WHITE VS. WHITE (FAMILY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the divorce-decree determinations for an abuse of discretion, citing Devries v. Gallio, 128 Nev. 706, 709, 290 P.3d 260, 263 (2012). The court framed the analysis under contract principles: "Parties are free to contract," Martin v. Martin, 138 Nev. 786, 793, 520 P.3d 813, 819 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted), and premarital agreements may contract with respect to rights and obligations in property in a manner that obviates community property law, NRS 123A.050. A prenuptial agreement is unenforceable if unconscionable at execution, involuntarily signed, or executed without full disclosure of assets and obligations, NRS 123A.080; but valid prenuptial agreements are enforceable as contracts, Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 45, 505 P.2d 600, 604 (1973); Ringle v. Burton, 120 Nev. 82, 93, 86 P.3d 1082, 1039 (2004). District courts may award alimony in a divorce "unless the action is contrary to a premarital agreement between the parties which is enforceable." NRS 125.150; see also Fick v. Fick, 109 Nev. 458, 463, 851 P.2d 445, 449 (1993). On the alimony issue, the district court expressly found the prenuptial and postnuptial agreements valid - based on disclosure of assets, Maureen's opportunity for attorney review, and the absence of unconscionability or a violation of NRS 123A.080 - yet awarded $500 per month in spousal support until age 65 based on the NRS 125.150(9) factors and Bryce's payment of Maureen's health insurance during the marriage. The Court of Appeals held this contravened the plain language of the agreements, which provided the parties would "forever release each other from any alimony or support obligations now and in the future no matter how their circumstances may change." Citing Davis v. Beling, 128 Nev. 301, 321, 278 P.3d 501, 515 (2012), and Kaldi v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 117 Nev. 278, 281, 21 P.3d 16, 21 (2001), the court emphasized that unambiguous contracts must be enforced as written and courts may not modify or vary the terms of an unambiguous agreement. Because both agreements could only be amended by a written agreement, and no other written agreement appeared in the record, the alimony award was an abuse of discretion and that portion of the decree was reversed. See NRS 125.150. On the 2023 federal tax obligation, the prenuptial agreement provided that upon separation "all Shared Debt will be deemed to be owed equally and each Party will be financially responsible for 50% of any jointly acquired or jointly held debt." The district court made no findings or conclusions regarding the prenuptial agreement's application, instead finding no community debts and summarily denying Bryce's reimbursement request despite noting the joint tax filing. The Court of Appeals held this was an abuse of discretion, citing Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 180 Nev. 67, 82, 319 P.3d 606, 616 (2014) (failure to apply the full, applicable legal analysis), and NRS 123.259(2), and reversed that portion of the decree. The court affirmed the denial of Bryce's request for reimbursement of Maureen's post-separation health insurance costs because he failed to cogently argue how those payments constituted a "shared debt" under the agreement. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). In a footnote, the court declined to consider in the first instance Bryce's request for reimbursement of any post-decree alimony payments, citing Ryan's Express Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Amador Stage Lines, Inc., 128 Nev. 289, 299, 279 P.3d 166, 172 (2012), but noted he could seek relief regarding any such payments in the district court on remand. The panel consisted of Chief Judge Bulla and Judges Gibbons and Westbrook.

In plain language

Bryce and Maureen White married in 2015. Before the wedding, they signed a prenuptial agreement - a contract made before marriage that sets out how money and property will be handled if the marriage ends. In their agreement, both spouses gave up any right to alimony (ongoing support payments after divorce), and they agreed that any jointly held debts would be split 50/50. In 2023, after Bryce filed for divorce and the couple then decided not to go through with it, they signed a postnuptial agreement (a similar contract made after marriage) that "reaffirms the prenuptial agreement" and again released each other from alimony or support. In 2024, Bryce filed for divorce again. Maureen argued the agreements should not be enforced, claiming among other things that the prenuptial agreement was signed under duress and without full disclosure of Bryce's assets, and she asked for alimony, noting that she had quit her longtime job at Bryce's insistence that he would provide her health insurance. After trial, the district court found the agreements valid and enforceable - it found Bryce had disclosed his assets, Maureen had a chance to have a lawyer review the agreements, and the agreements were not unconscionable. But despite those findings, the court ordered Bryce to pay Maureen $500 per month in spousal support until she turns 65, to cover her medical insurance costs. The court also refused to make Maureen reimburse Bryce for her share of the couple's jointly filed 2023 federal tax bill, and refused to order reimbursement of the health insurance costs Bryce paid for Maureen after their separation. The Court of Appeals reversed the alimony award. It explained that because the district court itself found the agreements valid, and those agreements plainly waived alimony, the court could not order alimony anyway. There was no other written agreement in the record allowing such an award, and both agreements said they could only be amended in writing. The appellate court also reversed the tax ruling: the prenuptial agreement said jointly acquired debt would be split equally, but the district court made no findings about that provision and simply denied Bryce's reimbursement request - even while noting the tax return was jointly filed. The court affirmed one point against Bryce: his request to be reimbursed for Maureen's health insurance costs after their February 2024 separation. He failed to cogently explain how those payments were a "shared debt" under the agreement, so the appellate court left the district court's denial of that request in place. The court declined to decide whether Bryce should be repaid any alimony he may have paid after the decree, noting it was unclear whether he had made any payments, but said he could raise that issue in the district court on remand.