 11 (1981). Subsequent events may render a once-live controversy moot. Personhood Nev., 126 Nev. at 602, 245 P.3d at 574. The dismissal of the underlying termination petitions in family court eliminated the live controversy. WCHSA invoked the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception, which under Bisch v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 129 Nev. 328, 334, 302 P.3d 1108, 1113 (2013), and Degraw v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. 330, 332, 419 P.3d 136, 139 (2018), requires the petitioner to show: (1) the challenged action is of relatively short duration; (2) a likelihood of recurrence; and (3) importance. Absence of those elements "would render any opinion advisory at best." Degraw, 134 Nev. at 334, 419 P.3d at 140. The majority assumed the importance and relatively short duration prongs were satisfied but concluded the evading-review prong was not. Although a pre-trial order on the constitutionality of a statute in a termination-of-parental-rights action is not immediately appealable - no statute or court rule authorizes interlocutory appeal, see NRAP 3A(b) - a final judgment on a motion to terminate parental rights is appealable by either party under NRAP 3A(b)(1). Because the constitutional question has a path to appellate review through ordinary final-judgment appeals, the issue does not "evade review" within the meaning of the exception. Petitions denied. Justice Herndon, joined by Justice Stiglich, dissented from the mootness disposition (while agreeing the matter is moot). The dissent would have applied the exception, citing the statutory timeframes: NRS 128.109(1)(a) and (2) trigger the presumption once a child has been in protective custody fourteen of twenty months, and NRS 128.055 generally requires completion of termination proceedings within six months of filing. The dissent observed that NRS 128.109 must be considered in any termination proceeding involving a child placed under NRS 432B, that constitutional rulings of the kind at issue may cause cases to resolve short of final judgment (as occurred here), and that parental rights implicate a "fundamental liberty interest." In re Parental Rights as to A.G., 129 Nev. 125, 135, 295 P.3d 589, 595 (2013).

In plain language

Washoe County's child-welfare agency had asked the family court to terminate the parental rights of two sets of parents whose children (H.B. and Z.R.) had been in the agency's custody since 2019. The parents pushed back by arguing that a Nevada statute, NRS 128.109, was unconstitutional. That statute creates legal presumptions that can favor terminating parental rights once a child has been in protective custody long enough. The family court agreed with the parents in part, ruling that two subsections - NRS 128.109(1)(a) and 128.109(2) - violated the parents' due-process rights. The family court did not at that point decide whether actually to terminate parental rights. The agency went to the Nevada Supreme Court and asked for an extraordinary order - a writ of mandamus or prohibition (a court order directing a lower court to take or stop taking some action) - telling the district court to vacate its constitutional ruling. While the petitions were pending, however, the underlying termination cases in the family court were dismissed. The Supreme Court declined to decide the constitutional question. The court explained that once the underlying cases were dismissed, there was no longer a live dispute to resolve - the question had become "moot." Nevada courts generally do not issue opinions on abstract questions; they decide actual controversies. The agency argued that the court should still rule because the issue is important and likely to come up again. The majority recognized the issue is important and that the challenged orders are short-lived, but concluded the issue is not one that will evade review. The court explained that even though a pretrial ruling on a statute's constitutionality cannot be appealed right away, once the family court enters a final judgment on a termination petition, either side can appeal and have the constitutional question reviewed then. Because there is a normal appellate path available, the case does not fit the narrow exception that allows courts to decide moot questions. Two justices dissented. They agreed the case was moot but would have decided it anyway, reasoning that the timelines built into Nevada's termination-of-parental-rights laws are short, the constitutional issue will keep arising, and rulings like the one here tend to cause cases to settle or be dismissed before a final, appealable judgment - so the issue can in fact evade review.