CAMPBELL VS. CAMPBELL (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

• -A parent who moves to modify physical custody is on notice, under Nevada's custody statutes, that the court may award primary physical custody to the other parent, because the court's sole consideration is the children's best interest and it is not limited to a particular remedy.
• -Where the issues of custody and parenting time are squarely before the district court and a party has an opportunity to be heard at an evidentiary hearing, the party's due process rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard are satisfied even if the resulting custodial arrangement was not the specific one either party requested.
• -A district court's factual findings underlying its NRS 125C.0035(4) best-interest determinations will be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence, and an appellate court will not reweigh the evidence or disturb the district court's credibility determinations.
• -A district court's custody order must tie the child's best interest, as informed by specific relevant findings on the best-interest factors, to the custody determination made.
• -To modify custody, the moving party bears the burden of showing both a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare and that modification serves the child's best interest.

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals addressed two issues: a due process challenge and a substantial-evidence/abuse-of-discretion challenge to the best-interest findings. On due process, the court applied de novo review, citing Eureka Cnty. v. Seventh Jud. Dist. Ct., 134 Nev. 275, 279, 417 P.3d 1121, 1124 (2018). It framed the governing standard from Martinez v. Martinez, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 73, 559 P.3d 863, 868 (2024): "Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard," and "[a] party's due process rights may be violated if the parties are not provided notice that the court will be considering a specific issue." The court held that Nevada's custody statutes put Camron on notice that primary physical custody could be awarded to Hannah in response to his own modification motion, because when physical custody is at issue the district court's "sole consideration ... is the best interest of the child[ren]," NRS 125C.0035(1), and courts may award joint or primary physical custody consistent with best interest, citing NRS 125C.003(1) and NRS 125C.0035(1). Relying on Martinez, the court reasoned that Nevada "allows a district court to modify its custody order consistent with a child's best interest upon the application of one of the parties and does not limit courts to a particular remedy," and that awarding a particular custodial outcome after a hearing on custody is "squarely within the scope of potential outcomes." Because Camron placed custody before the court and had an opportunity to be heard at the evidentiary hearing, the court found no due process violation. On the custody determination, the court reviewed for abuse of discretion, citing Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007), and will affirm factual findings supported by substantial evidence — "evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Id. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. A court abuses its discretion if "no reasonable judge could reach a similar conclusion under the same circumstances." Leavitt v. Siems, 130 Nev. 503, 509, 330 P.3d 1, 5 (2014). The sole consideration is the best interest of the child, NRS 125C.0035(1); Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 451, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015), and the court presumes the district court properly exercised its discretion, Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440, 92 P.3d 1224, 1226-27 (2004). The court applied the two-part modification test from Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 5, 501 P.3d 980, 983 (2022) (abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev. 401, 404-05, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023)): the moving party must show "(1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best interest is served by the modification," with the burden on the movant under Ellis, 123 Nev. at 150-51, 161 P.3d at 242-43. A court may award one parent primary physical custody if joint physical custody is not in the children's best interest under NRS 125C.003(1). The court walked through the district court's best-interest findings under NRS 125C.0035(4): the frequent-association factor slightly favored Hannah, NRS 125C.0035(4)(c); the conflict factor favored Hannah, NRS 125C.0035(4)(d); the communication factor favored Hannah, NRS 125C.0035(4)(e); the mental and physical health factor was neutral (including a finding that Hannah's marijuana use as a treatment tool was not improper), NRS 125C.0035(4)(f); the factor concerning the children's needs favored Hannah in light of the oldest child's treatment providers in Fallon and Camron's inconsistent participation, NRS 125C.0035(4)(g); the nature of the children's relationship with Hannah as day-to-day caregiver favored her, NRS 125C.0035(4)(h); and the half-sibling relationship favored Hannah, NRS 125C.0035(4)(i). The court reaffirmed that it will not reweigh evidence or disturb credibility determinations, citing Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 365-66, 212 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009), and rejected Camron's request that the court credit evidence favorable to him regarding withholding of the children and the grandmother's temporary care of the oldest child. It held the order properly tied the custody decision to the best-interest findings as required by Davis, 131 Nev. at 451, 352 P.3d at 1143, and did not fail to foster frequent associations and continuing relationships with both parents, referencing the policy in NRS 125C.001(1). In a footnote, the court noted that to the extent the district court's oral pronouncements differed from its written order, the written order controls, citing Rust v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 689, 747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987). In another footnote, it rejected any parenting-time challenge under Ellis and Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996). Finding no abuse of discretion, the court affirmed.

In plain language

This case involves two parents who divorced in 2023 and originally agreed to share custody of their two young children fifty-fifty (called "joint physical custody"). They had lived together in Fallon, Nevada. After the divorce, the father, Camron, moved to Elko County. Because of the long distances involved, exchanging the children for parenting time became difficult, and the parents encountered challenges arising from the older child's behavioral and medical issues. In 2025, Camron asked the district court to give him primary physical custody — meaning the children would live mainly with him. The mother, Hannah, opposed that request, said it was not in the children's best interest, and asked the court to adjust the parenting-time schedule to account for the distance between the parents. The court held an evidentiary hearing where both parents testified, along with several of the older child's care providers, both grandmothers, and a court-appointed investigator who had prepared a custody evaluation. After the hearing, the court denied Camron's request and instead awarded Hannah primary physical custody, while keeping joint legal custody (the parents still share major decision-making). The court gave Camron one weekend of parenting time per month, with exchanges in Winnemucca, daily phone calls, a holiday and vacation schedule, and five weeks of parenting time during summer break. On appeal, Camron raised two main arguments. First, he said his right to due process — his right to fair notice and a chance to be heard — was violated because Hannah never actually asked for primary physical custody; she wanted to keep the joint arrangement. The Court of Appeals rejected this. It explained that when a parent asks a court to change custody, Nevada law requires the court to decide the matter based on the children's best interest, and that an award of primary custody to the other parent is one of the possible outcomes. Because Camron himself put custody in front of the court and had a full chance to testify and present his position at the hearing, he had both notice and an opportunity to be heard. Second, Camron argued the court's factual findings were not backed by adequate evidence. He pointed to claims that Hannah did not consult him about the children's medical and educational issues, did not always ensure he got his parenting time, and had mental health difficulties. The Court of Appeals explained that it does not re-weigh the evidence or second-guess which witnesses the trial judge found believable. It reviewed the district court's findings — including the older child's medical treatment in Fallon, Hannah's role as the day-to-day caregiver and coordinator of that treatment, the children's close bond with their maternal grandmother, and the presence of a younger half-sibling — and concluded those findings were supported by evidence a reasonable person could accept. The court had reviewed the statutory best-interest factors, found six favored Hannah and the rest neutral or irrelevant, and connected those findings to its custody decision. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals affirmed.