WOLFE VS. MANNION (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

**Due process.** The court reviewed the due-process claim de novo, citing *Eureka County v. Seventh Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 134 Nev. 275, 279, 417 P.3d 1121, 1124 (2018). Applying *Martinez v. Martinez*, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 73, 559 P.3d 863, 868 (2024), the court reiterated that "[p]rocedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard" and that rights may be violated when parties lack notice that the court will consider a specific issue. The court held that Nevada's custody statutes — where the "sole consideration . . . is the best interest of the child," NRS 125C.0035(1), and where courts may award joint or primary physical custody, NRS 125C.0035(1); NRS 125C.0038(1) — put Bryce on notice that joint physical custody could result from competing primary-custody motions. Quoting *Martinez*, the court noted Nevada "allows a district court to modify its custody order consistent with a child's best interest upon the application of one of the parties and does not limit courts to a particular remedy." Bryce also had an opportunity to be heard, having testified on the long-distance arrangement's feasibility and E.W.'s best interest. In a footnote, the court rejected Bryce's subject-matter-jurisdiction argument, citing NRS 3.223(1)(a) and *Landreth v. Malik*, 127 Nev. 175, 184, 251 P.3d 163, 169 (2011). **Standard of review for custody.** Custody determinations are reviewed for clear abuse of discretion. *Ellis v. Carucci*, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007). "An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is clearly erroneous." *Bautista v. Picone*, 134 Nev. 334, 336, 419 P.3d 157, 159 (2018). Substantial evidence "is evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." *Ellis*, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. The court does not reweigh evidence or witness credibility. *Ellis*, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244; *Roe v. Roe*, 139 Nev. 163, 171, 535 P.3d 274, 285 (Ct. App. 2023). **Modification framework.** Under *Romano v. Romano*, 138 Nev. 1, 5, 501 P.3d 980, 983 (2022) (abrogated on other grounds by *Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue*, 139 Nev. 401, 403-05, 535 P.3d 1167, 1170-71 (2023)), a joint physical custody arrangement may be modified only where (1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare, and (2) the child's best interest is served by the modification. In a footnote, the court declined to decide whether a substantial-change showing is required to modify a parenting-time schedule (as opposed to custody), because both parties presumed it was and the court found a substantial change occurred; the court invoked the party-presentation principle, citing *State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Doane)*, 138 Nev. 896, 900, 521 P.3d 1215, 1221 (2022) (quoting *Greenlaw v. United States*, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008)). **Substantial change in circumstances.** Relying on *Hayes v. Gallacher*, 115 Nev. 1, 972 P.2d 1138 (1999), the court held that a parent's marriage and subsequent relocation can constitute a substantial change in circumstances. In *Hayes*, the Nevada Supreme Court held that a proposed relocation to Japan that "significantly impair[ed]" the father's ability to exercise his responsibilities "constitute[d] substantially changed circumstances." The court acknowledged a California move is less inhibitive than a move to Japan but found substantial evidence that Taylor's relocation would significantly impair Bryce's ability to maintain his prior level of involvement (he had parenting time every two or three days and attended 60 to 80 percent of E.W.'s therapies), given his testimony about the multi-hour commute. See also *Bryant v. Sorget*, No. 89717-COA, 2025 WL 2496107, at *3 (Nev. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2025). **Best-interest analysis.** The sole consideration is the child's best interest, NRS 125C.0035(1), and the court must consider and set forth specific findings on the twelve factors in NRS 125C.0035(4). Citing *Roberts v. Andrino*, No. 89438, 2025 WL 3119014, at *2 (Nev. Nov. 4, 2025) (Order of Affirmance), the court noted Nevada does not mandate that any factor be given controlling weight. The court rejected Bryce's argument that the order was internally inconsistent (denying Taylor primary custody in California while allowing joint custody in California), reasoning that the district court found no factor favored either parent when both could care for E.W.'s special needs and the parents lived in close enough proximity to share custody while E.W. was not yet school-bound. On NRS 125C.0035(4)(g) (E.W.'s physical, developmental, and emotional needs), the court held substantial evidence supported the findings: neither parent presented evidence beyond testimony about E.W.'s specific needs, the district court found E.W. was not harmed by missing three months of therapy (which Taylor performed herself), and both parents' testimony showed they would meet E.W.'s needs. Bryce's arguments largely sought reweighing, which the appellate court does not do. As to the monthly schedule, Bryce's own testimony that shorter schedules would not serve E.W.'s best interest, and his statement telling the court to choose a schedule, supported the district court's decision. In a footnote, the court declined to consider Bryce's challenge to the district court's refusal to consider expert testimony offered with his reconsideration motion, because he cited no supporting authority. *Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest.*, 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). **Child support / transportation costs.** Child support decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. *Romano*, 138 Nev. at 7, 501 P.3d at 985. Calculation and award of child support, including adjustments to the base obligation, are governed by Chapter 425 of the Nevada Administrative Code. See NAC 425.005-.170; NRS 125B.080. The district court kept the baseline obligation at $0 given similar incomes, then adjusted it under NAC 425.150(1)(e) (2020) (amended effective July 2025) to award Bryce $100 per month for transportation costs. Applying *Martinez*, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 73, 559 P.3d at 866 — which recognized transportation costs "cannot be considered separately from a parent's overall child support obligation" — the court held the district court properly resolved transportation costs as part of the overall child support determination, in a section titled "Child Support." The court rejected the amount-related challenge because Bryce failed to develop a record (his reconsideration motion did not even address transportation costs or child support), citing *Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev.*, 97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981). The court found the order's general findings satisfied NAC 425.100(3) (2020) (amended effective July 2025). In a footnote, the court declined to consider Bryce's arguments about the "income and household resources factors" in NAC 425.150(1) and his reading of NAC 425.150(1)(e), because he did not raise them below. *Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown*, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981).

In plain language

Bryce Wolfe and Taylor Mannion (now Taylor Clayton) share a young daughter, E.W., born in March 2022. According to the opinion, E.W. is nearly blind, has a growth-hormone deficiency, and has several developmental delays. In 2023, the parents mediated an agreement to share joint legal and joint physical custody, and the district court adopted that agreement, setting up a schedule where E.W. rotated between her parents every two or three days. Things changed when Taylor became engaged to a military servicemember being transferred to a base near San Diego, California. In February 2024, Taylor asked the court for primary physical custody and permission to move to California with E.W. Bryce opposed that request and asked for primary physical custody himself. By the time of the hearing, Taylor had married. At a January 2025 evidentiary hearing, both parents testified. Even though Taylor had asked for primary custody, she said she would be open to continuing to share custody, suggesting a two-weeks-on, two-weeks-off arrangement. She testified that E.W. needed regular specialist visits and twice-weekly therapy, but said she was not worried about continuity of care as long as E.W. had insurance and providers in both states. Bryce disagreed that a long-distance shared arrangement was in E.W.'s best interest, emphasizing E.W.'s need for stability, the difficulty of long car trips, and the importance of consistent therapists. At one point, Bryce told the court "it would be up to what you decide" because he "do[es]n't set custody . . . for a living." In March 2025, the district court denied both parents' requests for primary physical custody and effectively denied Taylor's request to relocate. The court found that Taylor had a good-faith reason for the move but had not shown that relocation was in E.W.'s best interest or offered an actual advantage. The court found that all of the best-interest factors were either neutral or did not apply, and concluded that both parents were fully capable of caring for E.W. The court kept joint physical custody in place, but — to address Bryce's concern about frequent travel — ordered a one-month-on, one-month-off schedule instead of the two-week rotation Taylor had suggested. On child support, the court kept the baseline obligation at $0 because the parents' incomes were similar, but ordered Taylor to pay Bryce $100 per month for transportation costs tied to her decision to relocate. Bryce asked the court to reconsider its custody and parenting-time decisions (but did not separately challenge the $100 transportation award), and the court denied that request. He then appealed. The Court of Appeals rejected each of Bryce's arguments. It held that his due process rights were not violated, because Nevada's custody statutes put him on notice that joint physical custody was a possible outcome once custody was before the court, and he had a chance to be heard on the issue. It held that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding a substantial change in circumstances (relying on a prior Nevada Supreme Court case involving a relocating military spouse) or in finding that joint custody with a monthly schedule served E.W.'s best interest — noting that much of Bryce's argument amounted to asking the appellate court to reweigh the evidence, which it does not do. Finally, it held that the court properly handled the $100 transportation award as part of the overall child support determination and that Bryce had not built a record showing the amount was inadequate. The court affirmed.