YOUNG VS. YOUNG (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review: The Court of Appeals reviews child custody decisions for an abuse of discretion, Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007), and will affirm the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, "which is evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Id. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. The sole consideration in a custody determination is the best interest of the child, NRS 125C.0035(1), and the court presumes the district court properly exercised its discretion in determining the child's best interest. Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440, 92 P.3d 1224, 1226-27 (2004). Modification framework: To establish that a custodial modification is appropriate, the moving party must show that "(1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best interest is served by the modification." Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 5, 501 P.3d 980, 983 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 43, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023). A court may award one parent primary physical custody if joint physical custody is not in the child's best interest. NRS 125C.003(1). Application: The district court found a substantial change in circumstances based on findings that Alicia coached the child to make false allegations of sexual and physical abuse against Richard, intentionally interfered with Richard's parenting time and his relationship with the child, and cancelled or skipped many of the child's therapy sessions. Evaluating the NRS 125C.0035(4) best interest factors, the district court found that Richard was the parent more likely to allow frequent associations and a continuing relationship with the other parent (see NRS 125C.0035(4)(c)); that Richard was best able to cooperate to meet the child's needs (the opinion cites NRS 125C.004(e) at this point); that Richard was best able to help with the child's physical, developmental, and emotional needs (the opinion cites NRS 125C.0035(g)); that Richard was best able to help the child maintain a relationship with her younger sibling; and that the abuse factor favored Richard because Alicia's alienating actions had become abusive and neglectful of the child's mental health and emotional needs. The Court of Appeals concluded these findings were supported by substantial evidence from the testimony of Richard, Alicia, and the child's therapist. Parenting coordinator reports and harmless error: The court observed that the district court did not specifically rely on the parenting coordinator's reports in its custody findings. Even assuming, without deciding, that consideration of the reports was error because they were not admitted into evidence and contained hearsay, Alicia failed to meet her burden to demonstrate prejudice. Under Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 465, 244 P.3d 765, 778 (2010), "the movant must show that the error affects the party's substantial rights so that, but for the alleged error, a different result might reasonably have been reached," and "When an error is harmless, reversal is not warranted." The court also cited NRCP 61 ("At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights."). Because Richard and the therapist testified extensively about the alienation and its harm to the child, and the district court made detailed best interest findings, any error was harmless. Reweighing: To the extent Alicia challenged the district court's substantial-change and best-interest findings, the appellate court noted it "is not at liberty to reweigh the evidence or the district court's credibility determinations on appeal," citing Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 366, 212 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009). Delegation: District courts have "the ultimate decision-making power regarding custody determinations" and may not delegate such power. Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 21, 535 P.3d 274, 290 (Ct. App. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, courts may appoint a parenting coordinator to resolve non-substantive disputes, so long as the coordinator's authority does "not extend to modifying the underlying custody arrangement." Harrison v. Harrison, 132 Nev. 564, 572, 376 P.3d 173, 179 (2016). Here, the appointment order authorized the coordinator to resolve disputes, make recommendations, and report abuse or neglect, but the court retained ultimate decision-making authority and separately entered custody orders supported by its own findings. Alicia therefore failed to demonstrate an improper delegation. Disqualification: Reviewing for abuse of discretion under Ellis, the court held that substantial evidence supported the district court's findings that the parenting coordinator did not exhibit bias against Alicia, had merely held both parties accountable, did not make improper recommendations or overstep her authority, and that no grounds for disqualification existed. Footnoted issue: Alicia also argued the district court abused its discretion by permitting the therapist to testify beyond the scope of her role, but because she did not identify which portion of the testimony was improperly admitted, the court declined to consider the issue as not cogently argued, citing Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006).

In plain language

Alicia and Richard Young divorced after having one child together, born in 2016. Under the divorce decree, they shared joint legal custody (joint decision-making authority), Alicia had primary physical custody (the child lived mainly with her), and Richard had parenting time every other weekend plus a midweek evening on alternating weeks. Richard later filed several motions alleging that Alicia was not following the custody arrangement and was denying him his parenting time, including overnight visits. Before a scheduled evidentiary hearing, the parties reached a new agreement: Alicia would keep primary physical custody, the child would continue seeing her therapist, and a "parenting coordinator" - a court-appointed professional who helps parents resolve day-to-day custody disputes - would be appointed and would aggressively promote expanding Richard's parenting time. The court's appointment order let the coordinator resolve disputes about the custody arrangement but did not permit her to make substantive changes to it, and it told the parties that the coordinator's decisions were not final and could be reviewed by the court. About two months later, the parenting coordinator reported to the court that Alicia had blocked efforts to reunify the child with Richard and refused to bring the child to therapy appointments, and that she believed Alicia's actions had become abusive and neglectful of the child's mental health needs. After further proceedings, the district court temporarily placed the child in Richard's care for 18 days. When the parties tried to resume the prior arrangement, more problems arose, and Richard moved to modify custody, alleging that Alicia interfered with his relationship with the child, withheld the child, coached the child to falsely allege abuse, skipped the child's therapy sessions, and refused to cooperate with the parenting coordinator. Alicia opposed the motion and asked the court to disqualify the parenting coordinator for bias and overstepping her authority. At an evidentiary hearing, Richard, Alicia, and the child's therapist testified. The therapist described the child's anxiety and said, among other things, that Alicia often failed to bring the child to therapy, that the child kept a food log and was weighed before and after her time with Richard, that the child looked to Alicia for confirmation when making statements, and that Alicia's actions had a negative impact on the child. The district court found a substantial change in circumstances - in particular, Alicia's actions causing parental alienation between Richard and the child and interference with the child's therapy - found that several statutory "best interest" factors favored Richard, and awarded Richard primary physical custody while keeping joint legal custody and giving Alicia specified overnight parenting time. The court also declined to disqualify the parenting coordinator. The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the district court's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence from the hearing testimony. As to Alicia's complaint that the court considered the parenting coordinator's reports, the appellate court noted that the district court did not specifically rely on those reports in its custody findings, and that even assuming it was error to consider them, Alicia did not show the error was prejudicial rather than harmless, given the extensive testimony from Richard and the therapist. The court also rejected the argument that the district court improperly handed its decision-making power to the parenting coordinator, because the court retained ultimate authority over custody and made its own findings. Finally, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the parenting coordinator was not biased and did not overstep her authority.