WISMAN VS. WISMAN (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court (per curiam) reversed an order declining, for lack of power, to hear a motion to modify alimony. The 1974 divorce decree ordered the husband to pay $1,000 per month in alimony until the wife remarried, died, 'or until further order of this Court.' In 1977 the husband moved to reduce the alimony; the district court ruled it lacked power to hear the motion because it had not expressly retained jurisdiction to modify the decree. Under NRS 125.170 (in effect in 1974; repealed in 1975), unaccrued alimony payments could not be modified 'unless the court expressly retained jurisdiction for such modification at the final hearing.' The Court held that the decretal language conditioning alimony 'until further order of this Court' was a sufficient reservation of jurisdiction. Relying on Lewis v. Lewis, 53 Nev. 398, 407-408, 2 P.2d 131, 134 (1931), which held that where the right is reserved to make additional or further orders regarding alimony payments the trial court has ample power to modify its decree upon a proper showing, the Court concluded that the district court, having conditioned the alimony 'until further order,' clearly retained the power to modify. The order denying the motion to modify was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

In plain language

William and Helen Wisman divorced in 1974. Their divorce decree ordered William to pay Helen $1,000 a month in alimony until she remarried, died, 'or until further order of this Court.' In 1977 William asked the court to reduce the alimony. The district court refused even to consider the request, ruling that it had no power to change the alimony because it had not expressly said, at the time of the divorce, that it was keeping the authority to do so. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Under the law in effect in 1974, a court could not modify future alimony payments unless it had expressly reserved the power to do so at the final hearing. The question was whether the decree's phrase 'until further order of this Court' counted as reserving that power. The Supreme Court held that it did. Relying on an earlier decision, the court explained that when a trial court reserves the right to make further orders about alimony, it has ample authority to modify its decree upon a proper showing. Because the decree conditioned the alimony 'until further order,' the court had kept the power to modify it. The refusal to hear William's motion was reversed, and the case was sent back for further proceedings.