YORK VS. YORK (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

On remand from York v. York, 99 Nev. 491, 664 P.2d 967 (1983), review was for abuse of discretion. Where community funds are expended to pay a mortgage on a spouse's separate-property residence, the community acquires an interest in proportion to its contribution to the purchase price (Sly v. Sly, 100 Nev. 236, 679 P.2d 1260 (1984)); the wife was therefore properly awarded an offsetting sum, and the husband's contrary factual assertions were disregarded because he failed to supplement the record as this court had ordered. The equal apportionment of the community debt was proper, including accrued interest on the repaid loan. The court reversed the $2,900 awarded "for other services" (household duties and childcare): while the marital community is a partnership to which both spouses contribute their industry, the wife cited no authority that such services are compensable upon divorce, and contentions unsupported by authority need not be considered (cf. Cummings v. Tinkle, 91 Nev. 548, 539 P.2d 1213 (1975)).

In plain language

This was the second appeal in the Yorks' divorce. In 1983, the Nevada Supreme Court had ruled that a $15,000 award to Ms. York was an error and sent the case back so the district court could decide whether to redistribute the community assets. On remand, the district court awarded Ms. York $13,042.41, made up of three parts: compensation for her contributions to Mr. York's separate-property home, repayment of a community debt, and $2,900 "for other services." Mr. York appealed, claiming the court abused its discretion. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed most of the award but reversed the "other services" portion. On the home, the court held that because community funds were used to pay down a mortgage on Mr. York's separate-property residence, the community acquired an interest in the home in proportion to its contribution, so Ms. York was properly compensated. (Mr. York's contrary factual claim failed because he never supplemented the record as ordered.) On the community debt, the court found the trial court had properly split it equally, correctly accounting for the interest that accrued on the loan Ms. York repaid. But the court reversed the $2,900 awarded "for other services" - money based on Ms. York performing household duties and caring for Mr. York's children. The court explained that although marriage is a partnership in which both spouses contribute their efforts, Ms. York cited no legal authority for the idea that ordinary household services are separately compensable upon divorce, and contentions unsupported by authority need not be considered. The case was sent back to modify the judgment by removing that $2,900.