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YOUNG VS. YOUNG (CHILD CUSTODY)

23-41702 · 87269 · Nevada (SCOTN/COA) · December 22, 2023

Disposition:Appeals dismissed; emergency motion to confirm the December 1 order's effectiveness denied; April 3 stay dissolved; countermotion for stay denied.Custody & Relocation

Posture Alicia Ann Young (n/k/a Alicia Ann Hagerman) filed two appeals from post-divorce-decree orders of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division (Judge Shell Mercer), concerning custody of the parties' minor child. Docket No. 85802 challenged a November 14, 2022, order that, among other things, denied an oral motion to stay a September 2022 temporary custody order giving respondent Richard Young exclusive custody for reunification purposes, approved a stipulation for a forensic custody examination, and set further hearings. Docket No. 87269 challenged an August 20, 2023, order that overruled as untimely an objection to the parenting coordinator's 2nd report and recommendations, denied a motion to modify those recommendations, and vacated a previously set evidentiary hearing. After a limited remand to permit the district court to address pending matters, the Supreme Court directed the parties to show cause why the appeals should not be dismissed as moot.

Key holdings

- An appeal is moot when an appellate court is unable to grant effective relief; appeals from temporary custody orders are moot once the exclusive custody period has ended and the parties have returned to their prior custody arrangement. - An order determining temporary custody of a minor is not substantively appealable. - An order is independently appealable as a special order after final judgment only if it substantially affects the rights and obligations of the parties arising from the judgment. - An order granting or denying a stay is not appealable. - A limited-remand order that issues only proposed resolutions, rather than finally resolving the matters identified for remand, does not accomplish the purpose of the limited remand and does not constitute a final, effective order. - Where jurisdiction never properly attached in the Supreme Court, the clerk may be directed to issue remittiturs forthwith under NRAP 41(a)(1).

Practitioner summary

The court resolved two appeals on justiciability and appealability grounds. As to mootness, the court applied Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010), reiterating that mootness is a justiciability doctrine requiring courts to render judgments only on actual controversies, and that an appeal is moot when no effective relief can be granted. Because respondent's exclusive custody period had ended and the parties had returned to their prior timeshare arrangement, the court found it could grant no effective relief regarding the temporary custody changes. The court rejected appellant's argument that important constitutional issues warranted review notwithstanding mootness, noting appellant cited no authority supporting such an exception under these circumstances. As to appealability, the court held the orders were not substantively appealable because they addressed only temporary custody changes and related measures. Citing In re Temp. Custody of Five Minor Children, 105 Nev. 441, 448, 777 P.2d 901, 902 (1989), the court reaffirmed that an order determining temporary custody of a minor is not appealable. The court also cited Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev. 912, 920, 59 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2002), for the proposition that a special order after final judgment is independently appealable only if it substantially affects rights and obligations arising from the judgment, and Brunzell Const. Co., of Nev. v. Harrah's Club, 81 Nev. 414, 419, 404 P.2d 902, 905 (1965), for the proposition that an order granting or denying a stay is not appealable. The court contrasted these orders with NRAP 3A(b)(7), which lists as appealable an order that finally establishes or alters child custody. On the emergency motion concerning the December 1 limited-remand order, the court explained that under NRAP 12A and Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122 Nev. 849, 856, 138 P.3d 525, 530 (2006), a limited remand returns jurisdiction to the district court on a limited basis to resolve specified issues. Because the December 1 order issued only proposed resolutions (referencing NRCP 62.1) rather than finally resolving the pending motion to modify custody and the objections, a new order would be required. Because the appeals were being dismissed, no additional remand was necessary; the court directed the clerk to issue remittiturs under NRAP 41(a)(1), after which the district court could enter a final order, with any order finally modifying custody appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(7).

In plain language

This is a family-law dispute between two divorced parents over custody of their minor child. After their divorce, the district court issued a temporary order in September 2022 giving the father exclusive custody so that he and the child could reunify. The mother appealed two later orders connected with that temporary arrangement: a November 2022 order that, among other things, refused to pause the temporary custody arrangement, and an August 2023 order dealing with a parenting coordinator's recommendations and canceling a scheduled evidentiary hearing. While the appeals were pending, the Nevada Supreme Court sent the case back to the district court on a "limited remand" so that the district judge could address the still-pending custody motion and the mother's objections to the parenting coordinator's reports. By the time the matter returned to the Supreme Court, the father's exclusive-custody period had ended and the parents had apparently returned to their previously agreed custody schedule. The Supreme Court asked both sides to explain why the appeals should not be dismissed as "moot" - meaning there was nothing left for the court to decide because circumstances had changed. The mother largely conceded mootness but urged the court to keep the first appeal alive because, in her view, it raised important constitutional issues. The father agreed the appeals were moot. The Supreme Court dismissed both appeals. It gave two reasons. First, the appeals were moot: because the exclusive-custody period had ended and the parties had returned to their prior arrangement, the court could not grant any effective relief. Second, the orders being appealed dealt only with temporary custody measures, and Nevada law does not allow appeals from temporary custody orders. Only an order that finally changes custody can be appealed. The court also denied the father's emergency motion to confirm that the district court's December 1, 2023, order was final and effective. That order had only proposed how the district court would rule rather than actually deciding the issues. Because the appeals were being dismissed, the Supreme Court directed its clerk to send the case back ("issue the remittiturs") so the district court could enter a final order resolving the custody motion and the objections to the parenting coordinator's reports. Any order that finally modifies custody can then be appealed.

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